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INTRODUCTION 
 
What we want and what we need is education, pure and simple, and we shall make surer 
and faster progress when we devote ourselves to finding out just what education is and 
what conditions have to be satisfied in order that education be a reality and not a name or 
a slogan. It is for this reason alone that I have emphasized the need for a sound 
philosophy of experience. 
John Dewey (LW 13:62)  
 
With this call for a philosophy of experience, Dewey concluded his short book 
called Education and Experience. In this book, he responded to an ongoing debate 
between traditional and progressive schools over the meaning of experiential education. 
The debate was waged along long-established lines. Worried that child-centered, 
experiential education was destroying any sense of the value of inherited institutional 
practices, traditionalists accused the progressives of a lack of instructional discipline. 
Progressives, from their side, accused traditional institutions of constraining the natural 
and spontaneous development of the child. Echoes of this debate linger today, not only in 
the debate over proper methods of schooling, but in the larger political wars between 
liberals and conservatives. What is first, the preservation of culture, or the liberation of 
the individual? 
Hoping to dissolve the either-or dichotomy between the two camps and to find 
new ground for experimentation into democratic modes of education, Dewey laid out a 
task for philosophers of education. He proposed that the camps could make no progress 
on the question of experiential education because they lacked the language to talk about 
experience. What was really at issue in the debate over progressive, experiential 
education had little to do with whether or not a child should be educated experientially—
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experiential education in its most basic sense is a redundancy. The traditionalists and the 
progressives were both right—and wrong. Education is both traditional and progressive; 
it must both preserve culture and liberate individuals through the reconstruction of 
experience. 
By turning to experience, Dewey offers the possibility of talking about the 
differential continuities between the individual and culture and between liberation and 
preservation. These continuities can be thought of as of the vague “and” that floats 
between the two terms; the article that both separates and unites the concepts, articulating 
a relationship between them. The “and” is a lived relationship; it is experiential—
experience includes individuals and as cultures; it is in need of transformation and in 
need of preservation. But the “and” here is too vague—what is this “and” that connects 
these concepts?  
To make an inquiry into this question, we need tools, one of which is a description 
of experience such that the individual and culture, progress and conservation, can be seen 
as continuities on an immanent plane, as interests marked out and differentiated within a 
rhizomatic field. It is doubtful that theorizing experience could solve the question of the 
priority of the individual or culture, of liberation or conservation—history shows that the 
intractability of this problem is built into the problem itself. The hope that drives the 
present theorizing of experience is that attention to the qualities of experience can begin a 
different sort of conversation, one that allows for more intelligent discussion about the 
meaning, outcomes, and institutions surrounding the slogan of education in a democratic 
culture.  
For those who have grown weary from breathing the bad air of the debate 
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between progressive and conservative education, perhaps thinking about the 
characteristics of experience can offer a way of rethinking the assumptions that 
perpetuate these warring views. The turn towards a theory of experience transforms and 
revitalizes inquiry because it makes it more attuned to existing habits, practices, and 
modes of reflection. Instead of perpetuating an endless argument over the ultimate ends 
of education, we might begin to ask a developmental and contextually grounded question: 
what sorts of experience should we preserve or create?  
Dewey bore no illusions that turning to experience would offer the hope of the 
elimination of disagreement. The hope was smaller: that the disagreement would take 
place on the same field of play, at least offering the possibility of intelligent 
communication and experimentation. By locating the problem of education within 
experience, the argument becomes experimental instead of intellectual, a matter of 
histories, practices, and forms of life. It becomes an argument for educators—for 
craftsmen of experience.  
So far, so good. But what, exactly, does it mean to make a turn to experience? 
How do we know when we’ve made such a turn? The problem is this: if education names 
an ongoing process of the reconstruction of experience, what is meant by “experience” 
must be understood. No matter the ends of education, an experiential education cannot be 
put into practice without an adequate conception of “experience.” And one of the features 
of experience is that it is constantly changing—outrunning our conceptions.  
For this reason, meaningful continuation of a Deweyan project of experiential 
education needs ongoing work. The educational purposes that we choose will depend 
upon our ways of understanding the meaning of experience. A metaphysical question 
  4 
recurs, rising out of our need for intelligent modes of education: in order to identify the 
features of experience worth preserving and worth changing, we must confront the 
question “what is the nature of experience?” 
So, what does experience look like today? My dissertation combs over 
Nietzsche’s metaphysics of power and James’ metaphysics of pure experience with an ear 
for this question. I hope to make the case there is some value to be found. James’ 
metaphysics of experience and Nietzsche’s metaphysics of power offer us perspectives on 
reality that allow us to make our educational practices more intelligent. Each of these 
views carves out a reality in which the educative effects of social institutions are 
emphasized, and the experience which these perspectives create is a consequential one 
for democratic social education. In short, the encounter with the metaphysics of James 
and Nietzsche gives us an experience that teaches us to look towards the educational 
effects of experience.  
A further claim I’d like to explore is that James and Nietzsche’s metaphysics 
teach us about the role that metaphysical views play in creating an educational 
environment. I intend to make the case that philosophers ought to make a return to a kind 
of metaphysical articulation of the meaning of experience. This return to metaphysics is a 
return with a central and transformative difference. There is great value in articulating the 
meaning of experience in democratic culture if these meanings are evaluated by their 
effects on education rather than on intellectual, theoretical, or purely rational grounds. 
That is, the value of a metaphysical view can be determined by the possibilities it creates 
for the democratic production of meaningful experience.  
Finally, from the perspective of the educator, whose job, in some sense, is the 
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creation and transformation of experiences, it makes sense to approach the issue of 
education metaphysically. The educator, whether we use the standard example of the 
classroom teacher or a large institution like Wal-Mart, Exxon, or the interstate highway 
system, works in and through the medium of experience. An education operates at the 
level of life itself, transforming habits and modes of being. Despite its philosophical 
baggage, perhaps there is no better word for the medium in which educators work than 
“reality” The task of education is so complicated, rich, and meaningful that metaphysical 
inquiry—inquiry into the general characteristics of the educational medium—is a helpful 
tool for educators and their critics. 
In the first chapter, I look at how a dualistic metaphysics that separates ideas from 
practices and ends from means continues to structure the way educational institutions are 
built and the relations between politics and education. I use differences between a 
Socratic pedagogy and a Platonic approach to education to compare two different 
paradigms for thinking through the relation between education and the ends towards 
which it works. I suggest that by moving towards an experiential view of education, 
educational practices might be made more democratic in an immediate way, and 
relationships between educational practices and the larger task of producing a democratic 
culture might be redrawn in more meaningful ways.  
 In the second chapter, I draw on the ideas of James and Nietzsche to develop in 
greater detail a concept of experience. I suggest that prior ways of understanding 
experience have handcuffed the development of a democratic approach to education, the 
renewal of life by transmission. The inability of educational institutions as well as the 
wider culture to provide adequate conditions of growth have led to and are reinforced by 
  6 
conceptions of reality that separate out knowledge from affect, ends from means, use 
from value, and faith from reason. Since intelligent educational practices require working 
through all of these aspects of experience, developing a model of reality that does not pit 
these aspects in opposition, but makes them relations immanent to experience is 
important for educational practice. To this end, I argue that what it means for an 
education to be experiential is that it be attuned to six related categories, each of which 
cuts under and through the oppositions that dualistic metaphysics employs: experience is 
eventuating, relational, physiological, perspectival, ethical, and herculean.  
 In the third chapter, I show how this conception of experience can be useful for 
thinking about forms of education that operate not only in the schools but also in the 
wider social body. I take up specifically the phenomena of war and religion as educative 
functions in the cultural plane, looking at how the metaphysics of experience may allow 
more democratic deployments of these functions. The metaphysics of experience does not 
take war and religion not as unified concepts that we might affirm or reject. It instead 
focuses attention on how these functions differentially create different sorts of 
experiences for different people across the social body. This sort of analysis of war and 
religion allows for more concrete and plural analyses into the particular forms of life they 
produce and stifle. This analysis is the work of bringing intelligence to the educative 
function of war and religion in a democratic way by creating an attunement to the variety 
of ways of life that might be lived and provoking experimental encounters across these 
forms of life. 
 In the fourth chapter, I look at the implications of the metaphysics of experience 
for schooling. I focus here on two levels of education, the question of how a democratic 
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school operates at the institutional level and the question of how a teacher might teach 
more democratically at the level of the classroom. I argue that if education is conceived 
as the production of democratic experience, then we might see the schools as autonomous 
sites for experiments into new ways of living. Instead of judging schools according to 
standards that may or may not bear a relation to the problems that the school community 
faces in ordinary life, we might look at the schools as specific sites of intervention into 
the problems that the community itself faces.  I look at the KIPP (Knowledge Is Power) 
schools from this perspective, arguing that such a conception of schooling revalues the 
teachers, parents and students that are involved in schools, empowering them as agents 
instead of seeing them as victims. Finally, I consider how the metaphysics of experience 
might configure the task of the classroom teacher as one of developing “an art of the 
wild,” looking at how such an art might provide possibilities for making both teachers 
and students aware of the ways in which their own experiences of education are 
influenced and shaped. This awareness may provide ways in which classroom teachers 
can find avenues for resisting the diminution of experience that is common in schools. 
In sum, this dissertation will attempt to make a case that metaphysical speculation 
can be an instrument for renewing commitment to democratic education. Whatever 
conclusions I draw are, perhaps, more suggestive than conclusion, more provocative than 
determinative, more experimental than argumentative. These choices have been made, 
however, because of my own sense that education is more a matter of breaking, openings, 
and inviting than a matter of finishing, refining, and completing. Life, to be sure, 
demands both. But the schools today and the culture at large seems to me to be much too 
finished, much too sure of itself, much too clear about its own concepts and directions. If 
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this is the case, then perhaps what is needed most for the growth, development, and 
renewal of life is a little less direction, a little less knowledge, a little less guidance. If this 
dissertation can contribute a bit of perplexity to the place, time, purpose, and ends of 
democracy and education, then its pedagogical purpose will have been served.
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CHAPTER I 
 
FROM INSTRUMENTAL EDUCATION TO EXPERIENTIAL EDUCATION 
 
Education as Means to Democratic Ends 
Two features mark the question of education today. On the one hand there is vast 
agreement that education is somehow “broken”. It is “failing”. It needs to be “fixed”. On 
the other hand, there is hardly any consensus about what this supposed failure means. It is 
a strange situation. How is it that people of all sorts of backgrounds, political ideologies, 
parents, teachers, students, administrators, philosophers, school boards, races, classes, 
and genders agree that education is failing but disagree so vehemently about what exactly 
the nature of the failure is, how to go about solving it, and what a way of education that is 
not failing might look like? 
I suppose I could take up this problem as well, adding my voice to the cacophony 
of perspectives. But I am not sure how useful one more voice and one more perspective 
on the failure of education would be. Instead of looking for a solution, I am interested in 
examining the problem: what is it that has produced the particular shape that problem of 
democratic education takes? Why is it that education appears as a failure? How does the 
problematization of education as a failing vehicle of democracy function to structure and 
delimit the way in which education is conceived and practiced in contemporary 
democratic culture? 
Failure is defined negatively by Oxford's dictionary, as a lack of success (Abate, 
1998). Failure, then, is a relational term, indicating that some positive success has not 
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been achieved. To see a thing as a failure is to see a thing as lacking in respect to a 
purpose that it ought to achieve. In other words, it seems that in order to have clearly 
defined failure, one must have a clearly defined purpose or "standard". A brief look at 
some examples will show what I mean. In rock climbing, a poorly placed nut fails if it 
does not hold a climber’s fall. Its failure is in relation to its intended purpose: to protect 
the climber. A tire fails if pierced by a nail: unable to hold air, it cannot achieve its 
purpose of allowing a car to roll smoothly. A course of treatment fails if it does not 
produce health in the affected body. Failure thus implies a clear standard of success. It is 
made possible by a clear purpose or standard that “sets the bar” against which the failure 
is made out. It implies that we know what it is that is expected of the object, person, or 
system that is at work. In other words, having a clear goal is a precondition of failure. 
However, such instances of failure do not translate well to the case of democratic 
education. In education the intuition of failure seems to come without any connection to 
explicit goals or purposes. It denotes instead a sense of malaise, a kind of general social 
melancholy that colors reflection on education and educational practices. Unlike our nut, 
tire, or treatment plan, instances in which the meaning of failure occurs clearly and can 
be tied to an already existing standard or activity, for education the problem is to find 
goals, standards, or ideas according to which our vague sense of failure might be settled 
and be made sensible, tranquil, and intelligible—known, if never fully dissipated. In other 
words, the failure of education is different from the failure of a tire. It is vague and 
pervasive: something like a social mood in which we live. Our various projects, plans, 
and practices do not work to solve the problem of the failure of education but are instead 
colored and motivated by this problem. Education works because it is failing. 
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If this is the case, if the thought that education is failing is a necessary condition 
of any action that it may take or any purpose it may pursue, then the solution to the 
problem of a failing educational system cannot lie solely in tying education to new 
purposes.  If the failure is prior to the purpose, then constructing a purpose for this failure 
can only provide a false sense of intelligibility with the respect to the failure of education.  
What might be more useful is to address the question of how it is that education came to 
be seen as failing from the outset. What might education be if we do not begin from a 
premise of its failure but from somewhere else entirely?  
The present analysis of democratic education is an attempt to transform the 
melancholy mood that surrounds reflection on a failing educational practice by looking at 
the habits of thought that inform and maintain such a mood. The implications of such a 
change will be dealt with in further chapters, but I have found that turning my eye 
towards the critical problem of the mood of education changes the place, the time, the 
function, and the possibilities of the relation between democracy and education, 
dissolving old seemingly ineradicable tensions and opening new and stimulating 
horizons. 
The line of thought that funds the gloomy atmosphere surrounding education 
seems to run like this. 1) There is a society that is better than the one we presently 
inhabit. 2) Education is the primary means to this society. 3) Since the society we want 
does not exist, the means to that society—education—must be to blame. Such a line of 
thought is full of presumptions. Most basically, and most important for present purposes, 
this line of thought conceives education as subordinate to general ideas about what the 
proper society should be. It assumes that the sort of society that education ought to 
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produce can be made clear, that there is a “we” who knows the sort of society we want 
from education, that there is a single society that ought to be produced, and that the 
function of education is to produce it. In other words, a standard or set of standards 
according to which education is judged to be successful or failing lies outside of the vast 
multiplicity of educational experiences, and still the failure of those ideals to be realized 
is placed upon education.  
I can make this point more clearly by turning to an example. Take the Colorado 
River. There are many ways to interact with the river. But a way of interacting directly 
through an experience of the river can be distinguished from interacting with the river as 
a means to ends that lie outside of the experience of the river. A river guide has, perhaps, 
this first sort of interaction with the river.  Her livelihood depends upon a complicated, 
contextual, and habitual response to the river. She comes to know it as a various and 
living phenomenon, and her habits of body and mind are rewritten according to its flow, 
so much so that she becomes a translator, a communicator, of the river’s demands, 
patterns, history and modes of life. A master river guide does not take you down the river; 
she gives you a rich and intense experience of it, one that engages the creative, embodied, 
emotional, and historical aspects of experience. She is able, by means of this experience 
to give an intimate experience of the river: to educate. After such an experience, one 
leaves the river with an appreciation of its life: the multiplicity of its power. 
Most who relate to the Colorado River do so in a way that provides no intimacy 
with it or direct experience of it. Take the city of Las Vegas. Just as the raft guide’s life is 
absolutely dependent upon the Colorado River, so is the life of the city dependent upon 
the river. This relationship of dependence however is fundamentally external, for the ends 
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of the city of Las Vegas have very little to do with the interactions it makes with the river; 
they are external to the experiences that make it possible. Though life in Las Vegas uses 
the resources that the Colorado River provides at almost every moment of every day, it is 
possible to go about life in Las Vegas without having any experience of the river. In this 
sort of relationship, since there is very little shared experience between the city of Las 
Vegas and the Colorado River, the resources of the river are used, but in such a way that 
the relationship between the river and the city are almost entirely ignored. Though their 
lives are tied inextricably, the city of Las Vegas and the Colorado River develop with 
almost complete disregard for their fundamental interdependence. The relationship 
between Las Vegas and the Colorado River is one of absolute interdependence and yet it 
is one that is almost totally lacking in shared experience. The interaction has no 
possibility of consummation; it is external in form.  
Such is the problematic externality of the relationship between education and 
democratic ideals. On the one hand we have infallible ideals: Freedom! Justice! Equality! 
On the other hand the school system: mechanical, unequal, unfree. The ideals twinkle and 
burst before us: Las Vegas rising out of the desert, promising hope, glory, risk, riches. But 
these bright ideals also cast a shadow. The logic is impenetrable from a certain point of 
view: our social ideals cannot be wrong; it must be the means of implementation that we 
can’t quite get straight. But the power that lights those ideals is borrowed from a source 
that it draws on daily but hardly remembers. Education is the water and light—the very 
power that makes democratic ideals possible. If these ideals are fading in their power, if 
the Las Vegas lights are dimming, if education is unable to keep up with the demands 
placed upon it, then perhaps the problem lies not just with the power source, but with the 
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blind expansion of the democratic dream. My intent in the following chapters is to 
reverse this logic. Yes: the Colorado River is and constantly will be a failure with respect 
to the development of Las Vegas. So, too, will education continue to fail, unless, perhaps, 
we find the possibility of forging a more intimate relationship between democratic ideals 
and the educational practices they both serve and guide. This is the way into an analysis 
not just of how the failure of democratic education may be made into a success, but of the 
prior question of how the relation between democracy and education came to be 
problematized as one of failure. 
Let me begin this analysis by offering a different way to problematize the 
situation of democratic education: what if the problem with education were not that it 
fails to achieve the society that a certain “we” imagines, but that it does so too well? 
What if the problem were that education has been enormously successful in its quest to 
produce a certain type of human life, to implement a certain sort of knowledge, to 
produce a certain type of future? What if the problem were not that education sometimes 
fails, at the margins, to produce the sort of citizen it sets out to create, but that it too often 
succeeds? What if educational institutions are such effective instruments for the 
achievement of social values that they produce a people who see the value of their lives 
in dead terms: as means to ideals that are all too sure, all too certain, all too mechanical, 
no matter how “liberal” or “democratic” they claim to be? What if the problem were not 
that education is broken, but that it too successfully prepares our students for the future of 
today, instead of—and herein lies the uncanny nature of the problem—the future of 
tomorrow? 
To put the point another way, if education is the instrument through which the 
  15 
future is produced, perhaps a certain amount of uncertainty with respect to the ends, 
means, and processes of education is healthy. After all, the future belongs much more to 
itself than it does to the present; when it arrives, it always arrives as a stranger. For this 
reason, a bit of perplexity, perhaps even brokenness, ought to be a matter of course for 
education—it is a sign that it takes the future seriously, which is to say that it preserves 
the element of chance and uncertainty that marks off its difference from the present. 
Which brings us to the reformulation of our problem: how to distinguish between the 
failures that are working and the failures that are not.  
When Dewey called education the laboratory of democracy, he made use of a 
metaphor drawn from science meant to invoke the notion of education as an experimental 
process. There are limits, however, to the metaphor of the laboratory. A scientific 
laboratory is designed to select a very narrow aspect of experience in order to 
experimentally test and produce a very narrow and precise sort of knowledge. Successful 
education, however, must engage with the whole of experience. Its experiments cannot 
eliminate wildness, change, chance, or multiplicity, and the results it produces cannot be 
evaluated in the same way that a scientific law might be tested or evaluated. The purpose 
of education is not only to produce inert facts and knowledges, but also vital, 
autonomous, and intelligent lives. The value of these lives cannot be taken if the wildness 
of experience is eliminated, for the very mark of vital and self-reliant intelligence is that 
it be able to make transformative encounters with the aspects of experience that are not 
yet—and perhaps will never be—described as known or knowable.  
Indeed, if I reflect back on my own education, I can say that my education has 
been more or less a success in part because this education has produced a great degree of 
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perplexity as to the foundations, intents, aims, and directions of my education. When I 
refer to this perplexity, I do not mean to denote a subjective and contingent property of an 
individualized experience, I mean to indicate the ways in which an objective and valuable 
sort of perplexity has been actively and effectively educated into me. In this sense, 
though the confusion is my own and is felt with that peculiar urgency that we designate 
with the all-too-technical term “subjective”, seen from the point of view of the 
institutions and practices that have produced this experience and even labeled it as my 
own, this confusion has actually constituted my own very awareness of that education. 
This confusion has made me want to be a teacher, to reflect on education, and to 
transform it. I refer to the “personal” source of this present work not because the 
idiosyncrasies of my personality are necessarily facts that bolster my argument, but 
because I want to emphasize that whatever critical purchase I have (or do not have) on 
the problems of education arise out of a particular education, particular interests, and a 
particular temperament—not a mind, but a life. Perhaps by describing some of the events 
that have produced this habit of perplexity, what I mean will be made more evident. 
Although I have been actively and consciously involved in my education, it was 
very rarely that I fully understood the purpose of the events that were unfolding around 
me. This confusion is not constrained by the too-neat division between school and 
society. I have been told that the place of education is in the schools or in the university. 
But I have found that many if not most of my most valuable educational experiences—
and some of my most stultifying mis-educations—have taken place outside of the 
purview of the places that we most readily identify as “educational” institutions: schools, 
colleges, and the like.  I studied Latin in school but I cannot read it. I learned Spanish in 
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the streets of Paraguay and cannot forget it. Was I taught how to pay attention by my 
teachers or by the television set? Did I learn how to obey the rules from my kindergarten 
teacher or from my parents or from the police? “Learning” seems to be a dubious way to 
distinguish the activities that happened inside school from those that happened outside of 
it. My habits are like my ears: they cannot be closed upon leaving the doors of the school, 
nor are they opened wider upon entering it. I have been confused with regard to the place 
of my education. 
This confusion also has a temporal dimension. As a young student, I did not know 
why my education had to serve the future and distant stranger of the adult life that had 
been imagined for me. Now, as the “educated adult” looking back on his schooling days, 
I can see the ways in which my education has chosen the life that I live, but I also chafe 
at the edges of the life I have been educated into. Further, as I approach the end of my 
formal education, it is clear that my own life continues to change, grow, adapt, and decay. 
The graduation dates and certificates I have received mark in no clear fashion the 
temporal boundaries of an educated life. I can mark no precise point where an educated 
self can be distinguished from an immature self. There have been shifts of emphasis, to 
be sure, but my education has had no clear end and no clear beginning. Many lessons I 
learned are still waiting to find a place for their application.  I have been perplexed with 
respect to the time of my education. 
The confusion of my education extends to the question of community as well. 
Who has been in charge of my education? As a child, I felt tensions between the habits of 
school and the habits of family life. This opposition has been further complicated by the 
fact that each school has multiple teachers, each parent, grandparent, and brother different 
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dreams. Outside and beyond those complicated communities, I have the shared 
experiences of friendship and the unique relation of marriage to thank for my education. 
But I also learned from those whom I did not count as friends or lovers, from those who I 
did not admire, from those against whom I set my life in opposition. They, too, have been 
great teachers. Off of the top of my head, I can list a few other influences: the grocery 
store and the movie theater, books, bicycles, sports teams, coaches, doctors, the United 
States Government, Christianity, paganism, Walt Whitman… I could continue. I have 
been confused with respect to the communities, things, ideas, histories, and events that 
educate me. 
Every teacher knows that the experience of confusion can be deadly to the 
educational experience or it can animate that experience, depending upon how such 
ignorance is put into play. As I have already indicated, my purpose in bringing forth this 
confusion is not necessarily to allay it, for confusion taken in the right ways is essential to 
education, experience, and also democracy. Indeed, I would like to suggest that one of the 
crucial problems with education is that there is not enough genuine perplexity with 
respect to education. The meaning, place, time, and space of education is known too well 
and connected too certainly with values that are held to be necessary. Education is too 
readily identified with a certain set of institutions and practices, and this identification 
works to homogenize educational possibilities as well as to tranquilize and circumscribe 
the radical educational possibilities that experience in its ordinary forms may hold. 
Indeed, confusion, ignorance and uncertainty—the certain blindnesses that are a 
necessary and ineliminable feature of the finite and contingent forms of life we live—can 
be put to work in ways that enable the production and spread of democratic habits instead 
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of being put to work in for warring factions motivated by empty names and slogans. 
When education is subordinated to the project of fixing values and knowledges 
instead of seen as a site of negotiation and production of values and knowledges, it is 
badly instrumentalized. Putting the educational machine to work in the service of 
certainties impedes the intelligent discussion of what education is and how it happens. It 
badly instrumentalizes because this sort of education works for the goals of the present 
and does not take into consideration the demands that the future places upon the present. 
These demands are always unknown and therefore require an education that reaches 
beyond certainty, or perhaps falls short of it. A badly instrumentalizing education is 
depicted by Jacques Ranciére book, The Ignorant Schoolmaster, and its main feature is 
the substitution of too much understanding from those who would guide education for the 
understanding of those subject to it: 
Unfortunately, it is just this little word, the slogan of the enlightened—
understand—that causes all the trouble. It is a word that brings a halt to the 
movement of reason, that destroys its confidence in itself, that distracts it by 
breaking the world of intelligence into two, by installing the distinction between 
the groping animal and the learned little man, between common sense and 
science. From the moment this duality is pronounced, all the perfecting of the 
ways of making understand, that great preoccupation of men of methods and 
progressives, is progress toward stultification. The child who recites under the 
threat of the rod obeys the rod and that’s all: he will apply his intelligence to 
something else. But the child who is explained to will devote his intelligence to 
the work of grieving: to understanding, that is to say, to understanding that he 
doesn’t understand unless he is explained to. He is no longer submitting to the rod 
but rather to a hierarchical world of intelligence … thus the child acquires a new 
intelligence, that of the master’s explications. Later he can be an explicator in 
turn. He possesses the equipment. But he will perfect it: he will be a man of 
progress. (1991, p. 8) 
 
Through a badly instrumentalized education, hierarchical habits of domination get set up 
in the name of progress, knowledge, understanding, and enlightenment. If these values 
refer to and justify a hierarchical system where the masters of culture are juxtaposed over 
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and against the groping and blind animal child, then such values lead not to education but 
to domination. The unknown and essentially wild, if fragile, future that the child 
represents is tranquilized in the name of patient and thorough explanation, cautious and 
thorough education, knowledge, enlightenment, and truth. The knowledge of the present 
becomes the disciplinary rod: its power functions mentally, experientially, and 
psychologically, instead of physically, but these modes of power do not change the ends 
in view: to obey the moral and epistemic authority of the educational apparatus.  
As Ranciére notes, this form of the reproduction of social authority is perhaps 
more insidious that that of the rod, for its disciplinary methods work in the name of 
progress and enlightenment instead of under the categories of punishment and reward. 
The disciplinary subject becomes more complex, more precise, and with it the forms of 
power. Ranciére’s analysis is not anti-enlightenment; it identifies that with the 
enlightenment a new regime of power is established, with new techniques, symptoms, 
and modes of discipline. With the enlightenment, then, comes not just a new set of 
values, but a new set of educative functions, a new set of instruments for controlling, 
producing, and liberating the human animal. Enlightenment values are neither good nor 
bad in themselves. What determines the value of these values is the quality of the 
relations that are set up in their name. The values of words like progress, knowledge, 
understanding, enlightenment—even democracy and education—are not determined in 
advance by logical argument or by definition. These values are determined by the 
systems of education and the forms of power that they both engage and produce: the 
practices they select and the forms of life that they make possible.  
A badly instrumentalized education, then, is not one that is ineffective in 
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producing results, but that the results it produces are not educational—that is, they do not 
lead to growth. The ends that it produces diverge from its means of production. It claims 
to pursue democratic ends, but implements hierarchical structures. It claims to produce 
experimental intelligence, but actually draws firm boundaries between the known and the 
unknown. It claims to create active and engaged citizens, but actually produces passive, 
docile bodies. It claims to work on behalf of maturity, but actually infantilizes.  
For this sort of education, the ends of education are conceived outside of the 
question of the means, methods, and institutions that make up actual educational 
practices. Any number of ends may therefore be imagined and used as disciplinary 
authorities motivating the continued, frenetic production of these ends. Education is 
preparation for civic responsibility. Or it is a matter of the preservation of certain 
disciplines of knowledge. Or it is the preparation of the child for entrance into the work 
force, as a way of maintaining the conditions of economic production. Or it is an 
instrument of social or racial justice. Or it is a way of stimulating or reducing the 
possibility of class warfare. Or it is a set of institutions charged with the task of 
maintaining a position of global and economic superiority over other areas of the globe. 
Or it is a way of preserving and maintaining a certain attitude towards religious texts. 
Though the ends to which these instrumental educations are put are different and 
sometimes incompatible, they share a common denominator: the thought that education is 
a sort of thing that is done by a specific set of public and private institutions to young 
people before their habits fully ossify in order to achieve specific and well-defined social 
interests.  
The externality that characterized the experience of the badly instrumentalized 
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education is a mark of the lack of attention to the immediate experience of the 
educational subject. Such an education subordinates experience to political, vocational, or 
moral ends, the value of which is not referred back to the possibilities immanent to the 
educational experience, but determined according to ends conceived externally to the 
educative experience itself. Education is not seen as the laboratory in which democracy is 
produced, but as a factory that churns the variety, multiplicity, and wildness of experience 
into a democratic product. 
By constantly dividing means and ends, such processes of indoctrination cannot 
help but produce habits that are antithetical to the notion of experimental action that is the 
criterion of genuine experience. As Dewey writes, “A unified mind, even of the business 
type, can come into being only when conscious intent and consummation are in harmony 
with the consequences actually effected. This statement expresses conditions so 
psychologically assured that it may be termed a law of mental integrity,” (LW 5:68). Such 
mental integrity is a rare commodity in the world at large, and the educational task is 
enormous. The present economic crisis both results from this division and is indicated by 
the lack of intelligent approaches to the crisis.  It is indicated by confusion over the very 
location of the economy, whether it resides in “Main Street” or on “Wall Street.” It is 
indicated by whether the appropriate measure of the economy is taken by the dividends of 
corporations or by the development of social life. It is indicated by the battles between 
investors working to salvage their portfolios and the vast social consequences of the 
corporate entities that make up those portfolios. On the one hand the economy is an 
empty games of interest rates, stock values, and credit futures, on the other it is a massive 
and equally empty system of “jobs,” each equally interchangeable, each more or less 
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meaningless, its means of production long distanced from its effects. In the end, both 
Main Street and Wall Street are empty concepts—explain to me which one, again, was 
Appleby’s and which Wal-Mart? Which the empty game and which the workplace? 
Which the site of meaningful community experience and which the raging, rapid, 
tiresome and hurried site of non-experience? 
That the difficulty of connecting ends with means in the wider society mirrors the 
disconnect between ends and means in the schooling system should come as no surprise 
because the schooling system is not independent of wider social habits. To see the schools 
as a means to the solution of this problem is, again, to merely reinforce the prevailing 
habit. What is needed is a new perspective on education, a new habit of seeing and 
producing the relation between democratic ends and the educational means that produce 
those ends. It is towards the development of this habit that this dissertation aims. 
 
Education as the Renewal of Life 
In opposition, then, to conception of education as means to democratic ends, I 
offer an alternative way of thinking about education. The point of view that this 
dissertation will attempt to clarify and defend takes education to name the primary 
challenge of individual and social life. This challenge is the forging of meaningful growth 
out of the ongoing encounter with changes that undermine meaningful experience. 
Dewey’s definition of education as “the renewal of life by transmission” captures this 
process well. Organisms, both individual and social, use whatever tools they have at their 
disposal to maintain and renew their lives.  This interactive and experiential process of 
individual, social, and environmental renewal is the most basic meaning of education. 
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When an encounter with forces, powers, and experiences fails to attain the maintenance 
and renewal of life, it can be called mis-educative. To be sure, the renewal of life often 
demands instrumental modes of education.  Experience shows that one of the most 
powerful means of the maintenance renewal of human life is the instrumental adaptation 
of experience to fixed and cherished values. But, as this dissertation will attempt to show 
in various ways, just as essential to the renewal of life is the adaptation of fixed and 
cherished values to new, fragile, and emergent possibilities. An education that is honest to 
the whole of experience with its grounds and its breezes, its trees and its pollinations 
must be as receptive to emergent possibilities as it is to established truths.  
In order to distinguish such an education from the dominant instrumental 
conception of education, which subordinates processes of growth to external and 
relatively stable values and knowledges, I will name this conception of education 
experiential as a way of indicating that it is receptive to the entirety of experience. 
 An experiential education conceives education as fundamental to culture, as both 
the instrument through which a culture functions and the means by which a culture is 
achieved. On this account education happens through the flourishing of the multiplicity 
of experiential interactions among individuals, classes, races, genders, sexualities, 
geographies, languages, cultures, arts, bodies, and minds that is the mark of a democratic 
culture. An experiential account of education still sees education as an instrument of 
social progress, but makes the relationship between ends and means the primary object of 
inquiry, rather than taking political ends as given and making education into a means 
toward those ends. This way of understanding education, then, changes the sorts of 
questions that we ask about education, tying the effectiveness of the inquiries that are 
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made back into educational processes by making them more concrete, power-oriented, 
and attuned to the complex, contextual, and temporal nature of experience. 
The instrumental paradigm of educational thought tends to tie educational inquiry 
into concerns about how well certain educational processes succeed or fail to produce 
certain whats: political or economic ideals or forms of life. An experiential account of 
education is attuned to hows and which. It asks how education happens, which forms of 
education work to privilege particular forms of life, how certain educational processes 
lead to forms of liberation or oppression, which experiences are seen as educative or mis-
educative, and how to transform experiences from mis-educative experiences into 
educative experiences. 
Conceived experientially, then, education is more than—and less than—an 
instrument of progress, if progress is conceived teleologically as the transmission of 
certain knowledges or the implementation of a certain set of values. It is more than the 
values, knowledges, and habits it teaches. Its task is to reach beyond the given and 
understood aspects of experience into a vague and yet-to-be known future. But 
experiential education is also, for this same reason, less than an instrument of progress: 
education, if done right, is essentially uncertain about the progress it is making. Indeed, it 
looks to understand exactly how notions of progress undermine or make possible forms 
of experience by taking the experience of education as primary and looking to the forms 
of possible progress that may arise from that experience. In short, experiential education 
happens through a full engagement with the habits of social life, which are as thickly 
embodied, sensed, and felt as the texture of experience. The challenge that this happening 
presents to intelligence is not necessarily how to interpret this happening in relation to a 
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set of political ideals. The challenges that the happenings of education present are 
specific, local, and pragmatic: how can this situation, this event, this encounter, this 
interaction be turned towards the ends of the renewal of life? And the radical contingency 
of these situations, events, and processes cannot be forgotten. Education, growth, and 
renewal require making forays into the unknown, and the make of such a foray is its 
essential riskiness, the fact that one may not come out of the encounter having been 
renewed, having grown, having been educated, having made progress. 
Indeed, ignorance, bias, perplexity, pain, fear and confusion are just as essential to 
the thriving relation between organism and environment as knowledge, truth, trust, 
friendship, and pleasure. An education that looks to sustain the rich intensity of the well-
lived life does not seek to eliminate these qualities of experience on behalf of what are 
taken as certain or foundational values, no matter how enlightened or progressive these 
values may be, but instead attempts to weave together what is decided and determined 
with what is sensed, felt, and otherwise embodied into a livable, but never totalized, 
whole. Instead of taking values or knowledges as the ends of education and setting up 
institutions and practices that serve these ends, an experiential education locates the ends 
of education immanently to the experiential plane. It understands education as a matter of 
the living, experimental, embodied, and social negotiation of experienced events—not as 
the production of a pre-determined form of life. 
Such an experiential view of education presents radically different implications 
for the way in which societies ought to be ordered. Though these implications and 
possibilities are different, they are not new. Indeed, it is possible to sketch out some of 
these implications more clearly by attending to the rough differences between Socratic 
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and Platonic forms of pedagogy.1 
Socrates practiced an experiential form of education. For the Socrates of the early 
dialogues, education, experience, and political life were not sharply distinguished. The 
collection of Socratic texts shows no overarching pedagogical telos. Acting sometimes as 
a torpedo-fish, as a lover, as a gadfly, and also as a martyr, Socrates constantly varied his 
persona according to the pedagogical situation posed in the encounter with a kind of 
experience. His teaching and learning were inseparable with his living. Socrates is 
attuned to encounters: the pious Euthyphro on his way to court, the all-too-sure Meno and 
the slave-boy in the market, the Apology at his own trial, the Symposium. His approach is 
radically situational. His teaching is not meant to reveal a secret he already knows. His 
methods vary according to the sort of person he meets, the time of day of the encounter, 
who is watching, who is not, and what is at stake in the conversation. If he has any 
overarching commitment, it is to the possibilities immanent to the encounter: joy, lust, 
hesitation, growth, perplexity, friendship, community, tragedy – philosophy. 
For the Plato of The Republic, education was an instrument of the good, and the 
good was an object of reflection. Instead of taking the chance encounter as the site of 
education, Plato attempted to use education to organize experience as a whole according 
to the idea grasped in reflection. What society needs from philosophy, on a Platonic view, 
is not a set of encounters, but a steady compass, constant, principle, criterion, or ideal 
according to which it might be organized. It is the philosopher’s task to find this orienting 
criterion, and it is education’s task to orient social life according to the ideal. Thus, 
                                                
1 Of course, the differences between Socrates and Plato are vexed in many ways. I do not in any way 
pretend here to a scholarly or comprehensive account of the “true” Socrates or “true” Plato. I mean only to 
take them as well known figures whose differing temperaments and styles as philosophers can be seen 
fairly clearly, if roughly, in a casual reading of the Platonic texts. 
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instead of an array of sporadic encounters, we find in The Republic an architectonic and 
instrumental approach to pedagogy. Instead of a mode of education Socratically attuned 
to people, context, and situation, we find in the idea of the philosopher king an image of 
thought as sovereign over all interactions. Thought does not emerging out of, transform, 
and return to life; it appears as a ruler over life. Philosophy becomes king, and education 
the means through which authority finds its material basis. The philosophy and education 
that were integrated in the Socratic mode are separated and placed in a hierarchical 
relation. 
It is not incidental that the The Republic appears after Socrates’ death. The death 
of Plato’s teacher is a constant reminder to Plato that the authority of philosophy—and of 
education—is not given in advance, is often inexplicable outside of a scene of interaction, 
and must constantly be renewed.  The Republic is motivated to undo the contingency and 
tragedy of philosophy, and Plato’s answer to this contingency and tragedy is to work out 
a way to secure this authority. The pure idea needs a method of control, a set of tactics, a 
way of implementing ideas, a bureaucracy that works to organize and harmonize society 
according to a guide or rule of thumb that is the philosopher’s job to find and to teach. 
The philosopher’s truth is never quite compelling enough; ears must be developed to hear 
it, and out of the fear of the powerlessness of the philosophical idea, an instrumentalizing 
education was born. Since the philosopher’s idea was necessarily divorced from and prior 
to the contingent experiences of everyday life, a practice would have to fill the gap 
between the contingent world and the purely known ideal. Thus Plato transformed a 
Socratic pedagogy of the encounter into a technique of wholesale social control. The 
dispersed and plural harmonies of Socratic philosophy are made orchestral: subordinated 
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to the thought of a social whole with its single song. 
By rejecting a situational approach to philosophy in favor of reflection on the 
absolute end of the social whole, Plato creates the classic problem for dualistic 
philosophy: the question of the relation between theory and practice. Instead of beginning 
with the assumption that the work of philosophy happens in and through interactive 
encounters, Plato begins with the theoretical thought of a pure idea and is then faced with 
the conundrum of how to “apply” the idea in a world of contingent change, vague 
processes, unwilling subjects, and ineliminable uncertainty. Philosophy is transformed 
from a pedagogical way of experience into a two-part question of how to found and 
ground ideas on the one hand and how to mold experience in the image of those ideas on 
the other. The founding and grounding is the work of philosophy and theory. The molding 
is the work of education and practice.  
There are two effects of this division. On the one hand, the temporal, the 
embodied, the probabilistic, the experimental, and the vague, are placed into a 
subordinate position and made to work in service of the idea pursued in pure reflection. 
On the other hand, because philosophy no longer rises out of experimental encounters in 
community life, but instead is a pursuit of transcendental ideals, it becomes remote from 
practices. Therefore, “practice” becomes synonymous with a rigid and disciplinary form 
of implementation, while theory becomes the remote and arid pursuit of ideas. In the 
following conversation with Glaucon, Plato paints a picture of this method and the 
philosophy of education that would accompany it: 
“...[E]ducation is not what the professions of certain men suppose it to be. The 
presumably assert that they put into the soul knowledge that isn't in it, as though 
they were putting sight into blind eyes.” 
 “Yes,” he said, “they do indeed assert that.” 
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 “But the present argument on the other hand,” I said, “indicates that this 
power is in the soul of each, and that the instrument with which each learns—just 
as an eye is not able to turn toward the light from the dark without the whole 
body—must be turned around from that which is coming into being together with 
the whole soul until it is able to endure looking at that which is. And we affirm 
that this is the good, don't we?”  
 “Yes.” 
 “There would, therefore,” I said, “be an art of this turning around, 
concerned with the way in which this power can most easily and efficiently be 
turned around, not an art of producing sight in it. Rather, this art takes as given 
that sight is there, but not rightly turned nor looking at what it ought to be looking 
at, and accomplishes this object.” (518b-c; p. 197) 
 
Instead of a Socratic, experiential encounter that puts knowledge into play with an excess 
of ignorance, or makes ignorance out of an encounter with an excess of knowledge, 
education becomes a means of implementing a set of ideas across the entire social body. 
On this model of pedagogy, the possibility of a Socratic encounter is radically 
undermined by the abyss placed between the philosophical intellect’s knowledge of the 
eternal truth and the ordinary folks’ blind, temporal, and embodied lived experiences. 
Instead of emerging out of a chance encounter among friends, philosophy is intuited by a 
divine, sovereign, and sacred mind, and the function of the art of education is to turn the 
social whole towards the truths divined by the philosopher. Since the truth on a Platonic 
model is accessible only from a privileged position, an art must be created that might 
cross the rift between the eternal and the temporal, between the universal and the 
contingent, between the sovereign authority and the masses subject to it. This art’s 
function is to subdue, orient, and tame the primary chaos of the experiences of the 
individual and her community by means of enforcing the sovereignty of the eternal ideal. 
These tactics of control were called education. On this model, the relationship between 
education and the political ideal is one-sided. The transcendental and rational good 
intuited by the philosophy sets the law according to which the practical, contingent, and 
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ordinary practice of education is judged. 
In the experiential encounter of Socratic philosophy, the arts of education, 
philosophy, friendship and politics are related immanently. Socrates is guided by the logic 
of the encounter. He only knows that he knows nothing. The participants in the Socratic 
texts are free to come and go as they please. All manner of social classes are brought into 
the dialogue. All manners and forms of knowing are blended. The Meno serves as an 
exemplary text. Meno asks: “Tell me Socrates, can virtue be taught?” Socrates reply 
opens the space for an experience, an encounter:  
If you want to ask one of us that sort of question, everyone will laugh and say: 
‘Good stranger, you must think me happy indeed if you think I know whether 
virtue can be taught or how it comes to be; I am so far from knowing whether 
virtue can be taught or not that I do not even have any knowledge of what virtue 
itself is.’ (71a; p. 59) 
 
Often these words are read as ironic. How could Socrates, the philosopher of 
philosophers, not know what virtue is? To read these words ironically is to read Socratic 
pedagogy as a type of leading questioning, not unlike the sort of questions that 
prosecutors ask witnesses to get them to stumble into the account of the truth that is 
already known. But such a reading begs the very question that is at stake in the Meno. It 
assumes that the function of philosophy is to disseminate wisdom, to determine what 
virtue is, how it operates, and how to actualize it in citizens. In other words, it assumes a 
Platonic model of education. 
 The text of the Meno belies the Platonic model. Meno is bewildered and confused 
by Socrates—as Socrates is by Meno. Their encounter is one that stretches the limits of 
language and of conversation. Socrates asks Meno for what virtue is, and he is given “ a 
swarm,” (72b; p. 60). Meno describes the effect of Socrates on him as “bewitching and 
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beguiling, simply putting me under a spell, so I am perplexed,” and he accuses Socrates 
of “practicing a kind of sorcery,” (80a-c; p. 68-69). After this moment of perplexity, 
Socrates takes the lead in the conversation, famously inviting the slave boy in for some 
mathematics. It is at this point that we begin to see the immanence of the Socratic, 
experiential education at work. Socrates’ teaching works only after making an encounter 
happen, only after the encounter with Meno exposes the fact that experiences often lead 
us beyond any positive conception of virtue or of knowledge. Socrates transforms the 
philosophical question what is virtue from its tame and sophistical form into an actual 
real and living problem. Meno is angered and frustrated. Socrates is also confused. They 
experience a lack of virtue: the problem is exposed, an encounter is made, and here a 
specific form of pedagogy might appear. 
 And so Socrates reflects upon the encounter and what its specific lessons for the 
problem they have encountered together are. It is only on the basis of the shared 
experience of perplexity—an experienced form of the problem of virtue—that Socrates 
and Meno together can begin to make out the relevance and importance of the question at 
hand. Socrates says to Meno: “I do not insist that my argument is right in all respects, but 
I would contend that at all costs both in word and deed as far as I could that we will be 
better men, braver and less idle, if we believe that we must search for the things we do 
not know, rather than if we believe that it is not possible to find out what we do not know 
and that we must not look for it,” (86b-c, p. 76). Socrates constructs the lesson of 
epistemic virtue out of the shared experience of perplexity. It is essential that this lesson 
grow out of the encounter, and the way in which Socrates articulates the lesson indicates 
the necessity of this relation. Their shared experience creates an answer to the problem of 
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virtue: out of their perplexity induced by the lack of knowledge concerning virtue, a 
virtue is formed. 
 It is for this reason that at the end of the dialogue Socrates asserts that virtue is not 
knowledge and that knowledge cannot be the basis of state craft. Instead, he claims that 
that virtue “would be neither an inborn quality nor taught, but comes to those who 
possess it as a gift from the gods which is not accompanied by understanding,” (99e; p. 
87). To translate into the language I have been developing, virtue emerges out of an 
encounter beyond the limits of understanding. The question of Socratic education is how 
to make such encounters possible, for it is on the basis of these sorts of encounters that 
knowledge, virtue, and forms of understanding that are all too well known are renewed. 
This is the virtue of philosophy: the promise of a pedagogy that works immanently 
through experience in pursuit of its renewal rather than externally beneath values and 
knowledges that are known all too well and are all too teachable. 
Such immanence is divided and replaced in Plato by a transcendental account. 
Philosophy and education, reason and art, truth and politics work as a two-part, weighted 
dialectic. Philosophy means determining the elements of existence that are outside of the 
living flux and education means implementing, through the art of rhetoric, a political 
form that will allow us to live according to them. The true, the good, the rational, and the 
just—the most noble ends of human life—are equated with eternal being, with what is, 
and are is placed in a position of regulative and administrative authority over that which 
is coming into being. Thus pedagogy becomes a matter of regulating and normalizing 
temporal events through recourse to ideal and eternal values, and the task of education as 
a political form of cultural renewal becomes one of unifying the polis by turning the soul 
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of every citizen towards the eternal features of reality, towards that which does not 
change. The pedagogical experience is slit into the dual functions of recollection 
(knowledge gathering) and implementation (pedagogy). The mind retrospectively 
recollects the pre-existing forms of knowledge, and the unity of the social sphere is 
strictly administered according to the recollection of these universal forms. 
 This habit of thinking about how political education functions has been repeated 
and reinforced in many forms down through the history of philosophy. It found its most 
compelling modern incarnation in Kant's moral philosophy and is perhaps most clearly 
seen in his concept of autonomy, which draws an equivalence between freedom of the 
will and obedience to the universal law. For Kant, like Plato, success in education means 
guiding the soul according to principles that have been determined ahead of time. 
“Everything in education,” writes Kant in his small treatise On Education, “depends upon 
establishing correct principles, and leading children to establish and accept them.” 
(2003/1899, p. 108). 
 Kant was a great admirer of Rousseau, whose Emile puts the a priori method of 
education to work in a modern context. To be sure, this more modern good is a more 
intimate “human nature” instead of the distant Greek eidos, but the basic pattern of 
thinking is still the same. The idea is to find a principle or idea that is free from 
contingency, chance, and change and to normalize behavior on the basis of that principle. 
When Rousseau writes in Emile that “our true study is that of the human condition,” he 
seeks the nature behind the culture, the free condition underneath our apparently 
accidental bondage. This nature is meant to serve as a critical guide for education and a 
social reform that aims at producing a universal sort of human creature. Here is 
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Rousseau: 
 We are born weak, we need strength; we are born totally unprovided, we 
need aid; we are born stupid, we need judgment. Everything we do not have at 
birth and which we need when we are grown is given us by education. 
 This education comes to us from nature or from men or from things. The 
internal development of our faculties and our organs is the education of nature. 
The use we are taught to make of this development is the education of men. And 
what we acquire from our own experience about the objects which affest us is the 
education of things. 
 Each of us is thus formed by three kinds of masters. The disciple in which 
their various lessons are at odds with one another is badly raised and will never be 
in agreement with himself. He alone in whom they all coincide at the same points 
and tend to the same ends reaches his goal and lives consistently. ... What is that 
goal? It is the very same as that of nature. ... Since the conjunction of the three 
educations is necessary to their perfection, the other two must be directed toward 
the one over which we have no power. (1979/1762, p. 38-39) 
 
Though the modern conceptions of human nature and the sanctity of the individual are 
certainly very different from the Greek conception of Being, the long habit of thinking 
about the goals of education and cultural renewal still faces a metaphysical divide, 
forsaking the contingent, temporal, and eventuating for the natural, eternal, and static. 
The function of political education is to turn habits of living away from the contingency 
of situation and towards a vision of universal, enlightened mankind. In short, our critical 
practices of education and cultural renewal are thought to be instrumental practices 
guided by a foundational and metaphysical reality: a Being outside of becoming or a 
human nature that is prior to the contingencies of culture or experience. 
 Though metaphysical inquiry and criticism has fallen into disrepute in 
philosophical circles, this habit of thinking about the way education works is reflected 
and reproduced still today. Our explicitly educational institutions are, generally speaking, 
organized Platonically. Their function is to produce an ideal citizen, the forms of which 
are not intuited by an intellectual philosopher king, but are organized according to 
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various prototypes in the cultural imaginary. These archetypes seem to come in three 
main forms. First, there is the archetype of the liberal citizen, whose life is structured 
around reproducing the highest ideals of the existing culture, at least as manifested by the 
literary texts that the culture has produced. This image of the tolerant and enlightened 
democratic citizen funds the goals and practices of the liberal educational institution. 
Second, in opposition to this image, we find the archetype of the vocational citizen. This 
vocational image comes in two forms, one of which opposes the class of the liberal 
democrat, while the other opposes its ideology of leisure. The first vocational education 
is reserved for the lower and middle classes and is organized around cultivating habits 
that will allow this sort of citizen to serve the existing social order with a techne 
necessary to the ongoing production of the standard order of things, such as secretarial 
typing, collecting garbage, or working on a factory assembly line. The second vocational 
education is reserved for the upper classes and is organized around cultivating habits that 
will allow this citizen to accumulate as much capital in her lifetime as possible without 
upsetting the standard flows of capital. 
 While the institutions organized around these forms do indeed produce 
encounters, and sometimes lively ones, the institutions that produce them are often 
structured according to rigid hierarchies that make no room for the evaluation of whether 
or not experiences that take place in these institutions are educative in the experiential 
sense. The more urgent the need to produce an informed and engaged democratic citizen, 
or a soul suited to serve and/or profit from the marketplace, and the more certain and 
fixed the image of the proper democratic citizen becomes in the public imaginary, the 
more homogenous, moralizing, and authoritarian—that is, antidemocratic—our 
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educational institutions become. Indeed, the stress of school, the torrid pace of curricula, 
the number of tests that one has to pass as a child, the immense and stifling bureaucracy 
keep the practice of education hurtling by so quickly in pursuit of the goal of producing 
children who fit into society and harmonize with it that there is hardly time to reflect 
upon whether or not ours is a society worth fitting into, worth harmonizing with, and 
whether the vocational or democratic images of life that fund educational practices are 
even possible or desirable given the state of affairs. The divine act, virtue as a gift from 
the gods, or just plain experience itself of any meaning is not even possible in such a 
situation. 
Such education is worse than Platonic; it works to implement from the top down a 
preconceived form of human life, but it takes this form from the most dominant aspects 
of culture rather than from a rational ideal. Education thus breaks, once and for all, with 
its task of renewing life, sacrificing its experimental and reconstructive possibilities to the 
undignified task of reproducing the social order. Democratic education becomes a mere 
slogan: a practice that reproduces the status quo, rather than one that aims toward growth. 
To imagine education as a system run by bureaucrats and educational officials for the 
ends of economic production is to deny the education its metaphysical capacity as an 
experience to creatively define itself.  
When “education” is connected with that other sacred shibboleth “democracy”, 
our secular religion pays homage to the practices and institutions thereby designated. It 
should be expected that practices that are neither democratic nor educative look to adopt 
these names. These are powerful words, sacred totems of contemporary life, and like 
most if not all sacred totems, much of their charismatic power comes from the fact that 
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they are so vaguely defined that they can be allied with just about any endeavor, 
including ones that do not lead to the broad-scale enhancement of lived possibilities that 
is the real measure of progress in democracy. Such a state of affairs calls for conceptual 
work. How do we distinguish between the actual site of democratic education and 
practices that merely co-opt these powerful cultural totems in search of something else 
entirely? How do we distinguish between education as badly instrumentalized practice of 
implementing ideas and education as an experimental practice of growth? 
This question was a central preoccupation of Dewey’s. As a tool for working 
through the meaning of democratic education, he turned to a third powerful word in the 
American imaginary: experience.  Decades after his famous Democracy and Education, 
he writes in a short text called Education and Experience that  
What we want and what we need is education, pure and simple, and we shall 
make surer and faster progress when we devote ourselves to finding out just what 
education is and what conditions have to be satisfied in order that education be a 
reality and not a name or a slogan. It is for this reason alone that I have 
emphasized the need for a sound philosophy of experience. (LW 13:62) 
 
Dewey’s turn to experience was an attempt to step out of the sloganeering that is 
common in writing on education in order to meditate more clearly on what democratic 
education might look like. The slogans of his own day still persist: some urge for a 
“child-centered” education. Others want “more standards.” Worries persist over whether 
education is “hard enough” to allow us to “compete” in a globalized economy. Others, of 
course, want no children left behind. In Dewey’s day, traditionalists accused the 
progressives of a lack of instructional discipline. Progressives, from their side, accused 
the traditional school of constraining the natural and spontaneous development of the 
child. Echoes of this debate linger today, not only in the debate over proper methods of 
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schooling, but in the larger political wars between liberals and conservatives, each of 
these camps using education as a field for battle among various slogans. 
      Hoping to dissolve this warfare and to produce a conception of education that 
finds a sphere of autonomous experience beyond the sloganeering of the culture wars, 
Dewey turned to a metaphysical issue. His sense was that the political warfare over the 
meaning and ends of democratic education was tied up with a misguided conception of 
how experience works. Both traditionalists and progressives conceptualized experience as 
a means by which each camp could implement the ideal values that they already knew 
were right. Neither camp took the educational experience on its own terms as producing 
its own ends, questions, and problems, but conceived education as a mere tool or system 
for the implementation of predetermined knowledge and values. This instrumentalization 
of education was the both the condition and result of a larger cultural battleground, as the 
value of these institutions continue to be determined in terms of theoretically 
predetermined and often irreconcilable values posited outside of experience. For the 
traditionalist, these were the set of dominant cultural values and knowledges that had 
been accumulated through the Judeo-Christian tradition. For the progressives, the right 
values and knowledges were those that Rousseau located in the radical freedom of the 
natural and secular individual. For each of these camps, the educative value of any 
experience was strictly determined by its success or failure to live up to oppositional and 
even contradictory political ideologies.   
Thus the debate over progressive, experiential education had little to do with how 
education might work as an autonomous site of the creation of democratic experience and 
more to do with how experience could be institutionally shaped in service of a set of pre-
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existing political ideals. As Dewey wrote, education became a mere “name or a slogan”, a 
stand-in for a set of political values that would be written on the bodies and in the souls 
of the youngest members of the culture through an institutionalized educational 
experience. In this way, the school became identified by a simultaneous devaluation of 
experiential processes within the school—weary teachers need to work harder; bored 
students ought to pay more attention—and exaltation of political ends outside the 
school—creating the liberal, tolerant citizen, or the entrepreneurial capitalist ready to 
defend the economic superiority of the country. The very experiences marked out as most 
educational become the ones that serve ideals that are distant from the way those 
practices work and the experienced lives of the creatures which they take as their raw 
material. Such a conception of education marks only experiences of submission to ideals 
as properly educative.  
Dewey hoped that a new theory of experience could aid in transforming 
subservient intelligence to experimental intelligence by shifting the reflection on 
education away from the Platonic question of whether an instrumentalized practice of 
education ought to serve a set of fixed ideals towards a more empirical, but perhaps 
equally ambiguous, Socratic sort of education. By turning a critical eye to primary, 
ordinary experience in all of its manifestations and independent of any relation of 
servitude, he hoped that cultural warfare could be diffused through a set of naïve 
pragmatic questions: Which sorts of experiences lead to further growth? Which ends does 
this growth serve?  And, how can the experiences that lead to growth be used to critically 
reconstruct the experiences that either do not lead directly to growth or which militate 
against its possibilities? Here, surely, much disagreement would remain but the 
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disagreement would be oriented away from how experience might best serve 
hypostasized and militarized foundational values and the rigid and dogmatic practices 
they engender toward the rougher but more productive question of how raw experience in 
all of its fertile and multiple forms both educates and mis-educates.  
At stake is the democratization of the field of politico-educational inquiry. Such a 
shift is quite radical. It reorganizes the sorts of institutions identified as educational, gives 
us a different perspective on what counts as good education and what counts as bad 
education, and perhaps most importantly brings questions that are normally reserved for 
an often abstract and technical field of political education down into touch with the 
workings of ordinary life. This democratization has two related effects. The first is that it 
brings the critical reflection on the values, practices, and interests that fund educational 
practices out of a specialized field oriented towards the narrow set of institutions that are 
marked off from the rest of society by the term “school.” The second is that it renews and 
reinvigorates the stock of critical insights on education by looking to the parts of 
experience that are not normally thought of as educational in terms of their educational 
effects, i.e. in terms of the growth and development of the habitual interactions that make 
up the plane of experience.  
In other words, the perspective that Dewey gives us is one that locates its critical 
point of view from the standpoint of the possible convergence of three concepts: 
democracy, experience, and education. Put simply, the work of democratic education is 
no more and no less than the production of democratic experience. It requires re-
imagining the relation between three of the most powerfully cathected concepts in 
contemporary culture, democracy, education, and experience, and for this reason it 
  42 
requires ongoing philosophical work.  
How to set out a critical opposition between a real education and an education that 
remains a name or a slogan is not self-evident, particularly given the commitment to the 
idea that education does just implement values, but is inherently and essentially a practice 
that invents new values.  If the democracy as educative experience is not to become yet 
another slogan, it is necessary to attend to the complexity and essential indeterminacy of 
the problem it poses. It is not simply a matter of taking an idea of the nature of 
experienced reality and then sticking that concept together with an idea of education and 
another idea of democracy. The question to be determined is organic; it asks how these 
three terms can be critically reconstructed into a harmonized, experimental and critically 
functioning whole. Such is the work of the rest of the dissertation. 
In this chapter I have suggested that despite claims to the contrary our educational 
system is neither broken, nor malfunctioning, but that it is working all too well.  A faulty 
conception of the relation between values and practices has led to an instrumental 
conception of education that threatens to homogenize and level the plane of experience in 
the name of knowledges and values that remain disconnected with experience. This way 
of understanding education gives power over the educational experience to institutions 
and powers far from the immediate act of education: federal bureaucrats, global 
capitalism, corporate institutions, testing agencies such as the college board, even 
political philosophers and philosophers of education. It does so by mis-conceiving the 
practice of education in such a way as to make it subordinate to ends, values, and ways of 
life that are distant and unrelated to the teachers, students, and communities that are 
immediately involved in the situations, problems, and experiences that education attempts 
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to solve. Such a divided conception of education cannot be understood as a practice of 
involved in the intelligent production and rearrangement of values. To conceive education 
in this way is to make it into a subservient practice that works to reproduce dominant 
social habits. The failure of education has no necessary connection to a lack of 
knowledge standards, lack of money, boredom of students, laziness of teachers, or lack of 
democratic values. These occurrences are symptoms of a much more profound failure. 
The failure of education is a failure to empower the people, the students, and the 
communities directly and inextricably involved in education to take creative control over 
the production of democratic experience.  
I have proposed, alternatively, that rethinking the relation between values and 
experience offers a more intelligent way to understand how education works. Yet many 
questions remain unanswered. How exactly does the idea of democracy as educative 
experience cause us to rethink the meaning of the institutions we presently identify as 
educational? How does it help us to be more intelligent about institutions or practices that 
are not now typically thought of as educational? If the value of values is not determined 
in advance but by and through the leading of one educational experience into another, 
what is meant by “educational experience”? And how the notion of “experience” not just 
one more fixed idea that education might be arranged to serve? These sorts of questions 
turn us towards the task of articulating more fully a way of understanding experience that 
allows us to depart from the dualistic idea of instrumental education, one that does not 
need or demand extra-experiential principles in order to address the practical and 
everyday issue of making social and educational goals.  
Completing this task means spelling out more fully what is meant by experience 
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and how experience itself can be understood as an autonomous site of education, 
independent of values or principles that would stand outside of it. This is the goal of the 
next chapter: to craft a different way of viewing experience, one that brings us to the 
point of view of experiential education: a more intelligent relation between education, 
democracy, and experience.  
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 CHAPTER II 
A METAPHYSICS OF EXPERIENCE 
 
As against this common identification of reality with what is sure, regular, and finished, 
experience in unsophisticated forms gives evidence of a different world and points to a 
different metaphysics.  John Dewey (LW 1:47) 
 
 
“Experience”: Some misconceptions 
Already in mathematics, and still more in metaphysics, the effort of invention consists 
most often in raising the problem, in creating the terms in which it will be stated. The 
stating and solving of the problem are here very close to being equivalent: the truly great 
problems are only set forth when they are solved. (Bergson 1946/1941, p.58-59) 
 
In the last chapter, I suggested that education has been often misconceived as a 
practice subordinate to the production of certain ends, goals, and values. I suggested that 
the habits of conceiving the relationship between educational experience and the ends 
that it works to achieve as a transcendental relationship have blinded us to the 
fundamental problem of education. Instead of understanding education directly and 
immediately as the production of experience, education is commonly seen as subservient 
system of schools, teachers, and students working towards privileged cultural ends. This 
way of understanding what education is and how it works blinds us to the possibilities 
inherent immediately in educational experiences themselves and works to maintain an 
unnecessary and often mis-educative separation between the actual various practices of 
education and the ends towards which they work. 
In this chapter, I will offer an account of experience that allows for a more direct 
connection between democratic ideals and educational practices. I will do this in two 
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steps. First, I will use Nietzsche’s criticisms of the dominant metaphysical split between 
the realm of ideas and the realm of contingent power to note how dualistic pictures of 
reality are both of product of and help to reinforce practices and institutions that divide 
the immediate experience of those involved in educational processes from the ends 
towards which such processes work.  Second, I will combine Nietzsche’s will to power  
with James’ radical empiricism to develop an alternative way of conceiving experience 
that highlights the connection between the immediate experience of the educational 
situation and the less immediate, but no less pressing work of producing a democratic 
culture. Out of the conversation between these two most experiential and experimental of 
thinkers, writers, and educators, I will develop a conception of experience whose logics 
are guided by and developed through a Jameschean account of power and pure 
experience. In later chapters, I will indicate more specifically how this account of 
experience reconfigures ways of conceiving the relation between democracy and 
education in ways that empower communities to work intelligently through their 
problems. 
In his Essays in Radical Empiricism, William James lays out the Weltanschauung2 
that orients his critical method, calling it “a world composed of pure experience,” 
(1996/1912, p. 38). By locating the term “experience” at the center of his world-view, 
James created some problems for himself and for the pragmatic tradition that would build 
                                                
2 I have already equivocated. Is the metaphysics of experience a Weltanschauung? A world view? Is it a 
view on reality? Is it a way of understanding? Is it a form of criticism? Is it a frame of reference? A point of 
view? Thus the philosophical mind lays its traps, hoping to catch the wild world in a concept, like a skin to 
collect. I will, purposefully and often, switch between metaphors to try to dance between and around some 
common philosophical traps on my way to making my meanings. This dance (now that I have made it 
explicit, will it be seen as a performance?), will most likely perplex as much as it guides, but such 
perplexity is basic to what experience means. That one word never suffices to gesture towards the workings 
of the world is a fact of the world, one that my elaboration of the metaphysics of experience is meant to 
bring into view. 
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on his insights. In the wake of the dualistic philosophy that James was taking as a critical 
target, the concept of “experience” as used in philosophical discourse had come to refer 
to half of a divided world, the subjective half. As often happens in philosophy, which is 
as much poetry as science, many of James’ critics did not understand that the task that 
James was undertaking in developing a metaphysics of experience required changing the 
meaning of the word “experience”. So, despite the fact that James’ reconstruction of the 
term “experience” was meant to fragment the radically dualistic opposition between a 
subjective world of inner life and an objective world of concrete facts at the heart of 
modern philosophy, James and many of his inheritors were written back into this dualistic 
opposition and accused of putting forth a “subjective” world view. 
Although a century of intellectual work has passed since James’ attempt to 
resignify “experience”, it remains the case that the phrase “metaphysics of experience” 
runs the risk of being misunderstood in exactly the same way that James himself was 
misunderstood. I choose to run these risks for two reasons, one polemical, the other 
practical. The polemical reason is that I believe that any moderately careful reading of 
James’ own text and of the work that Dewey did on experience in Experience and Nature 
and Art as Experience cannot conclude that by the term “experience” these philosophers 
were referring to the subjective phenomena of the individual mind. By using the word 
“experience” I stand beside these oft-misunderstood philosophers (and all philosophers 
who take up the difficult task of transforming meanings) in intellectual solidarity. Perhaps 
I can also push a few readers from outside of the pragmatic tradition towards their texts, 
despite the fact that they may appear at first glance to be proffering a philosophy that 
neglects half of the world. 
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The second, more practical, reason I use the word “experience” despite the risk of 
being misunderstood is that “experiential education” is a common term in education 
literature, particularly among advocates of progressive education. My sense, in reading 
through this literature, is that much of the confusion and misrepresentation of what 
“experiential education” looks like or might be goes back to this more fundamental 
problem of the meaning of experience. The debate over education also often breaks down 
along the lines of the dualism I hope to criticize through the metaphysics of experience. 
Experientialists are often seen as favoring a “child centered approach” because 
experience is seen as what happens inside the child. Educational realists are seen as 
favoring an “objective and standardized” approach, basing education on the “realities of 
the world” that lie outside of the child. This dualism is repeated outside the classroom in 
the battle over cultural values, “liberals” being construed as privileging “subjective” 
experiences that liberate themselves from the commitment that value requires, and 
conservatives being understood as clinging to fetishized and external “objective” values 
from the past.  
Of course, as I explained in the first chapter, the nature of the problem of 
education, both in the school and more broadly, is not whether the standards of education 
be located in the developing organism or in an ideal metaphysical sphere of ultimate 
values. The problem requires an entirely different frame in order to be seen and 
developed, and the metaphysics of experience articulated here is an attempt to continue 
the development of this frame.  
The way of thinking about education that my account is looking to displace can be 
seen in the way in which President Obama spoke about education in his recent speech to 
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Congress. This speech is representative of the way in which popular discourses around 
schooling tend to locate the site of power over education outside of the actual school 
communities. The schools are commonly theorized as victims to be saved, either by 
federal programs, by well-informed parents, by rigorous testing, by sums of taxpayer 
money, by religious or social values, by technology, by scientific research, or by infusing 
the schools with properly trained teachers. President Obama’s (2009) recent speech to 
Congress speaks of the schools as a “system”, whose proper function is made possible on 
the one hand by “lawmakers and educators” and on the other hand by “the participation 
of every citizen.” The ends of this “system” are expressed in terms of the generation of 
knowledge, instead of in terms of the generation of experiences, and the value of the 
knowledge that is the end result of this “educational system” is conceived not in terms of 
the experiences that it produces, but in terms of its value in the global economy as a 
tradeable marketplace commodity: “In a global economy where the most valuable skill 
you can sell is your knowledge, a good education is no longer just a pathway to 
opportunity -- it is a prerequisite,” (Obama, 2009) Education is here imagined not as 
plural and vital centers of democratic life, but as a subordinate system of schools that 
functions, with the aid of the powerful, to produce the answer to a problem that is only 
stated in economic terms. High rates of dropping out from “the system” are “a 
prescription for economic decline, because we know the countries that out-teach us today 
will out-compete us tomorrow.”  
Here we find a vision of schooling that has been totally subordinated to and by 
powers that are conceived externally to the school. There is a mention, in passing, of the 
responsibility of educators, but this responsibility is theorized as one of “making the 
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system work.” What is this system? If education is theorized in terms of the systematic 
production of high school and college diplomas, enrollments in vocational and technical 
schools, and the achievement of educational standards, then the power to create the 
meaning of education has been co-opted by the discourse of global economic 
competitiveness and by the corporations, federal education lobbyists, philosophers and 
scientists of education, and teachers unions who depend upon the perpetuation of the very 
institutions according to which the effectiveness of “the educational system” is judged. 
The sort of society that Paul Goodman described as an exaggeration is taken as a given 
fact: 
Conceive that the man-made environment is now out of a human scale. Business, 
government, and real property have closed up all the space there is. There is no 
behavior unregulated by the firm or the police. Unless the entire economic 
machine is operating, it is impossible to produce and buy bread. Public speech 
quite disregards facts. There is a rigid caste system in which everyone has a slot 
and the upper group stands for nothing culturally. The university has become a 
mere training ground for technicians and applied-anthropologists. … If we sum up 
these imagined conditions, there would arise a formidable question: Is it possible, 
being a human being, to exist? Is it possible, having a human nature, to grow up? 
There would be a kind of metaphysical crisis. (1960, p. 133) 
 
In other words, to imagine schooling as a system run by bureaucrats and educational 
officials for the ends of economic production is to deny the schools their metaphysical 
capacity as experiences to creatively define themselves. It is, essentially, to strip the 
experiences that happen in the school of their power by locating their conditions and ends 
in powers that lie far from the immediate experiences happening within the schools. To 
characterize the schools in this way is to ignore their communicative function, to deny 
their power not only to pursue democratic ends but, as communities in their own right, to 
produce, reconstruct, and re-imagine the possibilities (or lack thereof) of democratic 
experience. 
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The metaphysics that is offered here is intended to problematize education 
differently. It does not look to ground an educational agenda or fix and educational 
system; it is not foundational in this sense. Its intent is to draw attention away from the 
dominant metaphors that guide our thinking about what education is and how it works in 
order to bring the general features of actual and living educational experiences back into 
view. Perhaps it is best thought as a sort of metaphor-machine oriented towards what 
Bergson describes as “invention”: the production of new habits of relating to the world, 
new ways of encountering and working through problems. In this sense, what I offer here 
is indebted not only to the ideas of both James and Nietzsche, but also to their 
philosophical spirit, which to my mind is fundamentally inventive. Any reader that is not 
attuned to the effort of invention will miss the essential shift in perspective that is the 
challenge of this sort of metaphysics to produce. The metaphysical speculation that I here 
undertake with the help of James and Nietzsche is not best understood as providing an 
irrefutable argument for the true nature of the world. It is, instead best encountered as a 
pedagogy: an attempt to transform perceptions. I do not intend to offer “the correct” way 
of envisioning the nature of reality, but instead to offer a view of reality that shifts the 
nature of the relationship between education and democracy, making it more direct, more 
concrete, and indicating ways in which the control over this relationship might be put 
more directly into the hands of those people it most affects.  
I am more interested, therefore, in beginning discussions, in tracking emergent 
possibilities, and in supporting new forms of experience than in drawing conclusions. I 
make no claim that this way of seeing reality is the only or even the best way of 
understanding what reality is or how it works in an absolute sense. I do think, however, 
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that this way of understanding experience allows us to reconsider the relation between 
democracy and education in a way that may lead to more intelligent constructions of the 
problem of democracy and of education. Whether, in actuality, this way of thinking about 
the nature of experience actually will lead to better outcomes for those who choose to see 
the nature of reality in this way remains to be shown in later chapters of this dissertation 
and perhaps in future and current experimental endeavors with which it is the intent of 
this work to inspire and resonate. I say all of these things as a way of heading off a 
certain type of reading of the metaphysical reconstruction that I here attempt. The effects 
of the reconstruction I here offer are not yet determined because the manner of 
conceiving experience that I here offer has only rarely—if ever—been tried in any 
wholesale fashion, though I will of course be drawing on similar attempts to revision the 
way in which we approach education. Thus the success of this account ought to be judged 
by the sorts of thoughts, experiments, and experiences that it spurs, rather than in the 
conclusions that it draws. I believe this form of judgment is consistent with both the 
conception of metaphysics that I here offer and the conception of democratic education 
that it works to invent, clarify, and inspire. 
 
Defining Experience: Orienting the Metaphysical Inquiry 
Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition 
but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple, or a 
demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In 
whichever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is 
opposed to recognition. (Deleuze 1994/1968, p. 139) 
 
The first challenge in developing a metaphysics of experience is to give a 
definition of experience. The purpose of such a definition is to guide our attention 
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towards the phenomenon to be studied. This challenge is not straightforward, however, 
for what is at stake in the discussion is exactly this very question: what is the nature of 
experience. All metaphysics must admit to the problematic nature of its starting point. 
Critics of metaphysics always have two argumentative possibilities available. They can, 
on the one hand, deny that the account given has anything to do with the entity being 
described. So, a critic will always be able to make the claim that the account I am giving 
is perhaps adequate to some sort of phenomenon, but surely this phenomenon cannot be 
called experience, as experience is—and always should be—known by some other word 
or phrase: “a bundle of sense impressions,” etc. The other critical tack employs a similar 
strategy. The critic can always claim that a metaphysical account begs the question. That 
is, it assumes the very way of understanding reality that it attempts to demonstrate as 
true.  
However, these critical strategies also have their assumptions. They assume that 
the purpose of giving a metaphysical account is to secure that account against all other 
possible accounts. Or to argue that such a way of conceiving the world is somehow 
“necessary” or logically compelling. This is not my purpose. My purpose in the following 
is to indicate the ways in which understanding the nature of experience in particular ways 
leads us towards certain ethical, political, and pedagogical outcomes—and away from 
others. The merits of the account developed herein do not stand or fall on their own 
terms, but in terms of whether and how they may allow those who encounter it to revision 
the possibilities and impossibilities involved in democratic education. 
Understood in this way, to write a metaphysics is to produce, clarify, and deepen a 
set of ways of relating to the world. In this case, the manner in which these ways of 
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relating will be produced is through the articulation of the general features of an as yet 
unknown (but hinted at in certain ways) thing – process – activity – action – affect – stuff 
– world: when concepts multiply, for clarity’s sake, let’s stick to the term “experience.” It 
is, then, to produce a sort of “knowledge” about the world, but the value of this 
knowledge cannot be expressed in terms of its adequacy to a pre-existing world, but 
instead in terms of the ethical and social consequences that follow from this way of 
knowing. In other words, the point of metaphysical knowledge is not to identify or 
represent the world. It is, as Marx expressed, to change the world by accentuating certain 
things, processes, and ideas and de-emphasizing others. Metaphysical accounts, then, are 
views, but they are also activities. They are selective and interested: their function is to 
carve out and emphasize certain aspects of life. 
The metaphysics that follows is thus set by the political and educational problem 
identified in the first chapter: the challenge of understanding education in such a way as 
to make a more intimate relation between the immediate experiences of those involved in 
educational processes and democratic ideals. It is this demand that structures the way of 
inquiry and guides attention towards particular features of reality and away from others. 
To speak of the problem that motivates inquiry into the general features of experience is 
already to begin to explore the terrain of experience itself: one can tell a great deal about 
the general features of a mountain by the goal that motivates its exploration. Indeed, 
when speaking of the experience of the mountain, it is impossible to separate out the 
mountain itself from the way in which it is explored: a geologist finds a history of 
movement in its ancient stones, a botanist finds crusty lichens, a runner finds a heart beat 
and burning calves, the hiker her view. 
  55 
To discuss methods of metaphysical inquiry, then, is to discuss a manner of 
experience: how uncertainty as to the features of reality is experienced, how metaphysical 
knowledge might itself produce he experience of the satiation of that desire, and what 
further experiences this satiation may engender.  It is also to begin to give a positive 
account of what experience is because the terrain of habits that make up experience, 
viewed from the perspective of their potential and kinetic energies, is the same ground 
through which the waters of experience flow. The particular experience with which I am 
dealing here—the philosophical desire to understand the nature of reality—is muddy 
water that flows in a deep canyon. “All men by nature desire understanding,” Aristotle’s 
opening words to his metaphysics mark the headwaters of some strong currents of 
experience (1979, 12; 980a). Let’s give in to this desire for a bit, at least enough to catch 
the current. But let’s also take our time on its river, explore the eddies and currents, chart 
the drops, examine the canyon walls as they go drifting by. We might even find a 
swimming hole or two.  
Since the time of Plato and Aristotle, it is fair to say that metaphysical 
speculations on the nature of being have carved deep canyons in experience, and though 
the idea that philosophy ought to provide metaphysical foundations for our practices has 
fallen into some disrepute, the effects of the history of human thought—and the 
institutions, habits, and practices that are indistinguishable from its historical course—
continue to turn the “great flywheel of society.” 
The suggestion that ways of exploring experience are intimately connected with 
the results of the exploration begins to undo the dualism that is a primary obstacle to the 
metaphysical view I here expose. Although it is a fact that the desire to understand is 
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experienced with the realities it articulates throughout the history of metaphysical 
reflection, in practice this reflection has often held the “reality” it hopes to understand, 
and the “desire” to understand reality apart. Reality was imagined as a kind of object, 
stuff, or substance solid enough to provide a foundation. It was taken to be different in 
kind from the more fluid process of inquiry, which empirically speaking has been a 
flowing, rocky, contentious, and often failed endeavor to draw meaning out of that 
indifferent substance. The gathering, changing, risking hypotheses, and drawing 
conclusions had to be thought of as different from the real because these flows could be 
false—and the real, no matter what other aspects it might have, could never be thought 
apart from the true. After all, the primary function of the concept of the real has been to 
provide a standard according to which a dividing line is drawn between right and wrong, 
between true and false, between sanity and insanity, between rock and river. The story 
that justifies metaphysics is something like the following: the reflective organism needs 
an accurate accounting of the environment it faces: or else—what? Chaos, psychosis, 
degeneracy, irrelevancy, instability, danger, death, fear. In this conception, metaphysics 
works like the police: it marks the boundary of civilized reality, saving us from chance 
encounters with the more degenerate, chaotic, and essentially unknown aspects of 
ourselves. 
Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents (2002/1930) is as good a marker as any of 
the emergence of a wide variety of intellectual efforts to read the boundaries between the 
known and the unknown aspects of experience as riparian scenes of vital interactions 
rather than as a stark contrast between hostile and unrelated opposites. More recently, the 
flows of globalization have further vexed the firm boundaries between the known and the 
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unknown, between the barbaric and the civilized, and between the foreign and the 
domestic. When a government that at one moment prides itself on offering a home to the 
tired and the poor, contemplates at another moment building a wall in the middle of the 
desert to stymie the flow of those same masses, an analysis of the interactive ecology of 
the boundaries between civilization and barbarism, between democracy and tyranny, and 
between knowledge and the unknown becomes more than an intellectual exercise. It 
should be emphasized that if a new manner of conceiving what experience is 
indistinguishable from the appearance of new realities within experience. 
Therefore, though the habit of separating the manner in which reality is 
approached from the nature of the reality this approach finds is one of the deep 
metaphysical habits I’d like to reconstruct. Like all habits, it can change. An accurate 
account of the reality is a powerful tool of control, but the experience that motivates and 
produces this accuracy makes its own claims for inclusion in the conceptual apparatus of 
metaphysics. For this reason, I will use as a primary methodological principle in the 
present development of a metaphysics of experience the idea that the experiences that 
demand an accurate and intelligent account of experience must find a central place in to 
the metaphysical ecology of experience. This principle demands that the uncertainty, lack 
of control, misunderstanding, and suffering that are often taken as mere signs or 
symptoms of a lack of metaphysical understanding be reformulated as real characteristics 
of the experienced world.  These aspects of the world are not incidental to metaphysics; 
they often—along with more positive affects like wonder, joy, and curiosity—directly 
motivate the search for a true conception of reality. Indeed, if metaphysics ignores the 
precarious nature of the world in its pursuit of the stable and enduring characteristics of 
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experience, it finds itself unable to account for the very existence of its own practice. It is 
out of the precarious and problematic world that the need for a true account of the world 
arises. Thus, any metaphysics that articulates a world truly, finally, and without error, 
must deny the very features of the world that generate reflection in the first place—the 
natura naturans that is our desire to know.  
My point is not that prior metaphysical attempts have failed at their task; most 
have succeeded in articulating quite well coherent and understandable conceptions of 
reality. These theories had a different task: one of securing foundations for moral, 
epistemological, and political claims. This task caused them to over-emphasize the sharp 
edges of the world and underemphasize the fluid peripheries. Motivated by the desire to 
provide stable foundations, they understood the task of metaphysics to be to give an 
intellectual account of the eternal features of reality.  
If, however, the project that motivates the articulation of the general features of 
reality is not to provide a foundation, but instead is articulated terms of the ethical-
political-pedagogical function of the generation of new experiences, namely in terms of 
the democratic project of producing flourishing interactions between organisms and their 
environments, then the practice of metaphysics is also transformed. If the goal in 
articulating a theory of experience is to produce a conception of reality that motivates 
growth towards a vibrant, plural, and growing culture, then it is necessary to reimagine 
what it means to understand reality and reconsider the reasons why we desire this 
understanding. To develop a vital, pedagogical, and transformative conception of reality 
is to connect metaphysical inquiry with and through the wide, various, and fluid ranges of 
experience. Understandings of the real, then, like pedagogical practices, must be 
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precarious and stable, foundational and adaptive, in order to reflect and motivate the full 
breadth, feeling, and activity of living experience.  
Further and most crucially for the present purposes, this change in perspective on 
what it means to understand reality produces a different reality. How a methodology 
works is inseparable from the results it achieves. This is a fundamental feature of 
experience. The world that appears to the naked eye diverges from the one that appears 
through the lens of a microscope. The U.S. border appears one way from the standpoint 
of Lou Dobbs’ CNN watchtower and another way from the latino rivers that flow from 
familiar hardships to unknown ones. So also, the world that appears from the standpoint 
of the quest for an image of reality satisfying to the contemplative intellect diverges from 
the world that appears from the standpoint of the quest for a living and embodied 
democratic culture. Intelligence takes the encounter with the experienced world from the 
perspective of what it wants to learn from it. This taking, this selecting, this responding, 
this encountering, accentuates certain features and deemphasizes others. The view of 
experience that this chapter has already begun to articulate has understanding as its goal, 
but this understanding cannot itself be understood without considering the consequences 
of understanding in terms of the dissemination of meaningful living. In other words, once 
again, the value of the metaphysics here articulated ought to be determined according to 
the extent to which it enables the spread of a genuine democratic education, one 
intimately related to the movement of human desires and the experienced realities that are 
the life-blood of those desires.  
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Experience as Eventuations of Power 
…the scarecrow of the ancient philosopher: a plant removed from all soil; a 
humanity without any particular regulating instincts; a virtue that “proves” itself without 
reasons. The perfectly absurd “individuum in itself! unnaturalness of the first water— 
In short, the consequence of the denaturalization of moral values was the creation 
of a degenerate type of man—“the good man,” “the happy man,” “the wise man.” 
(Nietzsche 1967/1911, §430; p. 235) 
 
The task before us is the articulation of a conception of experience that 
foregrounds the task of democratic education. I have indicated that this education is 
inhibited by a divided conception of reality, one that separates out the democratic ideal 
from the methods and practices that bring that ideal into reality. Such a divided reality has 
made the question of the relation between education and democracy into a theoretical 
problem, a problem, literally of theoria, of how we see. The challenge that the following 
conception of experience must face is therefore also theoretical. It must produce a 
different way of seeing the relation between ideals and practices, one that “solves”—or at 
least “dissolves”—the theoretical problem of the relation between democracy and 
education by identifying the concrete and experiential forms that this relation takes. If the 
metaphysical theorizing is successful, the theoretical problem of the relation between 
democracy and education will be transformed into a set of practical problems. 
Pragmatic—localized, active, engaged—“hows” will be substituted for the 
metaphysical—universal, abstract, speculative—“what.” Experiences—living, 
experimental, risky—will be substituted for abstractions—arid, distant, safe. 
The most direct way to avoid the hostile relation between ends and practices that 
is characteristic of an account of a dualistic view of experience is to take a concept that 
relates to both ends and practices, but privileges neither, as the most fundamental 
characteristic of experience. The concept that will perform this function is the concept of 
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events. Therefore, I will take the first and most basic feature of experience to be that it 
composed of eventuations.  
What is an eventuation? It is a relation of continuous transition. James writes, “to 
be a radical empiricist is to hold fast to this conjunctive relation above all others, for this 
is the strategic point, the position through which, if a hole be made, all the corruptions of 
dialectics and all the metaphysical fictions pour into our philosophy,” (1996/1912, p. 48). 
Eventuations are the formation of conjunctive relations. If experience had a favorite 
word, it would be “and”—its grammar works not only through the connection of subject, 
verb, and object (this is only one kind of eventuation, one form of conjunctive relation), 
but more fundamentally through the multiplicative production of events: this and this and 
this and that and this. And. Eventuating, the indifferent overproduction of relations, is the 
most basic feature of experience. 
Therefore, to say that experience is a matter of events is to say that a general 
feature of experience is that it happens. Eventuations are temporal processes that emerge 
out of a past and into a future. Experience as event is experience-in-time. The way in 
which this “in” is thought is important. Just as experience is not an underlying and eternal 
stuff or substance, temporality cannot be conceived as a container or as a pure flux or 
flow. Time is as much in-experience as experience is in it. Though time is often 
associated with the spinning of clocks on a wall, what gives the movement of the arms of 
a clock its meaning is not only the regularity of that movement, but also the openness and 
indeterminacy of the events that this movement would regulate. The finishing time of the 
marathoner is a meaningless number unless it forms a relation with the qualitative 
urgency and intensity—the duration—of the experience of the race. The subjective 
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urgency and intensity is impossible to understand outside of its interaction with the 
marathoner’s objective goal and her possible failure to reach it goal. The fencepost-
passing of hours, sunsets, months, or centuries enclose a happening field within which the 
rhythms of occurences lay like waving grass and buzzing bees and the settling of dew. 
Breaks and continuities make its rhythms. 
To say, then, that an event is temporal is to say that it is characterized by an 
intimate interaction between practice and ends-in-view. Making sense of the “passing” of 
time requires referencing both the qualitative flux of that passing and the more 
measureable ends towards which (or against which) such passing moves. Making events 
fundamental to experience means resisting the temptation to give either the subjective or 
the objective aspects of any occurrence special consideration either as a “condition of 
possibility” of experience or as the sole location of the meaning of the event as it passes. 
These distinctions are real enough, but their function is not to draw rigid and 
unbreachable boundaries. Their work is pedagogical; their function is also characterized 
by movements in time: discerning, reconstructing, revising, accepting, resisting and 
recreating. Intellectual distinctions are means of embodied and practical understanding, 
tools for reflecting on events and orienting them towards future possibilities. 
Representations literally “take” from the event, reshaping it in light of and as a matter of 
experience’s ongoing eventuations. 
Here we find the second feature of experience. Experience is relational. It is 
composed of horizontal interactions, pulls and pushes, transformations, growths and 
degenerations. The metaphysics of experience takes the relation between subjective 
desire and objective outcomes as a real event. It refuses to impede intelligence by 
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creating a metaphysical gulf between the desire to know reality and the reality that such 
desire takes as its object. It also takes objectively real things in their connections with the 
functions and productions of subjective desire. In other words, the first principle of a 
metaphysics of experience is that it locates all experiences—subjective and objective, 
private and public, individual and social, natural and artificial, real and imaginary, known 
and unknown—as events on the same metaphysical plane, the plane of pure experience.  
This plane is demarcated by the small and seemingly inconsequential word: the 
“and.” As Raymond Boisvert notes in his analysis of Dewey’s notion of the event, it does 
not transcend, but “encompasses both ‘situation’ and individual” (1988, p. 54). The “and” 
marks out the range of experience: marking the ways in which reality is a set of “withs.” 
Such is experience: this comes with that. This and that. The qualities of these “withs” are 
various: some things are with each other only externally, as a hammer might lie with an 
orange. Others are with each other intimately, as a robin with her blue eggs. Others are 
with each other indifferently, as a student is with the fluorescent lights over her head. To 
take experience as eventuations is to see it as a tissue of ands. 
This tissue of eventuations is split into two specific kinds of eventuations. The 
first sort are epistemological, the eventuations we call knowledge. Knowledge is a certain 
type of relation, made out of a wider field of experience, but it does not characterize all of 
experience. As James puts it, “Knowledge of sensible realities … comes to life inside the 
tissue of experience,” (1996/1912, p. 57). In other words, known objects are specific sorts 
of experiential productions. They come to life as eventuations. Further, knowledge is 
immanent to the experiential plane: its place is as an eventuation “inside the tissue.” It 
holds no intrinsically special or authoritative site within experience. To know something, 
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then, is to be with it in a certain way: “In continuing and corroborating, taken in no 
transcendental sense, but denoting definitely felt transitions, lies all that the knowing of a 
percept by an idea can possibly contain or signify,” (1996/1912, p. 56; italics in original). 
Just as Darwin’s evolutionary theory explains the appearance of living species from the 
point of view of an evolutionary production, the metaphysics of experience sees forms of 
knowledge genealogically: as the “continuing and corroborating” of experimental 
processes, driven by the interactions of events. Objects of knowledge are formed out of 
the interactive processes of eventuation and therefore indicate lines of history and further 
development, rather than static truths.  
Therefore, the truth-value of knowledge is best understood from a temporal point 
of view, from the standpoint of the knowledge’s relations: what sorts of “ands” does the 
“continuing and corroborating” that is the special relation of knowledge make possible?  
This view of experience places knowledge back in touch with power: the question of 
what knowledge is cannot be separated out from an analysis of what knowledge does. In 
other words, the function of knowledge is not merely to explain power; it is power: the 
power to make relations, to continue and corroborate. Just as experience is experience-in-
time, knowledge is knowledge-in-power.  
Thinking, then, which is the active element of the epistemological dimension of 
experience, does not begin with the intention and purpose of a subject and end in an 
external object. It does not bridge two distinct metaphysical realms. Thought is the 
“continuing and corroborating” that rises out of the attempt to qualitatively change the 
character of experience, to give the vast multiplicity of eventuating “ands” the character 
of control. To interpret thought as the controlling feature of reality is to understand the 
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situation backwards: thought is an attempt to control that rises out of the indeterminacy 
and essential multiplicity of the relations of experience. Its clarity is not a sign of its truth, 
as Descartes would have it; clarity is a mark of the power of a thought to keep the 
indeterminacy of experience at bay.3 Just like any other feature of experience, clarity of 
intent or purpose is a sign or a symptom of other, plural, and unconscious powers, and its 
meaning must be interpreted in terms of those powers. Thought is a specific sort of 
eventuating; it is a way of transforming a particular “and” of experience into a more 
intimate sort of relation, the knowledge relation.  
Our conception of knowledge as eventuation implies that the epistemological 
dimension of experience is not the whole of experience. The “continuing and 
corroborating”—the controlling—quality of the knowledge relation is itself a relation; it 
is with another basic element of experience. There are eventuations that spur the 
formation of the knowledge relation. There are eventuations that defy the formation of 
the knowledge relation. There are eventuations that are indifferent to the formation of the 
knowledge relation. Nietzsche’s concept for these sorts of non-epistemic eventuations is 
the physiological.  
The third general feature of experience is that it is physiological. As Nietzsche 
writes, thought emerges out of this dimension. Knowledge is subject to, dependent on, 
and formed by elements of experience that are prior to knowledge:4 
                                                
3 Compare also Peirce’s criticisms of the method of tenacity and the method of authority in “The Fixation 
of Belief” (1992/1877). Peirce describes in this essay how these two methods are linked. When the tenacity 
with which an individual clings to the clarity of his belief fails on its encounter with other, alien, 
indecipherable beliefs, the tenacity of the individual becomes social. But the will of the state is no more or 
less arbitrary than the will of the individual; it has only more power to terrify. Peirce postulates an 
externality of experience independent of thought as the first principle of science; the function of this 
principle is to make the clarity of thought hesitate as to its autonomy. It points outward from thought to 
what is not clear: to what it cannot, may not, might not yet determine. 
4 This notion that knowledge and ignorance can be organized and transformed by elements of experience 
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Starting point the body and physiology: why? – What we gain is the right idea of 
the nature of our subject-unity – namely as rulers at the head of a commonwealth, 
not as ‘souls’ or ‘life forces’ – and likewise the right idea of these rulers’ 
dependence on the rules and on those conditions of order of rank and division of 
labour which make possible both the individual and the whole…What’s most 
important, however: that we understand the ruler and his subjects as being of the 
same kind, all feeling, thinking, willing –and that whenever we see or sense 
movement in the body, we learn to infer a kind of corresponding, subjective, 
invisible life. (2003, §40[21]; p. 43-44) 
 
The “physiological” in Nietzsche’s text does not refer to body of knowledge produced by 
science. Knowledge is is the part of experience that has been past-participled: reflected, 
subdued, controlled, and organized. However, the physiological events of experience 
operate according to another logic entirely. Their grammar is the wilder and more 
experimental gerund: undergoing, eating, feeling, digesting, moving, defecating, 
copulating, pleasuring, suffering. It is out of these elements that the demand for control 
that makes up the will to knowledge is derived. In other words, the physiological aspects 
of experience are the eventuations of experience that are not recognized but are sensed. 
They operate according to a physio-logic rather than an intellectual logic. These relations 
are resistant to the operations of knowledge, but they are essential and fundamental to the 
operation of intelligence.  
This point is crucial because it begins to bring forward the nature of experimental 
pedagogy. It is customary to say that the experimental method is the best way towards 
knowledge. However, if knowledge is only one aspect of experience as events, then a 
fully experiential experimental method cannot have as its only goal the production of 
knowledge. What is essential is the quality of the interaction between knowledge and the 
                                                
that lie outside of the epistemic relation is brought forward both by Carole Pateman’s work on the Sexual 
Contract (1988) and Charles’ Mills work on the Racial Contract (1997). Both of these theorists work to 
show in quite brilliant and insightful ways how the non-epistemic functions of experience can work to 
transform and pervert epistemic functions—and vice-versa. 
  67 
physiological aspects of experience, the way in which these relations are with each other. 
Since both of these aspects are ineliminable aspects of living experience, the question of 
pedagogy is not how to declare war on the physiological on behalf of the epistemological. 
The central pedagogical concern is with the maintaining the interaction between these 
two basic elements of experience. One side of the interaction cannot be sacrificed for the 
domination of one side over the other. Therefore, the experimental method properly 
understood does not serve the production of knowledge. It names the experiential 
interaction, the continuing and corroborating and the stupefying, bewildering, and 
wondering that marks the relations between knowledge and the physiological aspects of 
experience. This interaction is the very soul of the reflective experience. The question of 
pedagogy is how to make this interaction vital instead of hostile, leading to the 
enhancement and development of the powers and capacities of experience instead of to 
their diminution or death. 
By giving the bodily aspects of experience their due and by taking the event of 
interaction between the epistemological and the physiological aspects of experience as 
primary, the metaphysics of experience radically extends the purposes of the 
experimental method. By bringing knowledge together with the a-known, the 
metaphysics of experience produces what Deleuze (1994/1968) calls a new “image of 
thought,” one that imagines the function of thinking as the production of an experience: 
an encounter. Knowledge is not the end of thinking. Thinking names the encounter within 
experience among the logics of the past-participled knowledge and the gerunding a-
known physiological.  In other words, we must not only wring knowledge out of events, 
but we must also, experimentally, put this knowledge back into relation with the affective 
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and power-laden dimension of experience. If knowledge is a type of power to control, it 
is also the subjection of knowledge to powers outside of control that produces the 
thriving interaction called experimentation that leads to the production of meaning. The 
meeting of control with what is not in control; the forms of relation that are produced out 
of this meeting: this is the nature of the encounter, the pedagogical task that is demanded 
out of the conception of experience as eventuating, epistemological, and physiological. 
The fourth characteristic of experience is that it is ethical. If events, as 
interactions, are essentially experimental encounters, then the outcomes of these 
encounters are not matter of epistemology, of the limits and possibilities of knowledge, 
but a matter of ethics, a matter of how the encounter is made. The ethical terms “good” 
and “bad” refer to the outcome of the encounter; they are means of directing its further 
eventuations. The encounter demands not the known truth of an accurate recounting, but 
the formation of a life. As Deleuze writes: “A life is everywhere, in all moments that a 
given subject goes through and that are measured by given objects: an immanent life 
carrying with it the events or singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and 
objects,” (2001/1995 p. 29). Experience as continuous transition, as the interaction of the 
epistemological and the physiological, demands a pedagogy: the construction of a life. 
Here is Nietzsche: 
Learning to see – habituating the eye to repose, to patience, to letting things come 
to it; learning to defer judgment, to investigate and comprehend the individual 
case in all its aspects. This is the first preliminary schooling in spirituality: not to 
react immediately to a stimulus, but to have the restraining, stock-taking instincts 
in one’s control. Learning to see, as I understand it, is almost what is called in 
unphilosophical language ‘strong will power’: the essence of it is precisely not to 
‘will’, the ability to defer decision. (1990/1889, p. 76).  
 
The first ethical principle that the pedagogy of life demands is that one must affirmatively 
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resist the encounter. The encounter is an interaction, a play of powers, and in order to 
engage in this play a degree of difference is necessary. As an interaction, the encounter is 
characterized by being between, and the space of the encounter is opened up by what 
Nietzsche (1992/1888) calls elsewhere “the pathos of distance.” Thus, the first 
preliminary schooling in spirituality, the schooling that makes further learning possible is 
not to react. Nietzsche continues:  
A practical application of having learned to see: one will have become slow, 
mistrustful, resistant as a learner in general. In an attitude of hostile calm one will 
allow the strange, the novel of every kind to approach one first – one will draw 
one’s hands back from it. To stand with all doors open, to prostrate oneself 
submissively before every petty fact, to be ever itching to mingle with, plunge 
into other people and other things, in short our celebrated modern objectivity, is 
bad taste, is ignoble par excellence. (1990/1889, p. 76) 
 
The difference between resisting and reacting is fundamental to an ethics of the 
encounter. To react, to “stand with all doors open,” to “plunge into,” to “mingle with,” the 
encounter is to close it off because an encounter is, most essentially, a matter of meeting 
with the “strange” and “novel” aspects of existence. To encounter is always to encounter 
something new: this is the positive meaning of the event. This means resisting, which is 
the particular sort of application of power called criticism. This resistance creates 
experience with meaning: experience with has a past and a future, interests and 
oppositions, growths and degenerations, meanings and silences. All of these are 
communications, messages sent and received. 
 As we have already seen, from the point of view I have been articulating, 
effective criticism cannot remain at the level of concepts. Criticism must itself be 
conceptualized as an event of power and as an encounter with other powers. It is in this 
way that we become attuned to the experiential effects of criticism. Such a criticism 
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requires two moments. First, it requires conceptual identification and definition. Good 
analysis requires that the concepts used to characterize the event correspond with the 
event: the traditional epistemological “correspondence” notion of truth. This is, however, 
a relatively trivial aspect of criticism, and intelligence cannot stop with identification, it 
must also enact a perspective; it must interpret. We must say what the event is known as. 
Nietzsche puts the point this way: “Inasmuch as the word ‘knowledge has any meaning at 
all, the world is knowable: but it is variously interpretable; it has no meaning behind it 
but various meanings. ‘Perspectivism’. It is our needs which interpret the world: our 
drives and their for and against,” (2003, §7[60]; p. 139). Identification of perspective is 
the ethical aspect of intelligence, if what is understood by ethical is “related to an ethos, a 
perspective, a dynamic form of life.” This ethical moment requires an engagement of 
powers. If understanding is to be an encounter, criticism must selectively engage the 
event and transform the event for the better. This selective engagement with power is 
crucial to an intelligent encounter with a world of pure experience. 
The fifth aspect of experience is that it is perspectival. To note this aspect of 
experience is to say directly what has already been implied in prior discussions of 
meaning. If what experience is cannot be separated out from how the power relations 
through which it is encountered work, then to say that the primary category of experience 
is the event is to say that reality is perspectival. The elements of the plane of 
experience—thinking, imagining, conceptualizing, desiring, wanting, needing, feeling, 
enduring, traveling, retreating, taking, giving, enjoying, suffering, loving, hating, 
fighting, and embracing—appear as lived events, that is as the site of possible ethical 
encounters. The determination of their meanings demands experiencing them as ethically 
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charged, which means taking them up, selectively and experimentally as values, towards 
an end in view, and away from other possible ends. This “towards” and “away” 
determines a perspective. 
Perspectivism is often lampooned by moralists as a matter of “anything goes.” It 
is sometimes said that conceiving the meaning of values in terms of their experienced 
relations disavows the demand that is at the very nature of what a value means. Moral 
values, after all, require commitment! They are to be served and obeyed, the moralist 
says, not merely experienced.  We ought to make ourselves more like them, not make 
them more like us. Our ideals are not our friends and enemies; they are our masters. Their 
meaning is already obvious; all there is for us to do is to say yes or no, to succeed in the 
implementation of the ideal or to fail. 
However, such a characterization of perspectivism radically misunderstands the 
meaning of commitment. It imagines the relation between commitment and value as an 
external relation, as one of slave and master, because it makes, once again, an absolute 
distinction between what an idea is and how an ideal functions. Commitments, however, 
are not only the means to values; commitments necessary for values. We know our values 
not by the ideals that we speak, but by the lives that we lead. Our values are written in the 
body: our behavior, on our skin, in the flashing of eyes, the grinding of teeth, moments of 
elation, sighs of relief, our grief, confusion, anticipation and contentment are marks of the 
values we hold. Thus, the commitment that perspectivism demands is a not a blind faith 
in a law or a principle that speaks externally or from above, but is instead an 
acknowledgment of the interactive nature of experience. The “towards” and “away” in 
experience that are features of its flow are also sites of interactive engagement, 
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possibilities for activity and response.  
A perspective, then, is an embodied, ongoing, and experimental ethos. This ethos 
is not given, beforehand, as if by executive fiat. It is selected: achieved and cultivated, 
when it is possible, away from an encounter with an event and towards the next 
encounter. In other words, the production of meaning is inextricable bound up with the 
production of a habit of life. It is the result of interactions, and it makes new interactions 
possible. As such, the commitment that perspectivism demands is experimental, 
pedagogical, and open to risk. It is precarious and living. Indeed, perspectivism’s 
understanding is that commitment not only opens avenues but also closes them. 
Flourishing in one area always demands pruning possibilities in another.  
Sixthly, experience is herculean.5 It takes effort outside of an economy of 
compensation. Experience is multiple, life is finite, singular, and precarious, and the 
commitments entered into are produced through the intense and sometimes tragic 
demands that the singularity and finitude of life places on the teeming and interwoven 
strands of experience. If the attunement to events is radically focused on the experiences 
of human beings, it is equally attuned to the fact that being human means living in a 
world that is to a large degree indifferent to human aspiration. The metaphysics of 
experience does not place the human subject at the center of experience as its focal point 
and master, but locates it within experience, as aspect one of its many events. The subject, 
when it exists at all, is an event whose powers and productions are dependent upon and 
emerge out of interactions with objects, with physiological unknowns, pleasures and 
                                                
5 I owe this idea to John Stuhr’s Pragmatism, Postmodernism, and the Future of Philosophy. Stuhr writes, 
“…each person faces a Herculean labor that is both personal and practical: to determine how to think 
differently and live differently in the future from how one does in the present, and to act now so as to most 
fully move one’s thought and life in this, rather than some other, direction,” (2003, p. 1). 
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pains, joys and sorrows, boredom and anxiety, and the desires of other perspectives. 
Nietzsche calls these open, living, and dependent interactions “the body”: 
Put briefly, perhaps the entire evolution of the spirit is a question of the body; it is 
a history of the higher body that emerges into our sensibility. … Or rather: 
hundreds of thousands of experiments are made to change the nourishment, the 
mode of living and of dwelling of the body; consciousness and evaluations in the 
body, all kinds of pleasures and displeasure, are signs of these changes and 
experiments. In the long run, it is not a question of man at all: he is to be 
overcome. (1968/1911, §676; p. 358) 
 
Understanding experience in this way means moving away from the idea that “man”—
whether understood as Rousseau’s natural and originary individual, Plato’s philosopher, 
the democratic citizen, the bourgeois businessman, or an economic self-interested rational 
agent—is the measure of all things. It is a movement away from a teleological education 
towards an education that works through “the body”: the measure of man is both taken 
and undone, repeatedly, experimentally and inexhaustibly, by and through perspectival 
events of power, events that are taken as immanent to the experiential plane. “Radical 
empiricism, unable to close its eyes to the transitions caught in actu, accounts for the self-
transcendency or the pointing, (whichever you may call it),” says James, “as a process 
that occurs within experience,” (1996/1912, p. 239).  Such a radical empiricism would be 
a lived and experiential pedagogy, one that works to create conditions under which the 
experiences that have not yet been named, that are not yet human and perhaps never will 
be can occur. These modes of experience are the very condition of the growing 
interaction that is the criterion of educative experience. 
James’ radical empiricism is one that does not neglect any dimension of 
experience. It thus places a higher demand on education, for pedagogy must care for and 
cultivate—but also let play and moves with—the fragile interactions between intellect 
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and affect, between body and mind without the consolation of a promised land or an end 
to time. This same caring and cultivating radical empiricism must also affirmatively and 
steadfastly resist every tendency of thought that attempts to ignore or belittle the 
developing an emergent dimensions of experience in the fetishized name of single idea: 
Geist, man, God, subject, Truth, Good, Justice, Reason, democracy, – the list will surely 
go on. Radical empiricism’s pedagogy works like Penelope’s weaving: relentlessly 
unweaving any finished moral image into a landscape of multiple powers, unmasking 
what appears as a dominating idea. But also weaving the tangled threads experience back 
together in a looser and more colorful cloth by interpreting it back into the historical, 
physiological, and affective language of events. Radical empiricism waits always for 
Odysseus, without need or demand for the hero’s return. It is, in this way, incomplete but 
also open. Constrained, but also free. Ignorant, but also learning. It actively resists any 
philosophy that would close down the universe. “There is a story of two clergymen,” 
writes James, 
asked by mistake to conduct the same funeral. Once came first and had got no 
farther than “I am the Resurrection and the Life,” when the other entered. “I am 
the Resurrection and the Life,” cried the latter. The “through-and-through” 
philosophy, as it actually exists, reminds many of us of that clergyman. It seems 
too buttoned-up and white-chokered and clean-shaven a thing to speak for the vast 
slow-breathing unconscious Kosmos with its dread abysses and unknown tides. 
The “freedom” we want to see there is not the freedom, with a string tied to its leg 
and warranted not to fly away, of that philosophy. “Let it fly away,” we say, “from 
us!” What then?” (1996/1912, p. 278) 
 
A metaphysics that resonates with and places education at the center of social life must 
acknowledge and respect the ever-unfinished nature of reality. Education names this 
unfinished project. Too often what is unfinished is prematurely closed off. Values, test 
scores, bureaucracy, fatigue, and even knowledge are used to suture up the loose threads 
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of experience. But the openness of experience is basic and cannot be tamed through any 
processes. It is a pervasive and ineliminable feature of existence, just as the work of 
education is also never done. The challenge that goes by the name of education is not 
how to finish or to perfect culture, but how to renew its life.  
 It is in this light that failures of the educational system ought to be considered. 
Education will always and necessarily fail if the project of education is thought in terms 
of the development of a “system” that works to implement pre-established values or sets 
of knowledge because the project of education is one of opening as much as it is one of 
closing. Done properly, education generates ignorance as much as it generates 
knowledge. It touches and reaches into wildness, intensifying it and putting it to work.  It 
knowingly, actively, and caringly brings people into contact with uncertainty, with the 
loss of identity, with the disruption of the very values they hold most dear. Education 
must actively attend to these things if it is to live up to its definition as the renewal of life. 
If flux and the uncertainty that accompanies it is a threat to life, so too is rigidity and the 
certainty that accompanies it. Renewal, the art of education, requires attending to and 
cultivating both elements of experience. 
The creation of such a pedagogy means putting the metaphysics of experience to 
work in and through a critical genealogical method, a method that, in turn, takes its cue 
from the nature of experienced events. The way in which Nietzsche employs the idea of 
will to power provides a model for thinking about metaphysics as not simply a 
hegemonic way of interpreting the real, but as an instrument and weapon for social 
inquiry. The sickness of classic metaphysics, what Nietzsche calls the “frog’s 
perspective”, has its place within the overall ecology of Nietzschean thought (1992/1886, 
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p. 200). Nietzsche’s problem was never with classical metaphysics as a perspective, but 
with the refusal of classical metaphysics to acknowledge that it is a perspective: an 
attunement to certain aspects of reality and not others. Classic metaphysics ignores its 
will to power; it ignores its perspective and its creative responsibility. It imagines its will 
as a will to truth that is somehow unsullied by perspective, history, blindness, time, 
contingency, and chance and measures the success of its thinking by the distance that it 
moves from the categories of ordinary experience.  
The critical question of a metaphysics is not, however, whether or not it produces 
a sense of absolute correspondence, identity, or representation to a reality that pre-exists 
its production. Instead, a Nietzschean approach to metaphysics takes reflection on the 
nature of the world as an essential and creative aspect of living. Like all modes of 
reflection, its value is judged in terms of the forms of experienced life it makes possible, 
or impossible. Whose life does a metaphysics empower: that of the priest or that of the 
warrior?  Which qualities of experience does a metaphysics reinforce: revenge and 
ressentiment or affirmation and joy? What does the metaphysics work to empower: the 
same structures that already dominate contemporary life or the disempowered, marginal, 
and suffering that may not yet be structures?  
Nietzsche’s metaphysics does not stand over and against experience but is 
integrated immanently with the plane of experience, and its values are likewise taken in 
terms of living, partial, open, and happening experience. As Michel Haar writes,  
If Nietzsche’s last word takes us back towards a metaphysics of immanence or 
within immanence, it leads us also perhaps not to the direct reestablishing or 
validating of metaphysics, but to reevaluating its concept, once this concept has 
been freed of its reactive, negative, essentially pejorative charge and of its status 
as an obstacle to overcome. (1996/1993, p. xiii) 
 
  77 
Nietzsche’s metaphysics is, therefore, not simply a replacement of prior modes of 
metaphysical thought. It does not simply reject metaphysics or attempt to move past it. 
Seeing the value of Nietzsche’s metaphysics requires looking to its power to make 
encounters with and through events. Will to power is a metaphysics born out of the living 
encounter with the nihilistic and mis-educative consequences of the dualisms of Christian 
and Platonic metaphysics. The metaphysics of will to power is a form of creative 
pedagogy that rises out of the contingency of this encounter, and its value ought not to be 
measured according to this encounter, not according to the standards of the old 
metaphysics it is meant to reconstruct.  
As Haar suggests, the meaning of will to power is seen in its transformation of the 
very concept of metaphysics. Nietzsche takes the whole discourse of metaphysics in 
terms of its experiential functions, which is to say, in terms of its will to power. The 
consistency of the Nietzschean metaphysics is between the mode of critical evaluation it 
allows and the view of reality that emerges from the critical evaluation. Its essence and 
function—the theory and its practice, the idea and its power—can be distinguished 
intellectually, but not metaphysically at the level of the experience of his thought. What 
will to power is cannot be distinguished from how it operates. Will to power, like 
Jamesian experience, is a dynamic metaphysics in process, and its name refers to just this 
dynamism. Emerging out of an encounter, will to power is a contingent and singular 
phenomenon, as contingent and singular as Nietzsche’s own vision. But the singular 
lesson of will to power is that the singularity and contingency of metaphysics is no 
argument against the usefulness of metaphysical speculation for a singular and contingent 
project. All new thoughts and experiences are singular and contingent: these are the very 
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qualities that make them new. For a metaphysics centered on the centrality of the 
educational task, which is the renewal of life by transmission, attunement to the singular 
and contingent aspects of experience is perhaps the most powerful gift a metaphysics can 
give.  
By emphasizing reconstruction and transvaluation as attitudes of empowerment 
and resistance, will to power names the difficult task of life, which is the series of fragile 
and always eventually fatal remaking of indifferent or even hostile events into tools of 
growth. As Foucault puts it: “if the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, 
if he listens to history, he finds there is ‘something altogether different’ behind things: not 
a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their 
essence was fabricated in a piecemeal way from alien forms,” (1984, p. 78).  Not 
extending faith in the old metaphysics, Nietzsche and James teach us to look for new 
realities, for a secret world of piecemeal experiences and alien forms. The metaphysics of 
experience here articulated is just this secret world. Like the pedagogy it is meant to 
encourage, it does not operate primarily through claims and assertions, but through 
sensations, resistances, and implications: underground and physiological actions. 
Secretly, playfully, it takes up the name of metaphysics affirmatively in order to redraw 
the boundaries between metaphysics and the world it describes. If the metaphysics of 
experience is nature, it is also an experimental work of art: fabricated, piecemeal, alien, 
and unfinished—natura naturans, no more and no less. For those who are willing to 
make an encounter with it, such an encounter might renew life’s efforts by opening 
critical and active perspectives on the most basic question of pedagogy: how might 
experience—the health and sickness of interactions within the passing, unavoidably 
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ethical, power-laden, and perspectival events of the world—be made more critical, more 
joyful? 
In this chapter I have laid out a conception of experience as eventuating, 
relational, perspectival, physiological, ethical, and herculean. I have indicated in general 
ways how these categories of experience help orient our conception of education by 
dissolving certain problems and forming other sorts of problems. The value of this 
conception, however, cannot be judged until it is deployed in specific ways, in specific 
experience, for specific events. This task will be taken up in the next two chapters.  
In the next chapter, I will draw out some concrete implications of this 
experimental metaphysics of experience for thinking about reconstructing power into 
more democratic forms. More specifically, I look at how war and religion are 
reproblematized through the experiential account in terms of their implications for 
democratic education. The metaphysics of experience here elaborated finds its value in 
the reorganization of power and life in more democratic forms. War and religion have 
traditionally been obstacles to the democratic project. I intend to indicate how my 
conception of experience helps reorient these powerful functions immanent to experience 
towards the production of more democratic forms of life. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
WAR, RELIGION, AND EDUCATION 
 
That the world’s value lies in our interpretation (—that somewhere else other 
interpretations than merely human ones may be possible—); that previous interpretations 
have been perspectival appraisals by means of which we preserve ourselves in life, that 
is, in will to power and the growth of power; that every heightening of man brings with it 
an overcoming of narrower interpretations; that every increase in strength and expansion 
of power opens up new perspectives and demands a belief in new horizons – this runs 
through my writings. The world which matters to us is false, i.e., not a fact but a fictional 
elaboration and filling out of a meager store of observations; it is ‘in flux’, as something 
becoming, as a constantly shifting falsity that never gets anywhere nearer to truth for – 
there is no ‘truth’. (Nietzsche 2003, §2[108], p. 80) 
 
In the last chapter, I used James and Nietzsche to develop a way of conceiving 
experience oriented towards the production of democratic education. In this chapter, I 
show how this metaphysics allows for the more intelligent reconstruction of social habits 
in more democratic forms by showing how this metaphysics problematizes war and 
religion, two long-standing and problematic features of the social field, in terms of their 
pedagogical functions. 
I have suggested in the previous two chapters that the way to understand the 
metaphysics of experience is by looking to its implications for the project of democratic 
education. One problem that explaining metaphysics from an instrumental point of view 
presents, however, is that instruments are often construed as objects lying about, ready to 
be put to use by some pre-existing agent. Such a way of understanding instrumentalism, 
however, is dependent upon the very means-ends dualism that the metaphysics of 
experience undermines.  
The problem of the badly instrumental approach to education that was outlined in 
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the first chapter is not so much that education is conceived instrumentally, but that the 
very concept of instrumentality is badly understood. So, if we are to take an instrumental 
view of education, then we will need a different notion of instrument—if education is a 
tool, it is also more than a tool; it is a tool for making tools, and sometimes even a tool 
for producing the need to use a tool. The most general interests towards which the 
instruments of education work are the very reproduction of the instruments of education. 
In other words, properly understood, education is both instrumental and an end in itself: 
1) education creates conceptual tools where there are none yet, 2) education modifies or 
breaks and discards old conceptual tools that do not work, and 3) education generates 
problems that call forth in new ways the creative capacities and strenuous dimensions of 
human experience; that is, it creates (and sometimes breaks and refigures) the demand for 
creative imagination, exploration, and experimentation, the demand for education. In 
other words, education does not just solve problems or achieve ends; it alters the very 
nature of problems themselves, reconstructing or re-problematizing experience. 
Therefore from the point of view an experiential education, no absolute 
distinction can be drawn between education’s instrumental aspects and the ends towards 
which it works: good education is an effect produced by and through the experimental 
use and development of educative practices. The metaphysics of experience allows the 
very notion of an instrument to be reconstructed experientially, as the third category of 
education indicates above. By drawing attention to dynamic and open-ended processes, 
events, relations, and interactions instead of static and closed ends, means, ideas and 
values, the metaphysics reorganizes the relation between an instrument and the ends 
towards which it works. Instead of taking means and ends to be two different things, it 
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understands them as different aspects of a single immediate and primary experience, 
aspects that can be differentiated afterwards in reflection, but which, at a fundamental 
level, operate together and immanently within the plane of experience. Instead of talking 
about means and ends as if they were two different things, the metaphysics of experience 
takes means and ends, instruments and values, as two aspects of a single, primary 
interaction. To be an instrument is, in other words, to be an agent. The actual and 
experienced ends produced by the functioning of any given instrument are the only 
measure of the meaning and value of any instrument. On the other hand, the very 
meaning of ends is instrumental: their value can only be taken in terms of the actual and 
experienced habits and practices that they motivate. In other words, the value of a 
metaphysics of experience is located in the power that it has to produce experiences of 
renewal—to, as Nietzsche puts it, “overcome narrow interpretations” and to “open up 
new perspectives and demand a belief in new horizons.” In this chapter, I would like to 
highlight the ways in which the view of experience I have been articulating is 
instrumental in just this way: it engages and transforms powerful habits of thought that 
present obstacles to democratic social arrangements. The metaphysics of experience is 
both an instrument and an end: it engages human power as a tool in the service of 
democratic modes of life by articulating and motivating the necessity of that life. It is 
educative, then, in the broadest sense. 
The connection I hope to draw between metaphysics, power, and democratic 
education is not wholly mine. In “The Energies of Men,” James articulates the problem of 
education in its most general form and its relation to power:  
The two questions, first, that of the possible extent of our powers; and, second, 
that of the various avenues of approach to them, the various keys for unlocking 
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them in diverse individuals, dominate the whole problem of individual and 
national education. We need a topography of the limits of human power, similar to 
the charts which oculists use of the field of human vision. We need also a study of 
the various types of human being with reference to the different ways in which 
their energy-reserves may be appealed to and set loose. (WWJ, p. 683) 
 
The metaphysics of experience is just this sort of “topography of the limits of human 
power” in the interest of unlocking these powers in service of the creation of democratic 
forms of life. Therefore, the metaphysics of experience is best understood not as a 
disinterested analysis of the general features of experience but as the articulation, 
mapping, and redistribution of a topology of power motivated by the “problem of 
individual and national education.”  
In the last chapter, I examined the outlines of a theory of experience drawn from 
the philosophies of James and Nietzsche from an abstract and universal point of view6. 
For a philosophy that is not merely theoretical, however, the meaning of such an analysis 
cannot be determined without returning to the rough and more particular terrain of power 
and its effects. Since, in this chapter, I hope to look at what the view of experience I have 
articulated means in terms of the specific transformations such a point of view might 
make possible, my analysis will not begin with generalities but with the actual avenues of 
social power, the flows and impediments of “the energies of men.” 
I will take up two of these main avenues or flows of power: the war function and 
the religious function.  Through my analysis of these functions from the standpoint of the 
metaphysics of experience, I hope (1) to show how such a metaphysics might be enable 
                                                
6 By “abstract and universal” I do not mean that the theory of experience that I have described applies 
universally or will or ought to be universally accepted. This is farthest from my intentions. Understood 
pragmatically, the function of abstracting and universalizing theorization is not to regulate the field of 
ideas; it is to open new possibilities and stimulate growth by freeing concepts from prior uses. Dewey 
explains the point well here: “In truth, abstraction from human experience is but a liberation from familiar 
and specific enjoyments, it provides means for directing hitherto untried consequences, for invention, for 
the creation of new wants, and new modes of good and evil,” (LW 1:151).   
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more intelligent appropriations of these functions and (2) to indicate how, more generally, 
the meaning and value of a metaphysical scheme is found in its educative function, that is 
in its deployment in and through interactions with concrete problems in the service of 
unlocking latent or dominated human power.  
 
War Against War 
Overcoming the affects? – No, not if it means weakening and annihilating them. Instead, 
drawing them into service, which may include exercising a long tyranny over them (not 
just as an individual but even earlier, as a community, race, etc.). In the end they are 
trustingly given back some freedom: they love us like good servants and voluntarily go 
where our best interests want to go. (Nietzsche 2003, §1[122]; p. 63)  
 
First, war. Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary defines war most generally as “a 
struggle or competition between opposing forces for a particular end.” Such a definition 
suggests that the problem of war is its filtering of multiple forces through the pursuit of a 
single end. In other words, the function of war is to make, through any means necessary, 
the multiple into the unified. Imagined in this way, war is necessarily violent, as there can 
be no reconciling the many and the one, once they have been sundered.  
In “The Moral Equivalent of War,” James understands war precisely in terms of 
this disciplining and unifying function, writing that “so far, war has been the only force 
that can discipline a whole community, and until an equivalent discipline is organized, I 
believe that war must have its way.” (WWJ, p. 669) Interestingly, his taking of the 
phenomenon of war emphasizes its experiential effects: its power and its pedagogy. 
James’ way of seeing war is still relevant. That our national community and individual 
subjectivities are forged to a great degree in and through a love of war is a fact whose 
obviousness is clear, once one begins to look for it, but whose pervasiveness is such that 
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it often goes unnoticed. James’ 1910 essay brings this pervasiveness out of the 
background and foregrounds it as a specific problem of power and of education. 
To reflect on the depth to which war is imbedded in culture, is to realize that it is 
so deeply imbedded in our bodies and bones, minds and hearts that there is little ground 
free from war. Experience is a tangled system of war, producing and produced by war 
machines. My tax dollars this year, once more, bought the bombs that explode in Iraq. I 
am responsible for civilian deaths, for the armless children, for the grief and fear. This is 
the first and perhaps most obvious form of complicity in war—taxes. To pay taxes is to 
support war; there is no historical evidence that governments have been able to refrain 
from overt acts of violence and destruction against its own people and against others. 
Indeed, as the ongoing events in Iraq and Afghanistan attest, we could take Hobbes’ point 
a bit further: the war of all against all seems not only to be a condition of possibility of 
the liberal state, but also its consequence. 
But our complicity runs much deeper than taxes or government. War fuels the 
hive of red taillights that swarm and buzz around our cities and snake across the plains of 
Kansas. War hustles immigrants across borders, fueling racism and alienation. War forges 
connections across species and between the animate and inanimate. War drives approval 
ratings and elects presidents. The explosives and bulldozers invented during World War II 
make possible the literal decapitation of whole mountains in West Virginia; a mountain is 
burned and poured like boiling oil on the sky to keep my lettuce crisp.  My father still 
operates these same bulldozers, building businesses, churches, schools, roads, lakes, 
ponds. Pushing down trees. Putting food on our table, sending me to school. 
In the contemporary era, the event of war has been spread and smeared like a 
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thick butter across the face of the globe. It does not spring up as a series of isolated 
skirmishes. War cuts so deeply through experience: the space and time that Kant saw as 
conditions of possibility of experience can be seen as lines of flight spurring off from this 
much more central category of experience. Our conception of space is structured by 
political boundaries. We learn about lines and borders from walls erected, divisions 
drawn. The strict coordination of schedules that we think of as time emerged, perhaps, 
from a need to coordinate military strikes. History is a slaughterbench, says Hegel; the 
time of memory is punctuated by trauma, says Freud. The very space we inhabit is 
ordered by the movement of violence, organized and legitimized by barriers, bunkers, 
metal detectors, uniformed soldiers, x-ray machines, cameras, and police with batons and 
guns. The stop sign at the end of my street is the color of blood mixed with air. War 
creates order and chaos; it is both order and chaos—both Apollo and Dionysus, both the 
pain of birth and the beauty of tragedy. 
War multiplies and mixes discourses. Its glories are not contained to medal 
ceremonies, but are also disseminated by analysts and pundits on cable news and in the 
blogosphere. Little league teams steal bases. NFL teams battle and beat each other. 
Homages to war’s guilt, horrors, and fascinations arrive in the mail with Netflix (no late 
fees). The images of Abu Ghraib served up a strong cocktail of laughter, sexuality, 
torture, bodies, digital photos, prison, Arabs, gender, discipline, play. 
War is mundane. We make war with our supermarket purchases. When we turn on 
and off the lights. War flickers vaguely on the 24-hour news cycles; its distant violence is 
felt as a certain twinge at the sight of a green Darfur sign on a lawn. I just replaced the 
radiator in my Honda with one from China. How much of that purchase went to their war 
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efforts against the Tibetans? Did my purchase of that recent bag of Fritos just give Cargill 
the funds to buy another family farm, to wage its war of production against Middle 
America, Africa, and South America?  
War implicates. Is the paper that this dissertation—or its many drafts—written the 
product of those clearcut wars waged on the Cumberland Plateau? What is this paper, this 
blank, white, empty page—the bane of dissertation writers everywhere—other than the 
clean cut of steel into hickory bark? Is it more than bleach into the Pigeon River? Was it 
once a hemlock in a cool hollow before it saw the chip mill? Was there a time for this 
paper before it was barged across the ocean to bypass environmental regulations and then 
shipped back by International Paper as yet another tabula rasa, a chance (once more!) to 
begin again (and this time creatively!)—white, clean, empty, new. War, we must also 
admit, can repair and renew.  
War renews. It is, as James said, a force of cultural discipline. War does not only 
destroy and deconstruct; it creates new possibilities, forges new relations, and produces 
new complicities. It is a force of regeneration and reconstruction—if not the most 
powerful, one of the most powerful. War creates the possibility of victory—with no 
missions, there can be no missions accomplished. And this is why, if we must hate war 
for upsetting the peaces that were, for making innocents into victims, and for bringing 
certain possibilities to an end, we must also love it. Indeed, war is so pervasive and 
ongoing that the areas of peace that are produced, however intentionally they are located 
and scattered across the globe, are no less a part of the much more general production of 
war. 
Finally, war is an instrument of the production of meaning. As Lakoff and 
  88 
Johnson note in Metaphors We Live By (1980), deliberative argumentation is understood 
through the metaphor of war: “It is important to see that we don’t just talk about 
arguments in terms of war. We actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are 
arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. We gain 
and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can 
abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we do in arguing are partially 
structured by the concept of war,” (p. 4). War is a way of understanding and 
communicating. It is a deep and common social habit, what Lakoff and Johnson term an 
“experiential gestalt,” that makes meaning, community, and social interaction possible.  
War is, in short, multiple and pervasive. To bring an end to war is to bring an end 
a number of other essential cultural functions. War is not a “thing” or a “process” or a 
“mindset” to be ended or begun. It is an experienced event, whose ethos, perspectives, 
values, and efforts run deep and tangled in the thick weave of experience. As immanent to 
the flow of experience, war is open to and susceptible to flux; it is a particular sort of 
flux, meaning and value of which remains open. In other words, analysis of way from an 
experiential point of view must be plural and attuned to the actual eventuations that war 
produces, to whom those experiences redound, and how these relations might be 
transformed 
It is, I think, an insight of this sort that determines James’ approach to war as one 
of finding a moral equivalency—instead of, for example, bringing it to an end. As the war 
on terror has shown, the demand to bring an end to elements of the war function can have 
as its consequence an intensification of the military apparatus, a stimulation of bellicose 
appetites, and an increasing fascination with war as a political object.  The logic is so 
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common that it makes no sense to call it contradictory. We make war in the Middle East 
to eventually bring peace and democracy. We wage war to end terrorism. The war on 
drugs justifies military interventions in South America. And, each of these sentences can 
be written in reverse.  
James does not attack this reversible and seemingly contradictory logic; he 
embraces it, beginning his essay against war with the demand to make war: “The war 
against war,” he writes, “is going to be no holiday excursion or camping party.” (WWJ, 
660) But what can this possibly mean? In what sense can war be made into a moral 
equivalent through war? How can the answer to war be making another war? And what, 
pray tell, does this have to do with something so intellectually distant and cold as 
metaphysics as a topography of human power? James begins to address these questions 
by making a genealogical point: 
Modern war is so expensive that we feel trade a better avenue to plunder [yes, 
here his text shows its age]; but modern man inherits all the innate pugnacity and 
all the love of glory of his ancestors. Showing war’s irrationality and horror is of 
no effect on him. The horrors make the fascination. War is the strong life; it is life 
in extremis; war-taxes are the only ones men never hesitate to pay, as the budgets 
of all nations show us. (WWJ, p. 661) 
 
The deep, long lasting, and affirmative love we have inherited for war requires no verbal 
affirmations; its love-letters are found in its everyday actions, in the argumentative style 
of this dissertation, and in the conception of strategic instrumentality that underlies its 
pragmatic approach. Have I won you over to my side? Or must I surrender the argument? 
Will you make another critical counterattack on my basic position? The history of 
philosophy is philopolemic; we are long-time lovers of war.  
Indeed, the love of war runs so deep that it is possible to fight against it with 
every once of will and every argument that can be mustered, but continue all the while, in 
  90 
every action, to give the lie to our real passion. Like a long-married couple whose doting 
affection cannot be divorced from their ceaseless bickering, so the moral outrage against 
war and the affection towards it may come from the same source. In order to make sense 
of the continuation of the centrality of war to life in the United States, we who pay our 
taxes, we who buy the bombs, we who rage against the horrors of war, must see the way 
in which that rage is not in opposition to a love for war, but a product of it. Wars make us 
make wars make wars against wars make us. 
“Peace,” writes James, 
in military mouths to-day is a synonym for “war expected.” The word has become 
a pure provocative, and no government wishing peace sincerely should allow it 
ever to be printed in a newspaper. Every up-to-date dictionary should now say that 
“peace” and “war” mean the same thing, now in posse, now in actu. It may even 
be reasonably said that the intensely sharp preparation for war by the nations is 
the real war, permanent, unceasing; and the battles are only a sort of public 
verification of the mastery gained during the “peace” interval. (WWJ, 663) 
 
If these words were true in James’ time, they remain true today. The war on terror is 
explicitly defined as a war whose effect is to produce peace. Indeed, the discourse has 
evolved in such a way that is now possible to claim that every second of peace that we 
have had since 9/11 is a product of the war on terror. The new millennium has been 
defined as perpetual, ongoing, and global warfare. At any moment, the discourse of 
terrorism teaches us, war is possible. It is on—or just over—every horizon. It emerges 
randomly and can strike anywhere. The present discourse of war is, to this extent, 
Jamesian; war and peace are no longer opposites; they are mutually constitutive; a 
relation immanent to experience. Every moment of peaceful life justifies and legitimizes 
the ongoing wars, whose very intent and effect is to produce the peace that justifies its 
existence. This kind of “war against war” is one that leads to an intensification and 
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glorification of the war making apparatus. 
If the war against war is to produce different effects, it must employ different 
strategies. A technique we might learn from James for doing battle with war is to bring 
peace closer to the war mentality, not away from it. Although peace is produced by and 
through the war culture, the peace that is produced remains far removed from the 
evaluations, means, and ends that motivate its production. The relation is real, but it is 
mediated in such a way that the thrills, dangers, and horror of war are far removed from 
the peace-effects of war. To live in peace for many of us in the United States means to 
watch war on television—to be enthralled by its dramatic horrors, glories, heroes, and 
victims, by the life lived in extremis. To be a spectator of war is to be attracted to it. The 
old lie: dulce et decorum est, pro patri mori, has not endured for so long because of its 
untruth; it endures because of the thrall it produces.7  
The function of the thrall of war is to discipline the war spectator into a love of 
the warrior and a distrust of peace. Peace is for those who watch, he learns. War is for 
those who act. Peace is for those who do not have the dignity to suffer, whose lives know 
                                                
7 Few books capture the intensity, horror, political function, and beauty of war more adequately than 
George Orwell’s Homage to Catalonia (1969/1938). Here is a representative passage:  
“As our train drew into the station a troop-train full of men from the International Column was drawing out, 
and a knot of people on the bridge were waving to them. It was a very long train, packed to the bursting 
point with men, with field-guns lashed on the open trucks and more men clustering around the guns. I 
remember with peculiar vividness the spectacle of that train passing in the yellow evening light; window 
after window of dark, smiling faces, the long tilted barrels of the guns, the scarlet scarves fluttering—all 
this gliding slowly past us against a turquoise-coloured sea. 
“ ‘Estranjeros—foreigners,” said someone. “They’re Italians.” 
“Obviously they were Italians. No other people could have grouped themselves so picturesquely 
or returned the salutes of the crowd with so much grace—a grace that was none the less because about half 
the men on the train were drinking out of up-ended wine bottles. We heard afterwards that these were some 
of the troops who won the great victory at Guadalajara in March; they had been on leave and were being 
transferred to the Aragon front. Most of them, I am afraid, were killed at Huesca only a few weeks later. 
The men who were well enough to stand had moved across the carriage to cheer the Italians as they went 
past. A crutch waved out a window; bandaged forearms made the Red Salute. It was like an allegorical 
picture of war; the trainload of fresh men gliding proudly up the line, the maimed men sliding slowly down, 
and all the while guns on the open trucks making one’s heart leap as guns always do, and reviving that 
pernicious feeling, so difficult to get rid of, that war is glorious after all.” (p. 191-192) 
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no extremes. War is adrenaline, risk, and reward. Peace is for the individual, the 
consumer. War is about brotherhood and sacrifice. Peace is being free from responsibility. 
War is giving one’s self over to a higher law. Peace watches; war lives. “Unconcerned, 
mocking, violent—thus wisdom wants us: she is a woman and always loves only a 
warrior.” (Nietzsche 1992/1888, p. 533) The thrall of way devalues the very experience 
out of which the thrall arises. The spectator becomes conscious of the experience of peace 
as lacking, a devaluation that leads perhaps to the production of a kind of Nietzschean 
ressentiment.  
A digression into the way in which communication is problematized through the 
metaphysics of experience will make more clear the sense in which our conception of 
experience shapes the problem of war-discipline. When James writes that “Pacifists ought 
to enter more deeply into the aesthetical and ethical point of view of their opponents” it is 
important that we pay attention to the way in which this “entering” takes place and the 
purposes that it serves. It is in these technical differences that the pacific effect is 
achieved. He continues: 
[Enter] first in any controversy [into the aesthetical and ethical point of view of 
your opponent] … then move the point, and your opponent will follow. So long as 
anti-militarists propose no substitute for war’s disciplinary function, no moral 
equivalent of war, analogous, as one might say, to the mechanical equivalent of 
heat, so long they fail to realize the full inwardness of the situation. (WWJ, p. 
666) 
 
So long as war is only seen from afar, so long as it holds the spectator in its thrall, peace 
will always be lacking. James’ point here is both strategic and ethical, and examining 
each of these dimensions will lead us closer to the way in which the problem of war is 
also a problem of education—the problem of constructing alternative and more 
democratic forms of war discipline.  
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The strategic point is a simple one about the conditions under which the 
communication necessary to produce transformation is possible, one that the metaphysics 
of experience is specifically constructed to bring forward. What every teacher, lover, and 
friend knows (and, incidentally, what philosophers often forget) is that communication 
depends upon an experimental moment of imaginative empathy that funds the viability of 
the exchange. Since experience is eventuating, perspectival, and interested, there is no 
pure common ground to which we might refer in order to communicate. It is necessary, 
instead, to enter into experience in order to make encounters in partially shared realities, 
like the pervasive cultural experience of war, and to reconstruct that experience 
experimentally. Entering into the war perspective means breaking its thrall. 
The great difficulty of communication is that keeping both differences and 
similarities at the front of honest exchange. Communication would be unnecessary if we 
all shared the same ends, values, and purposes, and it would be impossible if we had 
nothing at all in common. But communication demands more than keeping our ends in 
front of us: making a genuine encounter demands also admitting the extent to which we 
do not even know what our commonalities and differences are. Communication requires 
humility, and out of that humility a willingness to construct new ends, interests, 
commonalities, and differences.  
Overlapping this strategic point about the centrality of imaginative empathy to 
communication is an ethical point. The moment of imagination that makes 
communication possible is made possible by a recognition that communication is only 
possible through the metaphorical invocation of partially shared experiences and 
therefore demands attention to how these blindnesses are constructed. Taking seriously 
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the value and motivating factors of our opponents’ position means taking up a herculean 
experimental reconstruction of these partially shared perspective towards more 
productive future sharings. Communication is never a matter of totalities; our own 
concepts derive their meanings from contingent and even opposing valences.  
The capacity to imaginatively encounter—a Socratic and experiential definition of 
the interaction through which the renewal of life happens—allows for the possibilities of 
bridging these differences provisionally. We can imagine better what motivates the 
advocate of war without going to war, but only if we can make an encounter, however 
briefly and tangentially, with the experience of that point of view in order to grasp the 
special and specific vitality, the directions of its habitual flows, that is inseparable from 
its meaning. This oppositional encountering is always ongoing, whether it is recognized 
or not. Every expression of meaning is constructed through the very institutions and 
structures that such expression opposes. Such is the nature of power.  
The question of war, then, from an experiential point of view, is how it makes 
certain encounters possible or impossible. The necessary blindnesses of communication 
are also sites of possibility. The busy-bee James surely contemplates the way in which his 
own business betrays him and blinds him, denying him access to a different sort of 
activity. His very business forces him to become a mere spectator to a friend who enjoys 
spending hours of quiet watchfulness in the woods: “For the spectator, such hours as Mr. 
Hudson writes of form a mere tale of emptiness, in which nothing happens, nothing is 
gained, and there is nothing to describe. They are meaningless and vacant tracts of time. 
To him who feels their inner secret, they tingle with an importance that unutterably 
vouches for itself.” (WWJ, p. 644)  
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Unutterable and secret, indeed, are our vital and clouded lives, but this 
“unutterability” is not primary. We can, and often do, open ourselves up and utter our 
most cherished and important and vital secrets, but disappointment is inevitable if we 
pretend that any utterance can substitute for the experience in all its vitality and in every 
situation. The unutterability of our tingling lives is the consequence of an ethical demand, 
which James utters in this way: 
Hands off: neither the whole truth nor the whole of the good is revealed to any 
single observer, although each observer gains a partial superiority of insight from 
the peculiar position in which he stands. Even prisons and sick rooms have their 
special revelations. It is enough to ask of each of us that he should be faithful to 
his own opportunities and make the most of his blessings without presuming to 
regulate the entire field. (WWJ, p. 645) 
 
We are caught between two seeming oppositions: the necessity of imagining alien 
demands and the necessary failure of this imagination. This tension is negotiable, when 
possible, only experimentally. “Imagination” names this experimental working through 
the constant ethical pinch. We try, experimentally, to place ourselves, over and over 
again, into the foreign whirl of the alien encounter, expose ourselves to new encounters, 
and out of the risk of exposure comes the possibility of a different habit, way of thinking, 
form of life. Such is the education of life, the renewal of experience. In this process, we 
have no recourse to transcendental values; there is only the dictum of experience: change 
or be changed. 
Such imaginative encounters are only matters of encountering the face of another, 
another autonomous agent or person. They happen through things, animals, weather, 
events, and perhaps most often, through encounters with our own selves. Nietzsche 
reminds us that we live eternally within a foreign perspective; the point of subjectivity 
can only be understood in terms of its horizons: “We place a word,” he writes, “at the 
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point where our ignorance begins – where we can’t see any further, e.g., the word ‘I’, the 
words ‘do’ and ‘done to’: these may be the horizons of our knowledge, but they are not 
‘truths’.” (2003, §5[3]; p. 106) The question, then, is not how to enter into the perspective 
of the foreigner (for we are always already in this perspective to some extent), but how to 
put the fringes and horizons of experience to work, how “to reinstate the vague” in a way 
that calls forth the energies of men in the service of the general and widespread 
flourishing of life. 
Here the metaphysics of experience may help to distinguish between the modes of 
imagination that lead to mis-educative consequences of war and the modes of 
imagination that would make it possible to put the war machine to work for educative 
ends.  An experiential notion of war brings forth in yet another way the sense in which an 
encounter with opposition is always a part of what is most intimate; the “body” is a 
blindness that produces knowledge; the “indeterminate horizons” of the senses draw 
another wider, alien circle around the corporeality. Mute, physiological horizons 
articulate the point of consciousness: it is out of these vague and unutterabilities of our 
lives that variability, the differences, the risks, and the blindnesses, that responsibilities—
the very vitalities of imaginative life—are forged. It is only in an encounter beyond the 
limits of knowledge that the renewal of life takes place. 
The inherent partiality of experience thus have a positive aspect: although a 
certain blindness is necessary to and part of the eventuations of experience, the flip-side 
of that blindness is the emergence of hypothetical vitalities, alternative secret divinations 
upon which the possibility of bridging what James calls “the blindness with which we are 
all afflicted in regard to the feelings of creatures and people different from us” depends, 
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(WWJ, 629).  
Therefore, although we are blind in a certain way to the specific forms of vitality 
of other lives, this blindness itself can be a resource for creative social engagement. The 
fringes, flows, perspectives, breaks and horizons in the metaphysics of experience are 
designed to point out just this curious blend of human powers: to bring forward the way 
in which ethical life depends not only on what we have the power to see, but also on what 
we have the power not to see—the powers that constitute and make possible our visions. 
By emphasizing the plurality of experience, the constant inadequacy of knowledge, the 
vague fringes and horizons that define the ethical ends and possibilities of experience, 
and the virtual occurrences within an experience that is more than immediately present, 
the experimental imagination upon which ethical life depends is transformed from a 
subjective faculty into an object of empirical inquiry. We can begin to ask critical 
educational question: who owns the vague peripheries of experience? How are they put to 
work? And, again, whose lives are empowered by them and whose are dominated? 
Such questions turn the imagination into a weapon in the war against war. The 
challenge of intelligent resistance to war is a matter of putting this weapon to work in the 
reconstruction of war into a polemic of peace—a peace that is not lacking in experience 
and possibilities for renewal, one that preserves the hardness, the strenuous nature, the 
sense of meaningful experimentation that motivates and disciplines the defender of war. 
It is not enough to argue for peace: the peace for which we argue must be articulated and 
imagined in terms that even—perhaps, especially—the warrior can accept. To engage the 
war-function in this way would be to turn it to pedagogical purposes, to highlight the 
ways in which war serves the interests of life’s renewal. 
  98 
With this insight in tow, we can return to some of the original questions that 
James’ seemingly contradictory “war against war” raises. The thought of a war against 
war is only contradictory from a standpoint that sees peace as totally opposed to war. But 
if war and peace make a relation immanent to experience, different questions emerge. 
Instead of asking how to produce more peace or eliminate war, we begin from the idea 
that every moment of peace is implicated in the experiential gestalt of war—and vice-
versa. The problem, then, is reconfigured. The question of war becomes not one of its 
existence, of whether it should be ended or advanced, but of its educational function: 
whether or not it serves the purpose of the renewal of life—and the renewal of which 
forms of life. 
The question that the perspective of the metaphysics of experience allows us to 
raise, then, is not the question of how to end war as such—to end war is, empirically and 
historically speaking, to end the only forms of peace that we know. As Deleuze writes, 
“The question is therefore less the realization of war than the appropriation of the war 
machine,” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987/1980, p. 420).8 It is a question of who carries the 
burden of war’s eventuation, of how its horrors are distributed, to whom it delivers peace, 
to whom glory and strenuous living, to whom boredom and disengagement, and to whom 
prosperity. Who does war dignify, and who does it humiliate? And would it be possible to 
create a morally equivalent war, whose end is dignity and hope? Is it possible to fight a 
war against war, one whose glories and triumphs come through the defeat of humiliation, 
and one whose benefits redound to the community as a whole, instead of to a social or 
                                                
8 Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of the exteriority of the war machine to the State apparatus in their 
“Treatise on Nomadology” also identifies war as a possible site of political renewal, developing the thesis 
that “In every respect, the war machine is of another species, another nature, another origin than the State 
apparatus,” (p. 352).  
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military elite? The question, again, is not how to eliminate the instinct for war, but who 
controls the war-function and to what ends?  
In this way, seeing war as an event immanent to the plane of experience makes 
war into a question of education, into a matter of the reconstruction of the habits of the 
war-function. James explains his vision: 
If now—and this is my idea—there were, instead of military conscription a 
conscription of the whole youthful population to form for a certain number of 
years a part of the army enlisted against Nature, the injustice would tend to be 
evened out, and numerous other goods to the commonwealth would follow. The 
military ideals of hardihood and discipline would be wrought into the fibre of the 
people; no one would remain blind as the luxurious classes now are blind, to 
man’s relations to the globe he lives on, and to the permanently sour and hard 
foundations of his higher life. (WWJ, 669) 
 
This passage must be read carefully. James is not calling for a war on nature—this war is, 
on the Jamesian view, always already ongoing. He is, instead, calling for a different 
outcome—for a moral equivalent to war. The battle he would like to see waged is one 
against the forces and powers that blind the powerful to the conditions of their power. It 
is a war against Nature, for nature with a capital “N”—and here, again, the value of 
metaphysical inquiry in this war and the ends to which it is put must be considered—is 
used as a way of blinding us to power relations that can be changed. The Natural 
superiority, for example, of white over black. The Natural hegemony of man over animal. 
The Natural domination of affect by reason. The Natural proclivity of the dominant 
culture to construct reason on models of warfare. The Natural luxury of the powerful. The 
Natural suffering of the poor. James’ vision is of a war for democracy and for intelligence 
against the sorts of blindnesses produced by wars waged on behalf of luxury—the very 
peace that has been disjoined from the hardness, strenuousness, risk, shared endeavor, 
sacrifice, and vitality that is the promise of war.  
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James thus approaches the question of war with the temperament of the educator. 
The educator does not ask: how can I eliminate the passion of the child; she asks how 
best she can put that passion to work, how it might be best disciplined and channeled. 
Just so with the war-function. For James, judging war is not a question of measuring the 
war-function against a concept of absolute peace. Interacting with war requires more than 
affirmation or rejection, condemnation or glorification. To see war as an event is to see it 
as educator. It is to ask the herculean question of how to put the war function to work. 
The educative question is never strictly moral; it is not a matter of prohibition and 
punishment. It does not ask how to stifle the alien demand or to repress it; education is a 
matter of hows: how to encounter the alien demand, how to tweak and transform it and 
our own demand, how to transform the space of contrast or conflict between demands, 
and, finally, how to find its demand in our own.  
The metaphysics of pure experience is useful at precisely this point. It is carefully 
constructed to produce encounters of the form just described because it is a picture of 
reality that preserves spaces of irreconcilable difference. It is a picture of reality and a 
topography of human power that attends to what is partial, what is powerful, and what is 
not yet finished. For this reason, it is possible to say that the metaphysics of pure 
experience is an imaginative attempt to further the war against war—to produce a picture 
of reality that is able to motivate the battle against any form of “Nature” that would attack 
human imagination, any attempt to blind us to our blindnesses. It is a vision of reality 
constructed to produce encounters with the alien that lead to the growth and vitality of the 
community instead of to the destruction of the alien demand. On this view, the 
differences between us are not an impediment to the formation of community; on the 
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contrary, they are the very conditions under which the imaginative empathy that funds the 
communicative relations between and among the members of society is produced. The 
war against war names this strenuous and experimental production; it names the work of 
education, the formation of culture. 
 
Faith in Faith 
The magic that fights for us, the eye of Venus that ensnares and blinds even our 
opponents, is the magic of the extreme, the seduction that every extreme exercises: we 
immoralists, we are extreme… (Nietzsche 2003, §10[94]; p. 189) 
 
The religious-function is another educative landmark on the terrain of human 
power, one that is and has been often linked with the war-function. The war on terror 
derives its energies through the linkage of these powerful functions. Religious faith, like 
war, seems to have a special educative capacity. Marx had it half-right—if religion can be 
an opiate, it can also be Benzedrine for the human animal. Leaders from Martin Luther 
King to Jerry Falwell to Mahatma Ghandi to Osama bin Laden have used its power—its 
disciplinary function—to move and organize entire populations for social change. It calls 
forth what is extreme in us, what drives us to the wall. It produces, in its absolutist form, 
what James calls “the strenuous mood,” a mood which has, historically and presently, 
been put to many ends. As in the case of war, when religion is viewed from the standpoint 
of its functions in experience, its multiplicity, contingency, force, and partialities reveal 
its radically various educational possibilities. 
Religion divides. As Martin Luther King Jr. remarked—and more recently Barack 
Obama reaffirmed—the eleven o’clock hour of Sunday morning is the most segregated 
hour in America. It produces valences and social flows, marking off believers from 
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atheists, Muslims from Jews, Protestants from Catholics, Hindus from Buddhists. It 
builds peaks and valleys, elevations and gravities, by marking the difference between the 
sacred and the profane, the devoted and the backslider, the saved and the lost, the wheat 
and the chaff. It distinguishes between preacher and congregation, saint and sinner, 
enlightenment and blindness, body and soul, ecstasy and despair, heaven and hell. Even 
time and eternity, good and evil, the pure and the impure, the sexual and the chaste, are 
subject to and transformed by the religion-machine. 
Religion consoles. It eases the body through practices of prayer and meditation. It 
creates communities of hope and generosity. Histories of long domination are turned into 
sites of refuge; the church of the inquisition now harbors immigrant refugees. The Black 
church turns the religion of the master into a dwelling-site of community. It turns long 
deprivations into jubilant bacchanalia—and back again—the sacramental wine of 
communion can also pour free and wild at Carnaval. Sunday morning service provides 
relief from the daily grind, a quiet place for reflection. It offers a mode of sublimation for 
fear and anger. It promises, sometimes tenderly, a future world to come, sweet 
replacement for the injustices and sufferings of our own. 
Religion mystifies. It provokes and sustains a sense of wonder. It speaks in 
tongues. It obscures and erases marks of power. It traces new connections and invents 
new interpretations. The body is a field of energy: how strange! The soul will be—or 
already is—one with God: who is he? There will be life after death: whose life? I was a 
wasp in a past life: did you retain your sting? The End is Near: let’s dance! Humanity, the 
earth, the animals, and the sky are all one: which one? God healed my cancer: good 
news! 
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Religion combines. It fuses hatred of the self with love of the other. It makes us 
all sons of God. Cathedrals built from the blood of colonization house serve as traffic-
ways backdrops for puzzled tourists. Jews practice medieval dietary restrictions and drink 
soda-pop. Christmas brings together families, sets the academic calendar, and fuels the 
economy. Pat Robertson and Jeremiah Wright call themselves Christian.  
Religion condemns and commands. It speaks with authority and privileges the 
beyond. It raises questions about the lives of fetuses and the rights of women. It adds 
crime to crime, pronounces judgment on intentions, and raises doubts about the value of 
certain forms of association. Religion ostracizes the different and the deviant, and it 
enforces the law. Celibate men tell married women what to do. Ancient wisdom raises its 
voice over the television. Televangelists turn guilt into profit. Theologians police the 
boundary between the human and the animal.  
Religion awakens. It reminds us to pay attention to what we do not understand. It 
interprets natural catastrophes as signs of God’s wrath. It renders the world a play of 
judgments, an intelligent design. It sees a reason behind everything, an explanation of 
God’s grace. Zen monks practice mindfulness. Football teams pray before games. 
Wounded soldiers clutch rosaries. Bus drivers make the sign of the cross when passing 
churches. Religious activists march for civil rights and they bomb abortion clinics. 
Religion fuels terrorism and pacifism, capitalism and fascism. It can fight totalitarianism 
and murder heretics. It generates both love and hate—hateful love and loving hate.  
So, how does the metaphysics-democracy-anti-war-war-machine that we have 
been analyzing engage and transform the religious function? The following oft-cited 
passage for James provides a clue for how the religious function might be intelligently 
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addressed: 
Every sort of energy and endurance, of courage and capacity for handling life’s 
evils, is set free in those who have religious faith. For this reason the strenuous 
type of character will on the battle-field of history always outwear the easy-going 
type, and religion will drive irreligion to the wall. (WWJ, 628) 
 
Paralleling his approach to war, James approaches religion from the angle of its 
experienced power and identifies the religious-function through its effects on this power. 
The war metaphor should not be overlooked. The problem is the same one he raises in the 
“Moral Equivalent of War”: how can the religious-function release human energies and in 
what directions ought it flow?  
James was fascinated by the power of religious faith to call forth the extremes of 
the human animal, noting that “even if there were no metaphysical or traditional grounds 
for believing in a God, men would postulate one simply as a pretext for living hard, and 
getting out of the game of existence its keenest possibilities of zest.” (WWJ, 628) And, 
just as he diagnoses the effectiveness of war as a cultural educator, James here notes 
another peculiarity of human psychology—that the thought that our own desires are 
backed up by the demands of an infinite and all-powerful being is a powerful motivating 
agent.  
Here we approach a deep tension in James’s thought. On the one hand, James is 
attuned to the value of the strenuous mood. If the modes of education reinforced by the 
metaphysics of experience cannot do what the religious mood does, if they cannot call 
forth what is best in the human animal: its herculean passions, willingness to adventure, 
and zest for life, then these educations ought to be “driven to the wall.” Just as the power 
of war as a stimulant to life presents a problem for the opponent of present forms of war, 
the concentration of the power of faith in a single absolute presents a problem to a 
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pluralistic and problem-oriented faith. The problem that James faces is the same one that 
we lovers of democracy continue to face today: the production of a mode of imagination 
that could tap the strenuous mood in the service of democratic modes of life. 9 The 
religious dimension of the question of education looks like this: is it possible to build a 
democratic form of the religious function; one that puts the wonder, awe, vagueness, and 
uncertainty that is invoked by it to work in the service of uplifting and emboldening the 
energies of men?10 History gives us few examples, so we must ask: is it possible to 
joyously and strenuously face a tragic universe of multiple conflicting goods and alien 
ways of life without the sense that the infinite is on our side? 
On the other hand, pluralism’s perspectivalism resists just this strenuous mood 
and its religious function. It asks: who are “we” that want such a democratic religion? It 
calls into question the demand for democracy itself and the acts that are perpetrated on 
behalf of this demand. It casts a wary eye towards the highest ideals, towards the noblest 
of endeavors. The temperament, the ethos, of democratic pluralism demands not only the 
recognition of alternative temperaments, but their preservation. It locates the intersection 
of differences as the site of imaginative experimental encounters, the very hallmark of the 
thriving interaction that serves as the meaning of democratic culture. But if this 
temperament and perspective came to dominate and restrict the experimental possibilities 
within experience, the very possibility of the perspectival educative experience that is 
                                                
9 In A Common Faith, Dewey writes eloquently of the need to construct a working faith in democracy and 
interestingly connects this faith with both education and the war-function: “Ours is the responsibility of 
conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values we have received that those who 
come after us may receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared 
than we have received it. Here are all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, 
class, or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it 
explicit and militant,” (LW 9:57-58) 
10 William Gavin’s William James and the Reinstatement of the Vague makes just this sort of argument. His 
penetrating analysis of the Jamesian conception of experience and its ethical and political implications 
colors much of my analysis throughout this dissertation. 
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located at the heart of democratic culture would be foreclosed. Can the war for the 
production of a faith in democracy call forth the strenuous mood on behalf of the 
democratic temperament? Or would this cultural strenuous mood be fascism 
masquerading as democracy, an ethos looking to dominate the plane of experience in the 
name of democracy? 
James’ way of tackling this problem illuminates the relation between his critical 
social philosophy and his metaphysical vision. James’ approach to religion parallels the 
problem of reconstructing the disciplinary function of war. Just as James wants to 
acknowledge and address our love of war in an attempt to bring about peace, he must also 
acknowledge and address our love of ethical absolutes in the attempt to bring about a 
pluralistic culture. As in his approach to re-evaluating the educative function of war, the 
strategy and the ethos, the practice and the vision, are combined. His approach to the 
question of religious pluralism does not work by placing them in opposition, but by 
encountering the religious-function in a certain way, to a certain extent. James is in search 
of a way to say yes to the motivating and life-affirming aspects of religion—any other 
approach would violate the commitment to the alien demand that is at the heart of his 
democratic pluralism—without sacrificing the commitment to pluralism that is at odds 
with the common claims that religion makes to single and absolute authority. 
The challenge he faces, then, is the creation of a democratic faith, one capable of 
appropriating the motivating power of religion in service of democratic ends. James will 
build his pluralism out of the psychological insight that what we love in our absolutisms 
are not the ends they commit us to, but the commitment itself, the sense of meaning, risk, 
sacrifice, and purpose with which it fill our lives. His gamble is that the ends to which an 
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anti-pluralist absolutist faith functions are less important to the believer than the 
experiences that it generates along the way. After all, it is the means—the strenuous 
mood, the motivating faith—that is experienced directly. And it is this experienced means 
that is the life-blood of any ethos. The ends, whether they be heaven, righteousness, 
judgment, domination, spiritual wealth, certainty, brotherly love, communion with the 
infinite truth, even political justice are really the means to the more essential means: the 
provocation of the strenuous mood, the meaningful life. The production of a pluralistic, 
democratic metaphysics is worth little if it cannot call forth from the game of existence 
“its keenest possibilities of zest.” 
Perhaps it is for these reasons that James builds a sort of religiosity into his 
conception of experimental freedom. Towards the end of “The Will to Believe,” James 
ruminates on the essential role that faith plays in intellectual inquiry. In all matters in 
which the truth is as yet not known faith is not opposed to reason, but is necessary to it. 11 
To wait for intellectual insight into the truth of things is, in fact, to act on the faith that the 
world hangs together intellectually and rationally. James writes, 
Indeed, we may wait if we will, --I hope you do not think I am denying that,--but 
if we do so, we do at our peril as much as if we believed. In either case, we act, 
taking our life into our hands. No one of us ought to issue vetoes to the other, nor 
should we bandy about words of abuse. We ought, on the contrary, delicately and 
profoundly to respect each others mental freedom: then only shall we bring about 
the intellectual republic; then only shall we have that spirit of tolerance without 
which all our outer tolerance is soulless, and which is empiricism’s glory; then 
only shall we live and let live, in speculative as well as practical things. (WWJ, 
734) 
 
Because experimental faith is an ineliminable aspect of an eventuating experience, to 
veto a belief for the sole reason that it is held on faith is unjustifiable. This does not mean 
                                                
11 As we will see, the picture of the world that we have been painting is one in which few, if any, truths are 
known absolutely; in a pluralistic and perspectival universe, faith has a role to play in practically every 
experience. 
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that every view must be tolerated; it only requires that faith itself be tolerated as 
intellectually honest. The metaphysics of experience, with its partialities, flows, and 
unfinished business does not take faith as opposed to an experimental intelligence. It sees 
genuine faith as essential to experimental reason. James’ vision does not pit religion and 
science against each other; it shows how they are actually similar in form, if different in 
content. In fact, the challenge that the opposition between science and religion presents is 
not how to eliminate one at the expense of the other, but how the relation between the 
two different forms of experience might be brought together and made mutually 
beneficial.   
The value of the metaphysics of experience thus cannot be understood outside of 
the context of the role that faith and belief play in the production of democratic 
intelligence. As I have indicated various times, the metaphysics of experience is not 
meant to set the framework of Being against which all becoming might be judged. It is 
not meant to answer for all times and for all people the question: “What is Being?” His 
metaphysics is not an answer to a question at all. It is an spur to experimental faith—one 
might almost use the word “investment” if it could be freed from narrow associations 
with the stock market—a lump sum of imaginative capital meant to fund the ongoing 
production and reconstruction of a democratic way of life, the outlines of which are 
always not yet known. 
James defines faith as “the greeting of our whole nature to a kind of world 
conceived as well adapted to that nature,” (WWJ, 735). Unhappy with the worlds 
available to his pluralistic, empirical, and democratic temperament, James puts that 
temperament to work in the service of a “world conceived” in imagination that affirms 
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the life that conceives it. His metaphysics is not legislative, it is ethical in the classic 
sense: it frames, supports, and harmonizes with a way of life. Instead of an architectonic 
founding and grounding of the house of being; his metaphysics, like Nietzsche’s, is the 
guiding vision of an ethos. Its function is not to provide a basis for truth claims. The 
metaphysics of pure experience is more akin to a Deleuzian desiring machine; it eats up 
anti-democratic views, digests what is nutritive, and shits out a soil that may—or may 
not; shit is still shit after all—be spread for the fertilization of democratic possibilities.12 
In the end, then, it is the problem of democratic education, the problem of how to 
create a democratic ethos of meaningful activity—the unlocking of human powers in the 
service of life—that is the criterion for evaluating the value of metaphysical ideas. The 
truth of a view of reality is found in its “continuing and corroborating” democratic 
experience. Does it work along with, cohere with, and inspire faith in the cultural 
production of active and strenuous lives? The truth value of the metaphysical idea found 
in its ability to educate—when the metaphysics is put to work in the world does continue 
and corroborate the production of active, growing, committed, meaningful, multiple, and 
strenuous lives? It is the commitment to this educational project in the widest sense of the 
word that gives the pragmatic standard for evaluation of theoretical metaphysics. 
In this chapter, I have drawn out some of the implications of the metaphysics of 
                                                
12 As a side note, the approach that academic philosophy often takes in its analysis of its monumental 
figures is similar to performing an autopsy. We love these old dead ideas, taking them apart, bending the 
old joints that have been stiffened by rigor mortis. Make the dead skeletons dance for a bit, and then put 
them back in their coffins. The present analysis of the work of William James is perhaps no different: the 
loving encounter with a dead man, a kind of intellectual necrophilia. Nature, though, knows a different 
economy of death. Its indifference allows for an ongoing refertilization: on the pre-organic, molecular scale 
we die a million deaths a second, and are born again just as frequently; on the scale of atoms and electrons, 
we live forever, endlessly recycled. William James, for example, was reborn as John Prine among others, a 
couple of generations later, singing: “Please don’t bury me down in that cold cold ground. I’d rather have 
them chop me up and pass me all around. Throw my brain in a hurricane and the blind can have my eyes. 
The deaf can take the both of my ears if they don’t mind the size.”  
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experience for problematizing war and religion in terms of their pedagogical functions. I 
have indicated the ways in which taking an experimental view of these functions draws 
our attention to the tensions available within these functions and the problems that these 
tensions pose for the formation of democratic forms of life. I have also indicated that the 
metaphysics of experience makes us more attuned to the differential effects of the war 
and religions functions, to the actual experiences they produce, and to the different ways 
in which their effects may impact different segments of experience. 
In the next chapter, I return to the question that framed reflective turn to the 
metaphysics of experience, the difference between a badly instrumentalized education, 
one that works in the service of names and slogans, and an experiential education, one 
that takes as its end the experimental production of experiences of growth. In this final 
chapter, I offer some ways of rethinking what a school is and how it works on the basis of 
the experiential notion of education. I also offer some thoughts on the problems and 
possibilities that this way of thinking offers to people directly and actively involved in 
processes of education. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
SCHOOLS AND THE CREATION OF DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 
 
…there is a more or less implicit, tacit, or presupposed image of thought which 
determines our goals when we try to think. For example, we presuppose that thought 
possesses a good nature, and the thinker a good will (naturally to ‘want’ the true); we 
take as a model a process of recognition – in other words, a common sense or 
employment of all the faculties on the same object; we designate error, nothing but error, 
as the enemy to be fought; and we suppose that the true concerns solutions – in other 
words, propositions capable of serving as answers. This is the classic image of thought, 
and as long as the critique has not been carried to the heart of that image it is difficult to 
conceive of thought as encompassing those problems which point beyond the 
propositional mode; or as involving encounters which escape all recognition; or as 
confronting its true enemies, which are quite different from thought; or as attaining that 
which tears thought from its natural torpor and notorious bad will, and forces us to 
think.” (Deleuze 1994/1968, p. xvi) 
 
Deleuze, in these words and in his general vision for philosophy, was concerned 
with articulating, both in style and content, a model of thought more akin to the 
movement of living experience. His thought, his criticism, his philosophy took its energy 
and direction from the intuition that the classic image of thought, in its will to truth, and 
its self-understanding as a process of recognition had caused us to lose sight of the 
experience of thinking.  
Thinking is familiar with error. Thinking points beyond propositions toward the 
vague and unspeakable aspects of experience. Thinking makes encounters beyond 
recognition. If the classic image of thought associates thinking with knowing, with 
recognizing, with understanding—with the features of a subject under control—then 
thinking as an activity must be torn from the complacency of this control, “its natural 
torpor and bad will.” Deleuze’s philosophy is an attempt to force us to think. We 
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experience in his dizzying and unsettling texts, as in those of Nietzsche, the force of his 
thinking. Deleuze works to reveal a model of thinking that is tangible, sensible, and 
productive, one that works to push beyond the limits of truth and knowledge. Indeed, 
Deleuze’s great insight is that the way in which thinking has been understood is an 
impediment to thinking. In this way, Deleuze’s texts recall the philosophical practice of 
Socrates, who loved thinking more than understanding and who pursued wisdom and 
truth for the love it generated in him. 
In many ways the task of this dissertation has tracked a similar path. I have been 
looking for a model of education that points beyond communicating the things we 
already know, beyond the institutions that are recognized as educational, beyond the 
opposition between student and teacher, in short a conception of education that operates 
beyond the dominant image of education. My strategy for developing this conception of 
education has been to focus on the nature of experience. Just as thinking, if it is to be 
creative, must make an encounter with the beyond, with the not yet cognized, much less 
recognized, so must education, if it is to lead to the growth and the renewal of life, make 
an encounter with the elements of experience that have not yet been tamed and brought 
under the control of social or individual life. 
In the first chapter of the dissertation, I suggested that many of the problems that 
education faces today are linked to and produced by particular habits of conceiving the 
relationship between education and the ends towards which it works. I suggested that the 
solutions that are commonly proposed to educational problems often in fact contribute to 
the very problems that they are intended to solve. By misidentifying the task of 
education, traditional educational “solutions” often work only to feed and metastasize a 
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collection of educational institutions and practices that work in actuality to create mis-
educative experiences by foreclosing and disrupting possibilities for experiences that may 
lead to growth.  
  The primary problem that I identified with respect to the relation between 
education and its ends is that the relationship between the educational practices and the 
ends they serve are commonly conceived as instrumental and external. We see this 
externality in three ways: 1) the separation between the results that we demand from 
education and the qualities of the immediate experiences that take place in educational 
institutions, 2) the isolation and separation of educational institutions from the wider 
social and political communities in which they operate, and 3) in the conception of 
education as a subservient system, the quality of which is only conceived in terms of 
experiences that lie outside of the immediate educational experience. Each of these three 
aspects of externality separates the subject of education from possibilities for renewal.  
In the second chapter, I suggested that the habits of thinking that fund the 
externality of the relation between education and democracy are connected with and 
reinforced by a long-standing metaphysics that take the very separations that inhibit the 
development of educational practice to be necessary features of reality. Through readings 
of the metaphysical work of James and Nietzsche, I developed an account of experience 
that takes these separations and externalities not as metaphysical features of the real, but 
as problems within experience to be treated, resolved and reconstructed. I argue that by 
emphasizing the elements of experience that have not yet been placed under the control 
of intellectual or institutional life, both James and Nietzsche’s metaphysical accounts 
offer resources for conceiving ways of educating that do not simply repeat experiences 
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that have been tamed, known, or otherwise controlled. They move us towards the creation 
of an educational practice that is experimental in a profound sense. The experiments of 
education do not simply teach knowledges and values that are already familiar. On the 
contrary, they open the way to experimental encounters beyond knowledges and values, 
encounters that work towards the renewal of a life that finds meaning in moving beyond 
meaning.  
In the third chapter, I showed how the account of experience that I developed in 
chapter two might allow us to rethink war and religion in terms of the project of 
democratic education. By taking war and religion as multiple, active, and 
transformational events of power immanent to experience, we are better able to 
understand the role that war and religion may play in the production of democratic 
experience. The metaphysics of experience allows us to see war and religion in terms of 
their differential educative effects and possibilities, rather than in terms of dichotomous 
oppositions like peace and violence or faith and reason. Seeing war and religion in these 
ways allows us to rethink these phenomena in terms of both the possibilities and 
problems they create for democratic culture. 
In this final chapter, I take up the question of how rethinking the nature of 
experience allows makes it possible to connect more intimately and less externally the 
practices and institutions of education with the political ends towards which these 
practices strive. I do this in two ways, at two levels. First, I take the institutional level of 
education: the question of how the relation between schools and the wider society ought 
to work. I look at the Knowledge Is Power Program (KIPP) schools as a model for the 
sort of institution that unifies the democratic and educational functions within the 
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experiences generated by and through the institution. Second, I take up the interpersonal 
level of education: the question of how the relation between teachers and students ought 
to work. Here I draw on my own experience as a high school physics teacher and as a 
graduate student instructor in philosophy, looking at both how my conception of the 
nature of experience has arisen from my experiences as a teacher as well as how it has 
allowed me to conceive both the ends and means of my educational practice more clearly. 
 
Schools and Society 
The difference between conceiving the educational crisis as a metaphysical crisis 
instead of, say, a funding crisis, a crisis in standards, or a crisis in skills, is that to see the 
question as one of metaphysics turns our attention to the sense in which problems in 
education are as profoundly rooted in experience as the problem of meaning itself. To 
look at education from a metaphysical perspective is to take education as more than a 
means to the accomplishment of human ends. It is to take education a process that works 
to define, create, and revalue these ends. To educate is to transform the meanings of 
experience, to uproot and tangle with the problems and possibilities of human striving. If 
schooling is imagined only as a system run by bureaucrats, educational officials, textbook 
companies, and teachers unions for the ends of social or economic reproduction, then the 
schools are denied their metaphysical capacity and responsibility as educational 
institutions to produce, transform, and renew the meanings of experience. The school, as 
steward of the production of the education, not only has the right to creatively define 
experience, it has the responsibility to do so. To ignore this responsibility or to partition it 
out to institutions that do not take the task of education as their central function is to strip 
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the experiences that happen in the school of their power and responsibility to do 
metaphysical work of creating meaningful experience.  
 In Democracy and Education, Dewey offers a way of thinking about schooling 
that focuses attention on the way in which schools not only educate, but also construct the 
concepts of education. At the end of the first chapter, in a short section called “The Place 
of Formal Schooling,” Dewey identifies the most basic problem of formal schooling not 
in the homogenization of formal education, not in the lack of resources for schooling, not 
in teacher pay, not in the tensions between public education and private education, but in  
the method of keeping a proper balance between the formal and the informal, the 
incidental and the intentional, modes of education… To avoid a split between 
what men consciously know because they are aware of having learned it by a 
specific job of learning, and what they unconsciously know because they have 
absorbed it in the formation of their characters by intercourse with others, 
becomes an increasingly delicate task with every development of special 
schooling. (MW 9:12) 
 
Here Dewey identifies a key and often ignored element of schools. Schools do not only 
educate the people who pass through their doors; they also educate the wider public into 
the very meaning of education itself. In other words, by establishing the distinction 
between formal and informal learning, between modes of experience that consciously and 
deliberately educate and modes of experience that educate without intent or intention, the 
formal school not only operates according to dominant conceptions of education, it also 
produces through the distinction between formal and informal education the very 
meaning of conscious learning.  
To understand the school in this way is to connect it immanently to processes of 
democratic production as an agent of democratic mediation instead of to understanding 
the function of schooling in terms of an external means/ends dichotomy. In other words, 
  117 
the educative function of schools is not only to transmit pre-established meanings, values, 
knowledges and practices of democratic culture, but also, through its very presence, to 
produce the very meaning of education itself.  
Schools, then are not only institutions, they are also concepts. They work to 
delineate, define, and disseminate the meaning of education through the mediation of 
experience. By determining the difference between an educational setting and ordinary 
“non-educative” experience, the schools mediate the difference between experiences that 
lead to growth and development and experiences that do not open pathways of learning. 
The schools not only educate the students who attend them, they also serve a symbolic 
function as “embryonic societies” that represent and communicate the possibility (and 
impossibility) of social growth. 
Dewey’s notion of the school is uniquely suited to analyze the school as a site of 
the production and dissemination of the meaning of experience. By conceiving schools as 
sites of the production of meaning instead of as a system that works in the service of 
external ends such as diplomas, economic competitiveness, and knowledge, Dewey quite 
radically transforms the problem space of education. This way of conceptualizing the 
schools makes them into sites of the experimental reorganization of experience, rather 
than as systems that work in service of the dominant regimes of power. Rethinking the 
schools in this way does not “solve” the problem of these powers, but it does expose 
them. Instead of asking: Why the schools are failing to make America competitive in the 
global market? Or, how might the schools be better administrated in order to produce 
global competitiveness? Dewey’s conception points us towards the relations between the 
concrete experiences within the schools and the concrete experiences in the wider social 
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body. We might ask, for example: How do the complexes of power that organize 
schooling institutions make possible or impossible the creation of new experiences within 
the schools? Or, how does the boundary between school and society functions to impede 
this creation on the one hand, and to quiet its happening on the other?  
To be sure, the outlines of a responses to these question are almost impossible to 
make out for the very reason that Dewey identified almost a century ago: “…the school 
has been so set apart, so isolated from the ordinary conditions and motives of life, that the 
place where children are sent for discipline is the one place in the world where it is most 
difficult to get experience—the mother of all disciplines worth the name,” (MW 1:12). To 
put the meaning of schools in terms of global social and political processes that have, 
practically speaking, no known relation to the immediate activities, habits, knowledges, 
and practices that make up the experience (or lack thereof) of the daily life of schools is 
to practically eliminate the possibility of extracting useful trains of experience from the 
modes of life that schools generate.  The externality and artificiality of many schooling 
procedures are a mark of the separation of the school from the very ends towards which it 
strives. The question of schools today is a simple one from the point of view of 
experience: how do the experiences created by and within school communities relate to 
experiences in the wider social body? If the externality and separation between these two 
modes of experience is too great, then the forms of life generated by the school are 
doomed to struggle in the soil of the wider social body. On the other hand, if the schools 
are to serve their critical social function it is clear that the experience that the schools 
produce must differ qualitatively from experience in the wider social body. The function 
of schooling is not merely to recognize and repeat the values held in society at large but 
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to renew and reconstruct these values in such a way that the growing ecology of this body 
is maintained and directed towards health and vibrancy.  
 As an example of a school that takes the question of the relation between the 
institution and the wider culture as a central aspect of its own educational practice, let me 
discuss briefly the Knowledge Is Power Program (KIPP) schools. The Oxford American 
Dictionary gives two primary definitions for school. The first is simply that a school is 
“an educational institution.” The second is that a school is a type of society: “a group of 
people sharing a cause, principle, or method.”1 Though these definitions are often 
separated, it is impossible to understand the school as a living phenomenon if these two 
ways of conceiving the school not thought together. The first definition names only an 
entity. The second definition names the activity of this entity. The KIPP program is a 
school in both senses of the word. It is both an educational institution and it is also a 
group of people gathered around a shared cause, principle and method. Its website 
proclaims this shared cause: “Every day, KIPP students across the nation are proving that 
demography does not define destiny,” (http:www.kipp.org, 2009). In carrying out this 
project, KIPP prides itself on measuring itself as other educational institutions do, and in 
many ways the results it measures its success appear at first glance to be external in just 
the fashion that I have been criticizing throughout this dissertation. Its website hosts 
numerous articles and studies that measure KIPP’s performance by traditional standards. 
KIPP graduates, for example, outperform their peers on achievement tests and enter 
college more regularly. KIPP students are taught from the moment that they commit to 
the school the year that they will graduate from college, and they are taught to believe in 
that possibility. They take the standardized testing system seriously and work explicitly to 
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meet the goals laid out by that system. They understand full well the power that this 
system wields in the centers of educational theory and in the halls of state and federal 
government.  
Where KIPP departs from standard ways of conceiving these results is that it 
explicitly acknowledges the power of these tests and of college admissions to determine 
the immediate future of its students and its students’ communities. These tests are not 
promoted to its students as ends in themselves, but—and this is the crucial point with 
respect to the question of the role of experience in schooling—as means to the immediate 
experiment around which the experiences of the school is organized: to prove, by means 
of the very tests that for years have demonstrated the opposite conclusion, that 
demography does not define destiny. The KIPP schools are focused on creating a 
community that has the power to take control of the very experiential valences that have 
worked to deny access to social capital and to turn them towards the opposite outcome. In 
other words, the KIPP schools are less a “system of education” and more a school in the 
traditional meaning of the word: an educational institution centered around a common 
and concrete mission. The purpose around which this school is formed is simply stated: 
to prove that education, the renewal of life by transmission, the openness of experience—
demography not defining destiny—is possible. Its ends are integrated with its means: the 
school is successful if it creates the sort of environment in which its own experience, the 
experience of education, is charged with meaning. 
 Though KIPP is “results oriented,” it recognizes that the results it achieves are 
immanently linked to the commitments it demands. The KIPP schools do use more or less 
typical criteria such as college diplomas, standardized tests scores, and other objective 
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data to determine whether or not their community goals are being realized. Howver, the 
real work of the school takes place in linking these criteria to the production of 
meaningful experience: experience that has a past and a future, an aim and a process, 
commitment and successes. By explicitly theorizing the relation between the criteria set 
up by the dominant powers in education and the immediate experiences that happen in 
the school community, KIPP enacts the educational moment that Dewey describes at the 
opening of Democracy and Education in which the forces that act upon the community or 
individual organism are taken up as possibilities for the renewal of life. By means of the 
critical appropriation of the institutions of education on behalf of the experience of those 
subject to these institutions works, KIPP works to create a dynamic experience, a living 
example of the Jamesian notion that sometimes faith in a fact helps to create that fact. 
Their entry requirement is a pledge of commitment—from all members of the 
community, students, parents, and teachers—that foreshadows the results to follow, 
(http://www.kipp.org/01/commitment_full.cfm, 2009). Here is an example of a school 
that is working to develop a new model of educative experience, one that involves and 
integrates the traditional aspects of schooling but in pursuit of new and more meaningful 
forms of democratic life. 
 When educational theorists do not attend to the immediate ways in which this 
educative experience is formed, this dynamism is split apart. In articles on the KIPP 
school, elements of community and experience creation that are essential to a KIPP 
education are often downplayed and the “results”, taken out of the context of the 
meaningful experience of which they are the natural outcome, are over-emphasized. So, 
for example, the work of community building that KIPP undertakes is reduced to the 
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notion of “an intense educational program,” the intensity of which is defined by the 
number of hours per day that the members of the school community put in (Musher 
2005). The question of KIPP becomes one of the sort of effectiveness of such an 
“intensive program,” and the effectiveness is not theorized in terms of the new 
experiences that is the true mark of this intensity, but in terms of the results of 
standardized tests and in terms of the ability of the student to be re-integrated into 
traditional schools: “The data from this study suggested that the benefits of an intense 
educational experience are cumulative and sustainable while students remain in the 
program. Anecdotal information, supported by objective test results, showed that alumni 
of this program continued to do well academically in public and private high school 
programs following completion of the KIPP middle-school program,” (Musher, 2005).  
The theorist’s report on KIPP can claim that what the KIPP schools really show 
has really nothing to do with the KIPP community goal of proving that demography does 
not define destiny. This mutilation by abstraction allows the theorist to co-opt the 
experiential function of the school. When it comes time to “provide insight into important 
social and political questions,” here is what we get: “This study showed that providing an 
enriched educational experience can lead to remarkable improvement in scores on 
standardized tests, supporting the notion that tests can be used to document the 
educational success of the experience,” (Musher, 2005). The important social and 
political upshot of the KIPP schools: reinforcement of the powerful and pervasive testing 
apparatus! Such analysis twists the KIPP experience from one that is interested in 
reconstructing long and pernicious social powers that have obstructed the development of 
poor, Black, and Hispanic communities into an argument for the effectiveness of 
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standardized testing. Because the educational theorist cannot see the task of the school as 
the creative reconstruction of what counts as an educational experience, the 
transformative characteristics of KIPP are co-opted by the very powers that historically 
worked to create or maintain the very social problems that KIPP attempts to solve. This 
power move is made possible by the theorist’s inability to see the transformative and 
philosophical nature of the experiences of the school. Blinded by the a perspective that is 
blind to the vitality of experience, the results of KIPP are portrayed to the wider public as 
arguments for the success of school testing, rather than in terms of the recreations of 
experience that they attempt. 
The remove of educational theory from educational experience mirrors an equally 
external relation between school and the rest of society. In most instances, the value of a 
school is seen primarily in terms of the success or failure of the students who are the 
“products” of the educational “system.” The results of a good education are articulated in 
terms of the outcomes of individual young people: whether or not they score well on 
certain tests or are admitted to particular colleges. A common story is told. Schools work 
on the bodies and minds of the young in order to facilitate the transition into social life. 
This story describes the school as an institution that channels social life through various 
separate disciplines into forms of knowledge that can be digested by the developing child. 
These disciplines are forms of power that work through mind and body to produce habits 
that the mature and responsible organism will use to continue the process of social 
reproduction on a larger scale. These habits of thinking about education set very precise 
boundaries on conceiving just how, where, and by what strategies education, the renewal 
of life by transmission, takes place.  
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However, to take schools as sites of the experimental creation of meaningful 
experience, is to pay attention precisely to the ways in which schools communicate the 
possibility or impossibility of democratic life. If we take the schools experientially, it 
becomes possible to understand how the school, through these forms of discipline, creates 
the very boundary between experiences of immaturity and maturity. It makes the 
difference between knowledge and ignorance. It marks off the intimate experience of 
family life from a more indifferent space of civil society. It creates students and teachers. 
It mediates between what has been and what will be. Schools become sites of the 
production of cultural values, rather than tools for the implementation of a culture that 
has already been determined. 
Schools also, through these experiences, set up the difference between an 
educational experience and an experience has, apparently, nothing at all to do with 
education. Schools have doors that open and close, sharp divisions between the different 
subjects that it mediates, a structured and defined curricula, and a clearly demarcated 
beginning and end. The school thus signals itself as an enclosed space of education with 
well-defined means and ends.13 Schools, therefore, not only mediate experience but also, 
by marking the difference between formal and explicit modes of education and informal 
modes of education, produce the way in which experience is taken as educational or mis-
educational by the wider culture.   
Indeed, the most remarkable quality of a school is that it is a community that is 
explicitly concentrated around the task of the growth and dissemination of meaningful 
experience. It is, to use Dewey’s language “an embryonic society,” (MW 1:12). Schools 
                                                
13 It is worth noting that by explicitly and actively drawing parents into the educational process, KIPP 
schools also work to vex this boundary. 
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are not opposed to the wider social body and they do not serve merely as a means to its 
perpetuation; they are specific kinds of societies. Namely, they are experimental ones, 
small communities organized around the task of the production of a better future. The 
schools are—or ought to be—places where conditions are established for the testing, 
modeling, and evaluation of democratic ideals. Their educative function, then, is not 
restricted to the participants in these experiments but extends also to the wider social 
project of developing a democratic culture. They are the institutional equivalent of a 
Kantian regulative ideal. 
  To speak in this way about the educative function of the school is to highlight in a 
precise way the real “problem” that schooling presents. This problem is not separable 
from the more general problem of democracy. The question of schooling is how, 
precisely, to create a democratic community. Schools ought to be judged according to this 
standard, and the value of any “educational result”, standardized or otherwise, ought to be 
expressed in terms of how well the school is working to solve and to renew the problem 
of how to create of a democratic community out of specific and local situations. 
 It is customary today to note the ways in which the schools are failing. But the 
failures of the schools are symptoms, not causes, of larger social failings. The primary 
and most pervasive of these failures is the lack of imagination with respect to social ends. 
The schools ought to be a site where this imagination is renewed, maintained, and 
provoked. However, if the best ends we can imagine for our educational practices are the 
vague and self-serving goal of “global economic competitiveness” or “literacy” or “better 
math and science scores,” then it ought to be no wonder that our schools are failing to 
produce meaningful democratic experience. If we continue to theorize the benefits of 
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education to students, teachers, parents, and communities in the same dead terms that 
underwrite and sustain the diminishing forms of community life in the 21st century, which 
often seem to draw their main inspiration from the movement of the DOW, then we 
should expect no better outcomes from the schools.  The challenge that schooling 
presents is no different now than it was in Dewey’s time: to present modes of community 
life that are meaningful enough to sustain and organize experiments in new forms of 
living. The function of Dewey’s conceptualization of schooling is to draw attention to 
this fact, to orient us towards the imaginative work that schools do and fail to do.  
 The educational challenge that faces the school, the laboratory in which ideas are 
tested, is the forging of continuity between and among the increasingly global and rapidly 
changing relations that work constantly to reshape the boundaries of individuals and the 
communities in which they live. Creating this continuity means inquiring into the forms 
of power that produce us—into the activities and re-activities that produce our individual 
and social habits and formations. Experimental inquiry into these forces—the creation of 
a “will to criticize power”—is the agency by which social bodies degenerating at the 
behest of these might be healed in particular ways, at particular sites.  The challenge is 
the formation of institutions and ways of life that will support this agency, an 
experimental and inquiring form of will to power. KIPP is an example of just this sort of 
institution: it works to transform the powers that work through its local communities by 
providing critical experiences to that community. It transforms the reactive relationship 
between community and testing apparatus (how does a school live up to the standards 
imposed by the testing apparatus?) into an active one (how can the standards imposed by 
the testing apparatus be appropriated for the task of the renewal of community life.) 
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 However, as hopeful as the KIPP example may be, the pedagogical continuity 
between activity and re-activity that makes creative life possible is not guaranteed. It is a 
problem that cannot be solved permanently for any of us, and to attempt to solve this 
problem permanently across the whole of the social body leads exactly back into the 
issues of externality of ends that were broached in the first chapter of the dissertation. 
The KIPP schools can be successful because they are unique and counter-cultural sites. 
Their power comes in their resistance to dominant educational models, but if their model 
was made dominant, its power as an agent of the renewal of life would be lost.  
Further, there are moments when the forces that act upon us are too great or too 
various or too subtle to be turned to the renewal of life. In fact, there comes a point in 
each living thing’s life when its ability to renew itself wanes. Growth is not always 
possible. The flux of experience does not always lead to renewal; it is just as likely to 
lead to death, despair, annihilation, and dispersion.  
 A herculean educational ideal arises out of this recognition of the contingency of 
growth that is at the heart of the metaphysics of experience. As a fact, the renewal of life 
by transmission is the formation of life-habits out of the response to the flux of 
experience. In this sense, we are always undergoing the strain of education, as every 
experience either contributes to or undermines habit in the living organism or structure in 
the world. As James writes, “We are spinning our own fates, good or evil, and never to be 
undone. Every smallest stroke of virtue or of vice leaves its never so little scar,” 
(1950/1890, p. 127). Education is an accumulation of scars, of small strokes. It names the 
sense in which transformation—for better or for worse—is always happening. In 
response to this fact emerges the reflective and critical demand that experience be 
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educative in a positive sense—that these experiences form habits of renewal instead of 
habits of decay. As a fact, education names the habit-forming element of experience. As a 
critical ideal, education is the demand that these habits renew themselves through 
engagement with the transforming elements of experience. The ideal of education is the 
habit of experimentally reconstructing our habits in response to new experiences.  
 This habit is one and the same as the will to examine and to remake relations of 
power, to see the world as an experiential plane of educative power. To critically inquire 
into the consolidations and formations of life is inseparable from the positive demand to 
see the world as an immanent web of educative power.14 Nietzsche’s definition of life is 
appropriate here: “an enduring form of processes of the establishment of force, in which 
the different contenders grow unequally,” (WTP, 342). The laboratory of education is an 
attempt to make and to control these forces to produce different forms of growth. It is a 
shifting world of power. To see the world as an immanent plane of unfinished events—
                                                
14  Foucault (1980) is one of the most thoroughgoing theorists of education in this sense. He makes 
plain the sense in which his view power is inseparable from the nature of his criticism: 
 It seems to me that power is ‘always already there’, that one is never ‘outside’ it, that 
there are no ‘margins’ for those who break the system to gambol in. but this does not entail the 
necessity of accepting an inescapable form of domination or an absolute privilege on the side of 
the law. To say that one can never be ‘outside’ power does not mean that one is trapped and 
condemned to defeat no matter what.  
 I would suggest, rather (but these are hypotheses which will need exploring): (i) that 
power is co-extensive with the social body; there are no spaces of primal liberty between the 
meshes of its network; (ii) that relations of power are interwoven with other kinds of relations 
(production, kinship, family, sexuality) for which they play at once a conditioning and a 
conditioned role; (iii) that these relations don’t take the sole form of prohibition and punishment, 
but are of multiple forms; (iv) that their interconnections delineate general conditions of 
domination, and this domination is organized into a more-or-less coherent and unitary strategic 
form; that dispersed, heteromorphous, localized procedures of power are adapted, reinforced and 
transformed by these global strategies, all this being accompanied by numerous phenomena of 
inertia, displacement, and resistance; hence one should not assume a massive and primal condition 
of domination, a binary structure with ‘dominators’ on one side and ‘dominated’ on the other, but 
rather a multiform production of relations of domination which are partially susceptible of 
integration into overall strategies; (v) that there are no relations of power without resistances; the 
latter are all the more real and effective when they are formed right at the point where relations of 
power are exercised; resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere to be real, nor is it 
inexorably frustrated through being the compatriot of power. It exists all the more by being in the 
same place as power; hence, like power, resistance is multiple and can be integrated in global 
strategies. (p. 142) 
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always undergoing, as always producing and being produced, as always engaged and 
being engaged, always charged with a will to power, always involved in differential and 
unequal processes of growth—is to adopt a strenuous critical attitude with respect to 
education. It is to set out the demand to listen to the multiplicity of habits that create us, a 
difficult task with no respite and no clear end. Can we make a home out of this labor, a 
democracy on an open road, the endless flow of the stream of experience? This is the 
philosophical question that democratic education poses, writ plain and clear. To respond 
well to this question is the task to come. 
This brings me back to the question of experience and the role that philosophers 
who are committed to the project of democratic education have in mediating experience. 
We can take our cues from Dewey and also from KIPP. When we theorize about 
democratic education, it is of primary importance to attend to how we mediate these 
processes of experience. Philosophy is a school of thought. Its role is not to “discuss” the 
meaning of democratic education. It does not determine, on its own, a conception of 
democracy that is meant to guide educational practice from on high or from afar. Its point 
is not merely to imagine new ideas. As a school of thought, philosophy experimentally 
generates the meaning of experience out of its own practice. Its social function is 
educative and mediating: to create, out of past experiences new communities, new forms 
of life, new ways of thinking, new modes of experience. The metaphysics of experience I 
have been articulating is a concept that encourages the development of this function. 
 
Teaching and Learning 
We have just seen how the metaphysics of experience reconfigures the relation 
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between schools and the wider culture. It draws attention to the interactions and 
experiments that the schools run. It evaluates schools as sites of the experimental 
production of democratic experience, in terms of the actual experiences they produce, 
instead of (primarily) in terms of ends that may have very little to do with the problems 
that the actual school community experiences. In what follows, I will examine how 
taking an experiential approach might orient thinking about proper pedagogy at the 
classroom level, for classroom teachers. 
In Thus Spake Zarathustra, there is a short section called “On the Land of 
Education.” It begins, “I flew too far into the future: dread overcame me,” (p. 231). This 
dread of the future sends Zarathustra looking for a home, and on his way he stops briefly 
among the “men of today” in the “land of education,” (p. 231). Zarathustra says, “I can 
endure you neither naked nor clothed, you men of today. All that is uncanny in the future, 
all that has ever made fugitive birds shudder is surely more comfortable and cozy than 
your ‘reality.’ For thus you speak: ‘Real we are entirely, without belief or superstition,” 
(p. 232). Education, on this account, inspired by a fear of the future runs the risk of 
manufacturing realities without belief or superstition. The schools are machines set up by 
the men of today as an attempt to tranquilize the future, an attempt to control the future 
for the sake of the present. Their strategy for doing this is to hide the way in which 
knowledge is belief, to hide the ways in which reality function as superstition. They 
work, in other words, to mask the elements of faith, transition, and perspective in 
experience. 
In this manner, Nietzsche situates the problem of education between two 
extremes. First, Nietzsche notes that since education takes the future as its object, as its 
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product, its main task is to control this future for the sake of and in the interests of the 
men of today. Education frightened by the uncanny nature of its task, substitutes a reality 
“without belief or superstition” for the dread of the future. The schools of today: “half-
open gates at which gravediggers wait… this is your reality: ‘Everything deserves to 
perish,’” (p. 232). If educators look only to prepare students for the reality of today, they 
are the gravediggers of the future. The difficult space of education is figured as on the 
one hand a future that is never present and on the other hand the nihilistic fetishization of 
a present-without-a future that is the very same phenomena put backwards. 
On the other hand, Zarathustra the fugitive wandering bird, with his love of flight, 
is in danger of falling prey to the same form of resentment. He closes the short section on 
education with these reflections: 
From all mountains I look out for fatherlands and motherlands. But home I found 
nowhere; a fugitive am I in all cities and a departure at all gates. Strange and a 
mockery to me are the men of today to whom my heart recently drew me; and I 
am now driven out of fatherlands and motherlands. Thus I now love only my 
children’s land, yet undiscovered, in the farthest sea: for this I bid my sails search 
and search. In my children I want to make up for being the child of my fathers—
and to all the future, for this today. (p. 233) 
 
Having been driven out of fatherlands and motherlands, having found himself cast adrift 
in a world of will to power, a world of pure experience, a world of makings and 
unmakings, Zarathustra sets sail for “my children’s land, yet undiscovered, in the farthest 
sea.” Here, perhaps, is a vision of childhood that is opposed to an education that would 
only repeat the conditions and problems of today. But this vision is itself a reactive one, a 
dream formed out of resentment against the betrayal of the future by the men of today: “I 
want to make up for being the child of my fathers—and to all the future, for this today.” 
Even for Zarathustra, ressentiment inspires the vision of the land of the future. 
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 On the one hand, then, Nietzsche gives us education as a machinery of the present 
working on the body and the mind of the child to maintain and perpetuate the present at 
the expense of the future. On the other hand, we have a concept of childhood that is 
merely reactive, an empty concept, forged out of contempt for the machinery of education 
and its lack of respect for and dread of a future that it cannot imagine and will do its best 
to prevent. Neither of these moments is enough to create a positive conception of a 
liberatory education. We have here only a negative space: a dead education of today and 
an empty and reactive childhood of tomorrow.  
 Throughout this dissertation, in various ways and in various contexts, I have been 
suggesting that the concept of experience—or rather, the actuality of experience—as 
articulated by James’ metaphysics of pure experience on the one hand and Nietzsche’s 
will to power on the other provides a way of conceptualizing education that falls into 
neither extreme. I have suggested that an attunement to events, relations, bodies, ethoi, 
perspectives, and efforts might provide a way through the problem space that Nietzsche 
here identifies. The way to an intelligent educational practice means creating institutions, 
practices, habits, and forms of life that escape both the repetition of today and a naïve 
escapism into a romanticized tomorrow. 
 In what follows I provide some invitations to consider more positively what such 
an educational practice may look like from the standpoint of teaching and learning, how 
such a practice might challenge institutional structures of the school, rearrange relations 
of power in the classroom, and open the way to encounters that lead to neither to the 
repetition of today’s forms of life nor to the resentment of those forms of life. I pose the 
labor of classroom teaching as an affirmative relation, a sort of gay science, one that is 
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not practiced on the basis of a today or a tomorrow, but instead reaches out of a 
generalized today or a romanticized tomorrow into the hard but necessary work of living: 
encountering and creatively working through the tissue of lived experience, weaving and 
unweaving difficulties, constructing the singular lives of people, the singular places of 
community, the singular intersections of meaning. 
In the first chapter, I argued that part of the problem of education was that it does 
not take the future seriously enough as a future. The relation between educational means 
and political ends had been drawn too tight in part because the ends are known all too 
well, in advance, and not allowed to emerge out of the means. The political ends come to 
dominate education, making it into a mere means. Such domination has an effect on both 
the educative function as well as the political ideals. The primary effect is to diminish the 
wildness of experience, to tranquilize it, to subsume it, and often to make this wildness 
erupt into violence. When the transient, vague, and unsettled aspects of experience are 
ignored by intelligence or put into service of the constant, the clear, and the determined, 
these elements of experience are not intelligently connected to the task of education—
growth, the renewal of life. The wildness of experience is then stripped of its ability to 
play a meaningful role in the educational process. When it appears, it appears only as 
chaos, uncertainty, fear, or disobedience, never intelligently as an integrated part of the 
practice of education. James famously quotes B.P. Blood in the preface of “The Will to 
Believe” (1956/1897): “Not unfortunately the universe is wild, —game-flavored as a 
hawk’s wing. Nature is miracle all; the same returns not save to bring the different. The 
slow round of the lathe gains but the breadthe of a hair, but the difference is distributed 
back over the whole curve, never an instant true—ever not quite,” (p. ix). If, for 
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“universe,” the word “classroom” were substituted, most of us would laugh. But in this 
laughter is the challenge of the teacher. 
 A full practice of teaching, one that puts the unsettles as well as the settled to 
work on behalf of intelligent life, demands an “art of the wild,” a definition of which is 
given by the poet Gary Snyder (1999/1992): 
The “art of the wild” is to see art in the context of the process of nature—nature 
as process rather than product or commodity—because “wild” is a name for the 
way that phenomena continually actualize themselves. … The work of the art of 
the wild can well be irreverent, inharmonious, ugly, frazzled, unpredictable, 
simple, and clear—or virtually inaccessible. Who will write of the odd barbed, 
hooked, bent, splayed, and crooked penises of nonhuman male creatures? Of 
sexism among spiders? Someone will yet come to write with the eye of an insect, 
write from the undersea world, and in other ways that step out of the human. (p. 
260) 
 
Snyder is, of course, calling for a sort of poetry, a written art of the wild that draws 
attention to the processes of nature. But the case is translatable to the art of teaching. 
What is essential to an art of the wild is that it attend not only to phenomena, to what is 
present before us in the form of products, ideas, commodities, possessions, but also and 
perhaps more essentially to the way in which the “phenomena continually actualize 
themselves.” In other words, an art of the wild brings reflection to the aspects of 
experience that have not yet arrived, the aspects that are on their way, the aspects that are 
of the future of tomorrow, not the future of today.15 
 That the encounters of teaching ought not only be such an art, but already are 
whenever such encounters genuinely occur is merely a logical point. There is no renewal 
of experience, no preparation for the future, no possibility of growth without connecting 
up an encounter beyond the limits of the present with the present and the past out of 
                                                
15 Certainly the notion of wilderness can and should be extended beyond that of nature and animals; Mills 
notes, for example, “the nonwhite body is a moving bubble of wilderness in white political space, a node of 
discontinuity which is necessarily in permanent tension with it,” (1997, p. 53). 
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which it arises. The future must be made real, brought present not reactively out of 
negation of the present, but affirmatively as the possibilities of the present, as the way in 
which the present itself is not yet settled. This is a metaphysical point that is also a 
pedagogical point.  Bergson (1998/1911) puts it this way: 
…if the evolution of life is something other than a series of adaptations to 
accidental circumstances, so also it is not the realization of a plan. A plan is given 
in advance. It is represented, or at least representable, before its realization. The 
complete execution of it may be put off to a more distant future, or even 
indefinitely; but the idea is none the less formulable at the present time, in terms 
actually given. If, on the contrary, evolution is a creation unceasingly renewed, it 
creates, as it goes on, not only the forms of life, but the ideas that will allow the 
intellect to understand it, the terms which serve to express it. That is to say, the 
future overflows its present, and can not be sketched out therein in an idea. (p. 
103). 
 
The future overflows its present. In the term “overflows,” there is the possibility of 
delineating more positively a relation and interaction between the future and the present, 
one that succumbs neither to the petty realities of the men of today, nor to the fugitive 
flight of the Nietzschean bird. A pedagogy responsive to the overflows of experience: that 
not only education, but also the very terms by which an educational experience is 
identified, known, and constrained, is subject to the overflow of the future would be one 
that is attuned to the art of the wild. It would work to create experiences that work out of 
the present, that reach, to echo Nietzsche and Snyder, beyond the human. The question 
then for a teacher committed to the renewal of experience is to take stock of the situation 
of the classroom, to see some critical ways in which it is, or might be, a site where the 
classroom experience overflows itself.  
These overflows are not difficult to find, once one begins to look. What this 
means concretely is that the classroom itself is seen and engaged by the teacher from the 
standpoint of the actual experiences that happen instead of in terms of a future as seen 
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from the present, a place where grades are disseminated, where degrees are conferred, 
knowledges and characters are formed according to prevailing social conceptions. These 
are futures that are all too present, so much so that they bear down upon our students. 
These are the futures they have been taught will happen, must happen, and ought to 
happen. But the lifelessness of these futures is a sign of the deadness of the educational 
experiences that are formed through the intent to secure that future.  
However, if these futures are problematized as not fully present; if they are 
theorized as sites for negotiation, interest, experiment, and activity these futures can be 
brought back into relation with the present. If they are taken as relations of power, as 
interactions of experience, then their existence becomes a site of possible encountering. A 
site not just for the reactive production of a future that is already present, but also, 
perhaps, a chance for activity, for reconstruction, for the forging of new identities, 
meanings, and relations out of that future. 
How does this insight provide a signpost for educational practice at the level of 
the classroom teacher? Here the analysis cannot be abstract and communication cannot be 
direct; I must go down into the wild weeds of experience and attempt a sort of 
pollenization. For this purpose, I will take the luxury here in this last section of my 
dissertation to reflect upon some experiences in education, how those experiences turned 
me to philosophy, and how this turn to philosophy has changed the way in which I view 
the goals and challenges of teaching. Out of these experiences, I will draw a few lines of 
thought that are not irrelevant to the general push and vision of the more general and less 
idiosyncratic push of this dissertation.  
If the account I have been giving all along makes education something that 
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happens in smaller places, in the events, happenings, openings, angles and crannies of 
experience, then perhaps it is appropriate that the ideas of which I have been speaking 
terminate in smaller and more personal problems. I take this manner of finishing not as a 
retreat from reflecting on the large and endemic problems of education that plague and 
stymie the production of democracy. On the contrary, by turning attention to the ways in 
which philosophy has a chance to change, to create, and to disassemble and reassemble 
problems on a micro-political scale, I hope not only to indicate that philosophy can have 
the effect of generating meaningful experience if we look to its experiential effects on a 
smaller and more local scale, but that it has had those effects, the mark of which I carry 
in my own life, which is bound up in small but not invisible ways with other lives, with 
your life.  
In the classroom, the teacher practices a kind of experimental micro-politics. The 
problem of the classroom is how to create a meaningful, ongoing, intersubjective and 
developmental experience. The relationship between this micro-political production of 
meaningful experience and the larger problem of the production of a democratic culture 
is never direct. However, the argument of this dissertation is that we cannot understand 
the large social questions of democracy or of education without taking into account the 
effects of these questions on actual and living experiences, the sites that José Medina 
(2006) calls “eccentric and polyphonic” contexts. To turn, then, to the eccentricity of my 
own experience is not to speak for others or to make a claim that my experience is or 
should be like yours or his or theirs or hers. It is to interrupt the flow of reflection, to 
break a habit, to call attention to something smaller and more ordinary. To speak for a 
moment from elsewhere and to invite you to listen. Such is the challenge of teaching, the 
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work of pedagogy. It is in these small breakings and invitations, rather than in sweeping 
theoretical suggestions or the radical conclusions of political speculation, that the work of 
democratic philosophy, culture, education, and experience begins, ends, and finds itself 
again. 
The question that will guide this final foray is one that takes reflection not as the 
abstract mind of a philosophical subject, but locates it as arising out of particular 
situations and returning, transformed to those situations. The question is simply this: How 
are the ideas and strategies developed here on the general subject of the relation of 
experience to the problem of democratic education related to my prior experiences as 
educator? This question has two related dimensions, one retrospective, and the other 
prospective. I will take these one at a time. 
The retrospective question is takes up the issue of how theory, the reflective 
moment, rises out of past problems and practices. The impetus for the present reflection 
on issues of education can be derived from many sources, and telling the narrative of how 
this impetus came into being, like all acts of memory, is a matter of selective and 
interested engagement with the past. But it cannot be doubted that these thoughts on 
education rise at least in part from my experiences as a high school teacher at a small 
private school in Tennessee. What was most problematic for me at the time in this 
situation was a problem that I believe is common for many teachers. I was confused by 
the task that I was given and the responsibilities that it bespoke. These responsibilities 
worked on me as Nietzsche’s dread of the future. I had fallen into the position of prophet 
without ever considering the message that I was beholden to give. My task: to create a 
future.  
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The classroom was designed in a certain way to communicate this task to me and 
to my students. Their chairs were oriented towards me. I had a curriculum that was 
progressive. We had common goals to achieve, a certain set of knowledges to inculcate, a 
certain set of values to instill. Time was marked everywhere: the repetition of classes, the 
regular bells, the quarters and semesters and school years: freshmen, sophomores, 
juniors, seniors, communicated to all of us that we, together, were involved in the task of 
bringing a very particular sort of future into being. The younger students could see their 
future in the older ones. The newer teachers in their older peers. The older peers in the 
memories they had created, in the students that had passed through before, in the ones to 
come who were surely not so different. The school seemed to me, at least from this 
perspective, to be a vast and breathing machine capable of turning out progress. And so it 
went: 9th graders went on to become 10th graders. Chemistry students passed on to 
become physics students. Classes were passed, certificates received. Experience was 
ordered and meaningful, at least at a certain level. Education was happening. This is what 
the macro-level of the school experience indicated. The whole operation flowed along 
quite smoothly. 
On the other hand, at the level of ordinary encounters and experiences this 
institutional progress was consistently problematized.  Students complained about the 
tedium of classes. They wondered aloud about the point of their educations. Teachers saw 
their own experience as repetitive. Friendships were made and friendships broken. Trust 
betrayed and earned again. Students daydreamed in some classes, focused in others. 
Some individuals were expelled from the school. Schools were formed within the school: 
alliances of teachers, oppositions. The same with students. There were disagreements 
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over the meaning and ends of education, about how the school should operate, over its 
basic values, its most fundamental practices. Young people got sick. One was killed in a 
car wreck. Teachers gave birth, had hidden affairs, and some of them retired. This was the 
school in which we lived, it seemed to me. A wilder place, one where progress was much 
less evident but also where the stakes of education were much more clear, more 
immediate, and more direct.  
My life, then, as educator, was divided between these two levels of experience. At 
one level, experience was loaded with the responsibility of progress, the demand to move 
students through, to expand their potentialities, to allow them to grow in real, 
measureable, and communicable ways. The demand to learn was ever present. At another 
level, this very same school was as fraught with a lack of progress in precisely the same 
ways and to the same extent that life outside of school is or might be. Here, there was a 
life that overflowed the ways in which the progress of the school was framed. Living 
experience militated against, problematized, and stimulated the demand to learn.  
A.S. Neill (1992/1960) writes that children do not come to school in order to 
learn, but in order to live. This would be true, if these tasks could be separated. It is not 
possible to make a clear distinction between the macro-logical level of learning which 
heaves the sense and burden of the responsibility of progress onto each life it touches and 
the micrological wild livings of experience that escape and elude this responsibility. The 
micrological movements of life are the stuff out of which both the demand for progress 
and any measure of success that one might have in living up to that demand is made. This 
tension between living and learning is what the classroom is made out of. There is the 
order of the syllabus, the trajectory of the plan, the knowledge disseminated, tests 
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rendered, standards achieved, levels passed. Here is also the wild beating of hearts, the 
circulation of blood, the jiggling of legs, the wild dreams and thoughts, dust in the 
corners, light in the windows, fractures in the ceiling, skin, desire, the flash of sweat, the 
heat of explanation, the stubborn wall of frustrated confusion. To make a bridge between 
these two levels of experience is the job of the teacher. It is shared by the student, not 
because the institution demands it, though it does, but also because the student comes 
with her own task of building a life, renewing a life, out of all of these stimuli. The task 
of learning is partitioned out across the plane of the classroom. 
The challenge of experiential education at the level of the classroom, then, is not 
so much to engage the experience of the student in way that it can be taken up and 
integrated with the notion of progress that the school institutions demands. To phrase the 
problem of teaching in this way is to put the task of living at the behest of the 
pedagogical task of learning instead of keeping the relationship between the two vital and 
open. More accurately, the difficulty that I faced as a teacher was in drawing connections 
backwards and forwards between the macro-level of experience-as-learning and the 
micro-level of experience-as-living. How can the classroom situation be made into a site 
not just of learning, of progress, of orientation towards a future that everyone knows all-
too-well, but also of living, which is to say a site of repetition, relation, experimentation, 
lines of flight, and trains of effort? This was the way my experience was framed by the 
problem that I faced every day when I walked into the classroom. How could I live and 
educate? How could I make my teaching an act of living? And how could I let my 
students live while also demanding that they learn? These were the questions with which 
I was faced by the classroom experience, the problem that I had to work out. What was 
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the criterion by which genuine progress in the renewal of life can be separated from the 
sort of progress that schools are designed to communicate, as a set of slogans, often in 
advance of any renewing experiences that might or might not take place. 
In response to these problems and question, I developed a few strategies. The first 
is simple, but powerful. Thematize the narrative of progress that frames and structures 
lived experiences within the school as a set of positive, if underdetermined values for the 
students in the classroom. Students should be made aware, from the outset, of the values 
that the school imbeds in the experiences that it creates. So, for example, students ought 
not only to sit at desks or in chairs. They ought not only use science labs and libraries. 
They ought not only to participate on sports teams or in choirs. They should also be made 
aware of how these experiences structure to frame and develop their very ideas about 
what it means to be a student is, and how those ideas arise. I worked to make students 
aware of how these elements of experience close off or make possible encounters within 
the classroom that may work beyond the idea that the classroom is a neutral site where 
education happens, perhaps magically by dint of my authority and the institutions 
standing behind me.  
By thematizing these problems, I was able in some limited ways to bring out the 
ways in which the classroom space was not an empty place in which learning somehow 
magically occurred, but was able to indicate how the learning that took place in these 
areas was linked directly to the experiential conditions of the classroom. Students could 
see, for example, how the spare and simple laboratory instruments of my mechanics lab 
reflected the spareness and simplicity of the Newtonian equations. And how also, the neat 
corners and well-defined experiments blocked off certain forms of encounters with the 
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world. It is one thing know an eraser as it flies across a classroom room as a parabola. It 
is quite another know how to arc a basketball in a game, as the clock winds to zero, 
through the hoop. But the one practice informs the other.  It is in this way that immediate 
experience becomes a part of the lesson and gets its chance to speak and to be heard in its 
own voice. The distinctiveness of this voice cannot be heard unless it is set over and 
against other possible situations. The precise situation of the physics classroom and the 
immediate experiences that it is set up to produce make no sense unless they are related 
to other situations, other possible classrooms, other modes of learning and living. 
Secondly, I found it helpful to think about the classroom as a sort of problem 
space, attending to the ways in which the structures, values, and norms of the classroom 
make certain forms of social engagement possible and certain relations impossible. Why, 
for example, are science classrooms equipped with laboratories while history classrooms 
are not? What lesson does this communicate about the manner of conducting inquiry in 
science? What lesson does it communicate about the manner of conducting inquiry in 
history? Students might be brought into discussions, then, that not only work within the 
framing of the disciplinary experience, but also make this framing itself apparent as an 
experience, that like all experiences has its own perspective, its own ethos, its own 
criterion for effort, for success, for truth and falsity. In other words, it has been helpful for 
me to consider my practice as one of creating disciplinary experiences instead of, for 
example, as one of communicating truths, giving understanding, or raising questions. 
Surely, each of these other ways of framing education are tried and true principles of 
growth, but none of these pedagogical tools can be understood by teachers and students 
unless they are linked back into the question of what is happening at the level of ordinary 
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experience in the educational process. 
Such an attunement to teaching as an art of creating experiences re-orients the 
problematic of pedagogy away from questions of what sort of pedagogical strategies are 
best for achieving what sorts of knowledge or moral goals. It rephrases this problem in 
terms of the more general problem of how these goals and strategies work both on and in 
experience to produce particular forms of life: particular ways of relating to each other. In 
other words, it puts the macro-logical curricular and institutional goals into conversation 
with the micro-logical living and lived experiences, not as powers that stand over and 
against these experiences in a disciplinary way, but as routines and channels around 
which the micro-logical happenings of life take place. It reminds us as teachers that our 
task is not only to learn, when we enter the classroom, but—like our students—our task is 
to live. To live means appropriating, encountering, transforming the forces that act 
directly upon us. The task as teacher is to create situations in which students can live. 
This can never be forgotten. 
When we teach, we are involved in the experimental production of an embryonic 
society. The values structuring such societies are not determined solely by the forms of 
learning they make possible or by forms of life they communicate and educate into the 
lives of the people who work at the school or who attend it. Their value is also immediate 
and living. They have value in themselves as meaningful and living experiences in their 
own right. To delay or defer the value of these experiences to some social end or to 
theorize it solely in terms of the development of some species of adult life that will 
probably never arrive is to ignore the rich possibilities that may be available for living 
better now. 
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 Finally, I have found it important to thematize the way in which the classroom 
experience is made possible by and dependent on in real and unavoidable ways on 
communities and individuals that these classrooms do not immediately reveal. If the 
classroom is to be a space for the renewal of experience, then it seems crucial to ask: 
whose experience can a classroom renew? Which forms of life does it suit? And which 
forms of life does it restrain? The people affected by what happens in classrooms are not 
only the people who sit in them, but the whole population of workers involved in the 
schooling institution and by the other institutions that fund and feed the school 
community. Who is made visible by the notion of classroom teaching? Who is made 
invisible in these communities? How can the classroom be a site where those who live 
and work at the margins of school life can be seen? And would they even like to be seen?  
 These questions point towards the way in which a classroom is imbedded in a rich 
social context. Drawing connections between the work of the classroom and the world 
outside of its walls is a delicate and difficult task, but the value of a lesson learned 
depends in part on the connections of that lesson to the wider social body. So, a teacher 
might ask: how can this classroom be made into a space where these connections are 
more evident, where the encounters that take place not only enact the current relations 
that make up the school body but problematize and engage these relations.  When a leaf-
blower moves underneath the window of a class at Vanderbilt, disrupting a conversation, 
what are the choices that can be made? Are these choices a part of the lesson? Does the 
whirr of the motor enter the class as an annoyance? As a representation of a relation of 
class? As a reminder of Vanderbilt’s commitment to order and cleanliness? As a 
mechanical sound wave? And how do these meanings get attached to the motor? Which 
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are the principles of selection that operate? And how might this spontaneous event, which 
appears as disruptive, be reappropriated by the classroom participants into the discipline 
that the course demands? 
 Sometimes, surely, the answer will be: it can’t, shut the window. We have an 
important conversation to continue. But if this is the answer always, and every time, if 
spontaneous occurrences are always shut out and never brought forward as part of the 
classroom experience, then the relation between the micrological structure of lived 
experience and the macrological drift of the classroom discipline never rises to the level 
of active and intelligent attention. Experience is flattened and condensed. The whirls and 
vaguenesses, the atomic percolations, the elsewheres and borderlands are stripped out. If 
they appear, they do so in harmless forms, as day dreams, as boredom, as a whirl of text 
messages, vibrating cell phones, and ipod earbuds. Learning becomes associated with its 
opposite, with the diminution of life, rather than with its advancement. The classroom 
becomes less wild, less experimental, less experiential.  
At least this is my experience.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Alas, what are you after all, my written and painted thoughts! It was not long ago 
that you were still so colorful, young, and malicious, full of thorns and secret spices—
you made me sneeze and laugh—and now? (Nietzsche 1992/1886, p. 296) 
 
I have been writing for a while and have grown weary of my own voice. A call for 
an education committed to wildness, to renewal, and to pluralism can only be repeated so 
often before it becomes heavy, and tame. It is time to end the dissertation, to move on to a 
defense, a conversation, a new beginning. But before ending, as a way of moving 
forward, let me track where I have been.  
In the first chapter, I drew rough characterizations of two models of education. 
The first I termed instrumental education. It was characterized as the dominant way of 
framing the question of education today. This way of imagining education sees it as a 
means to social and political ends that are determined without regard to the actual 
practices that make up the education of the social body.  For instrumental education, the 
means and the ends of education are not mutually constitutive or interactive. The political 
ends work to structure unilaterally the institutions, practices, people that make up the 
educational experience. In contrast to this way of framing education, I posed the idea of 
experiential education. An intimate and interactive relation between means and ends 
characterized this way of framing education. Instead of seeing education as a system 
working to produce established political ideals like the democratic citizen, the corporate 
worker, or the critical thinker, experiential education frames the question of education in 
terms of the actual experiences that education produces. It understands education as an 
act of living, first and foremost, as the ongoing, lived, immediate, and embodied 
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encounter with the task of the renewal of life. I suggested that conceiving education 
experientially may lead to more intelligent analyses of the relation between the political 
task of producing democratic culture and the educational task of renewing life. 
In the second chapter, in order to articulate more positively this account of 
experiential education, I drew from the metaphysical speculations of William James and 
Friedrich Nietzsche to delineate six categories of experience. I suggested that by 
theorizing education as eventuating, relational, perspectival, physiological, ethical,  and 
herculean, some of the dualisms that animate the instrumental conception of education 
might be dissolved. I suggested that conceiving experience in this way foregrounds the 
project of democratic education as one of seeing the ways in which both traditional 
educational institutions and events, institutions, and practices work immanently to 
experience to create or inhibit the renewal of life in various forms. I argued that the 
meaning of experience that I articulate using James and Nietzsche might be valuable for 
freeing up the concept of education from its association with a system of schools and as a 
means to political ends, reproblematizing the issue of education as an experimental 
project of the renewal of life across the entire social body, rather than as the production of 
a set of knowledges or values. 
In the third chapter, I look at how the metaphysics of experience frames war and 
religion as experiential and educative functions. I argue that the metaphysics of 
experience allows more democratic ways of encountering these functions because it 
attunes us to the way in which these seemingly monolithic functions actually produce a 
variety of different experiences. If we understand the meaning and value of war and 
religion in terms of the actual experiences they produce, we can see possibilities (and 
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impossibilities) within war and religion for the production of democratic culture. Instead 
of taking war or religion at the level of a pre-defined concept, by looking to how these 
functions actually work, in concrete and living experiences, war and religion can be 
considered as functions appropriable for the renewal of experience—and criticized for the 
specific and concrete ways in which they inhibit the renewal of life. In other words, the 
metaphysics of experience allows us to see war and religion as educative functions that 
work within the wider social body. Such an way of taking these phenomena may create  
the possibility for critical interventions into these functions of the behalf of the 
production of democratic experience. 
In the fourth chapter, I employ the metaphysics of experience to explore more 
traditional educational questions. First, I work to show how an attunement to experiential 
education makes it possible to see the schools as autonomous sites of the experimental 
production of democratic societies. I look at the KIPP schools as exemplary in this 
respect, showing how schools that take the question of the immediate creation of 
meaningful experience are more effective educators. I also suggest that looking at the 
schools in terms of the actual and direct experiences that they create, helps empower 
members of those school communities—teachers, students, administrators, and parents—
by seeing them not as victims, but as active and engaged members of a community. 
Secondly, I turn my attention to how the way of thinking that I have been developing 
informs and was informed by my experiences as a classroom teacher. I invite an 
experimental attunement to the modes of experience that are unsettled, wild, and 
interruptive, and I suggest that such an attunement can enhance the classroom teacher’s 
ability to connect the macro-political project of creating students who have learned and 
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who are capable of continuing the project of learning with the micro-political project of 
creating spaces for living well together. 
Many questions and problems remain. I have been concerned in this dissertation 
with developing a sort of specific vision for education, and I have suggested in a variety 
of contexts ways in which this vision may yield more democratic ways of living together. 
But much work is left ahead. My work, like most philosophical work, is long on 
imagination and short on concrete specificities. In order to determine more precisely the 
scope of its applicability, whether not this vision may be illuminating and helpful to 
others or idle speculation is yet to be determined. How the vision I have here articulated 
will survive and what future forms it will take will be determined in precise situations, by 
how it motivates me to take up future projects, and by how it might effect others to do the 
same.  
I see, from where I stand, three different futures for this work. The first involves 
traditional education. I would like to translate these ideas and ways of thinking into 
language that helps people on the ground—teachers, students, policy makers, and 
administrators—make sense of their own work. I would like to work more directly in the 
future with these folks, to have them criticize my ideas and reformulate my thoughts in 
ways that are more practical and relevant to concrete and specific problems of schooling. 
The second future for this work looks like social criticism. Though I have taken up in 
broad strokes the question of the educative functions of war and religion, these analyses 
were prolegomena for concrete work in and on specific situations. Each of these 
phenomena are instantiated in vary particular ways and in very particular situations. 
Looking at these actual instantiations and their consequences for the renewal of life in 
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concrete forms is the actual work of democratic social criticism. The third future for this 
work involves more traditionally philosophical inquiry. More work remains to be done in 
analyzing the connections between metaphysical conceptions of reality and political 
projects. I would like to draw more intimate and transformative relations between the 
traditional task of metaphysical speculation and the political consequences of these 
speculations. This work calls for further reading in metaphysical and political philosophy. 
It demands uncovering the views of reality that motivate particular conceptions of 
political and social life. It also means extracting new ways of understanding the world in 
which we live from emergent forms of political life. 
The unfinished nature of my task is, I hope, no argument against it. Philosophies, 
educations, and democracies, at their bests, are invitations to future encounters. It is in the 
spirit of invitation that I hereby conclude this dissertation. 
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